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CHRISTENDOM

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CHURCH UNION FROM THE TOP DOWN

By HERBERT L. WILLETT

THE divisions of Christendom are its most conspicuous reproach and its chief cause of inefficiency. They present a moral affront to the enterprise inaugurated by Jesus Christ and constitute the outstanding limitation of its progress. They are an essential denial of his spirit of love and fellowship and a misuse of the resources of his followers. No thoughtful Christian would affirm that our Lord approves the present dismembered condition of his body of believers. It is a repudiation of the sentiment uttered in his intercessory prayer and a challenge to the convictions of his most devoted interpreters through the centuries. Rosmini declared that of the five wounds of Christ, the most ghastly was the gash in his side, which symbolized the divided state of his church.

I

Prophets of the faith in all communions and in all periods of Christian history have pleaded for the union of the people of God, from the times of the apostles and the martyrs to our own day. In that list are such names as Grotius, Calixtus, Chillingworth, Baxter, Stillingfleet, Leibnitz, Campbell, Schaff, Roberts, Chown, Gardiner, Smythe, Brent, Söderblom and Ainslie. Similar are the testimony and appeal of Christian leaders today. In every denomination and in every land commanding voices are raised regarding the emergency caused by division and the imperative need of unity. In this company are numbered Stanley Jones, Archbishop Temple, Studdert Kennedy, Wilfred Monod, Adolf Deissman, T. Z. Koo, S. K. Datta, Toyohiko Kagawa, Karl Barth, Ivan Lee Holt, and a host of other leaderlike men and women around the world. Such warnings and adjurations as "Christians, Unite," "The Crisis of the Churches" and "Unite or Perish," are

increasingly the watchwords of the hour. As truly as war is an anachronism and a scandal to civilization the divided state of the church is an affront to Christianity.

The church, although weakened by its divisions, has rendered important services to other generations, but today it is facing problems so serious that it is forced to realize the enormous liability which its divided condition involves. Among these problems are the class hatreds which prevail, the chauvinistic nationalism which stimulates race antagonisms, the inequalities of the present capitalistic system with its passion for profits and its blindness to social injustice, the exploitation of youth by commercialized amusements and the lure of vicious literature and of crime-instigating narcotics, the yet unsolved drink problem, and above all, the spread of the militaristic spirit by war propaganda both overt and insidiously concealed. These are present issues which are beyond the ability of a dismembered church to encounter with success. A divided church has little time or wit to bestow upon the major evils of the social order when it is exhausting its vitality in providing for its own survival. Only a united church can furnish the program and the power to meet the emergencies which confront the world today. It is the consciousness of this fact which causes the restlessness and anxiety alike of Christian leaders and laymen.

They are oppressed with the conviction that the church is declining in power, as a result of the breakdown of the denominational system. The instruments of sectarian maintenance, such as denominational journalism, colleges, missionary agencies and other types of religious activity are in process of constant diminution of efficiency, to the alarm of their supporters and the cynical comment of non-Christians. That the church is sensible of attacks from numerous quarters is one of the causes of its decline in morale; and the central point of these attacks is the denominational system. Its weaknesses are obvious beyond all argument. As Bishop Brent declared, "The world is too strong for a divided church." "Divide and conquer" was the counsel which Milton put into the mouth of Satan in the assembly of the rebel angels. It was Saladin's strategy in the crusades. Division of forces was the weakness of the Allies in the World War, until they learned by tragic failure the wiser technique of unity. Division is the Achilles heel of the Christian enterprise.

Unity has been achieved on many frontiers of activity, national and international. In the areas of scientific research, industry, commerce,

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education, child welfare, women's interests and efforts at moral reform, great progress has been made in cooperation. It is an age of participation in common enterprises. Religious forces are sensitive to this impetus toward unity and are expressing that sentiment in a multitude of forms. It is the recognition of increasing emergency and the spectacle of many stimulating examples of this movement toward unity which press upon the conscience of the modern church the sense of urgency and obligation in furtherance of the design.

II

There is frequent misconception of the pattern of Christian unity, involving a tendency to limit the idea to some all-embracing organization, such as was the dream and in part the realization of the church in the Middle Ages. From that contour of uniformity, Christianity was happily released by the Reformation, even at the expense of the denominational system, which has prevailed since that event. Yet, with all their varieties of doctrine, ritual and structure, the followers of our Lord constitute the most united body in the world, if they once realized their basic oneness. In the majestic essentials of the faith, they are of one heart and soul.

Never has the church been united in the articulate sense in which Christian unity is often envisaged. The apostolic churches possessed no such unvarying form of doctrine or organization as is assumed at times to be the required program of unity. There were divergencies of belief associated with the names of Peter, Paul, John and other writers of early Christian documents. There were variations of organization, suggested by social customs prevailing in Jewish, Greek, Roman or oriental areas, and the titles which were gradually associated with leaders and offices in the churches were derived from the secular callings of the age. Yet the congregations were united in bonds of fellowship which transcended these diversities. Such is the opinion of scholars like Lightfoot, Hatch, Lindsay, Harnack, Schaff, Hort, Foakes-Jackson and Streeter. The three types of church administration, presbyterial, episcopal and congregational, are traced by their respective advocates to the New Testament, and often with contending claims to exclusive prevalence. Yet it appears probable that all three forms were recognized as valid, and should be today. No one denominational group nor method of administration is the sole channel of divine grace. There are diversities of gifts and ministrations, but the same spirit.

In the last number of CHRISTENDOM, Professor Douglass presented a clear and convincing statement of the wastage which prevails in many areas of the church's life as the result of the competitive denominational system. His plea was in behalf of "Church Union from the Ground Up." That is a caption which elicits historical and logical approval. It was in the various localities of the Graeco-Roman world that Christianity found its first varied but concordant expression. While there was a common faith and loyalty among believers, it was in the local communities that the gospel was interpreted in varied forms and made its influence felt. It was the churches of Galatia, of Asia, of individual provinces and cities, which became the custodians and mediators of the good news. And it is not unlikely that in the final issue it will be the community pattern of churches that will prevail.

This does not refer to the community church as it is known today, which is of varying models and degrees of efficiency. But essentially it is the community which determines the spirit and structure of its organizations and agencies, whether social, educational, administrative, cultural or religious. It is inevitable that the congregations of a locality should be bound together by community interests more closely than any one of them is likely to be to congregations in other and separated places merely because they bear an identical denominational name. Such divergent groups are held in a semblance of relationship by church machinery and by officials whose existence depends on the continuance of the system. But the natural relationships of churches, as of other expressions of associated life, are found in the communities which they inspire with their teaching and enrich with their ministries. This is church union from the ground up and is not inconsistent with such variety of opinion, liturgy and administration as may well lie within the wide contours of the Christian society.

III

But while church union is bound to proceed upward from the local and community forms to that wider manifestation which involves cooperation in the great Christian ministries of evangelism, philanthropy, social reconstruction and world redemption, it is also true that there is an increasing measure of unity proceeding from those forms of church administration which have gathered about the names of Christian leaders, historic localities or types of procedure. Examples of the first class are found in denominations with such names as Lutheran, Calvinist and

Wesleyan; of the second in Albigenses, Moravians and Plymouth Brethren; of the third in Lollards, Quakers and Episcopalians. In the eleventh century occurred the separation of the Roman and the Eastern Orthodox churches over the rival claims of the pontiff and the patriarch. In the Middle Ages there were defections from the church of Rome on the ground of protest against its autocracy and corruption and in the effort to gain liberty of conscience and access to the word of God. The Reformation released other groups under various leaders.

Many motives operated to cause these separations. Among them were historical considerations, racial controversies, geographical separations, political disagreements, cultural diversities, doctrinal differences, conflicting interpretations of Scripture, ambitions of religious leaders, and, in not a few instances, failure to distinguish between essentials and non-essentials of Christian teaching. The dismemberment of the body of believers caused by the great upheaval of European thought in the sixteenth century was far-reaching in its consequences. It safeguarded endangered truth, but it entailed a series of divisions upon the church from which it has not yet recovered. It was doubtless better that these divisions should arise than that unity should be purchased at the expense of uniformity and a devitalized, worldly and sterile institution. But the separations which resulted have left their scars on the body of Christ, and have robbed it of much of its power.

We are not to blame for the divisions which we have inherited. But we are at fault if we add to them or fail to employ all practicable means for their removal. It is useless to debate the question as to whether it would have been better to follow the more patient and conciliatory course of reform advocated by Erasmus rather than the daring and forceful methods of Luther and Calvin. What we are we are, a divided household, and the problem faced is that of discovering the way out of the confusion.

When once the sin and disaster of the divided state of Christendom were fully realized, various efforts were made to repair the damage. The methods of persecution employed by the medieval church to suppress sedition were soon seen to be ineffective. They only multiplied desertions. Overtures were made between Orthodox and Roman, between Catholics and Protestants, and between different groups of reformers, in the effort to modify disagreements and restore some measure of unity. The list of such efforts is long and impressive. Honored names are associated with such endeavors. But the centrifugal impulse was

strong, and the results were meager. The denominational system had taken firm hold upon the Christian world, and the exhilaration of independence was the prevalent mood.

It is astonishing with what audacity and assurance the various bodies pursued their separate ways. Each was sure of its reason for existence and its possession of the total truth, for it is the nature of a denomination to exhibit at once the limitations of a sect and the self-consciousness of the universal church. Each of these separated groups was animated by the three major interests of all church reformers—a spirit of criticism of the prevailing belief and practice of contemporary Christendom, an appeal to the apostolic pattern in an effort to restore the outlines of the primitive church, and an attempt to meet the conditions of the time through such modifications of creed, ritual and administration as current circumstances seemed to demand. In other words, protest, restoration and progress.

With the rising tide of emigration to America, the denominational spirit was still further stimulated. The forms of doctrine and organization prevalent in Europe were brought to the new continent and multiplied here. It was an open and inviting field for great religious experiment. All three types of ecclesiastical administration were brought over—episcopal, presbyterial and congregational—and were endlessly elaborated. Few efforts were made to effect unions among the numerous and competing communions. Rather were the energies of these groups directed to the extension of denominational boundaries as the frontiers of colonial regions were pushed out by pioneers. Such co-operative movements as were launched in that period, either in Britain or America, were likely to be limited to areas outside the churches, for the simple reason that there was not sufficient cooperative spirit to warrant the effort within the sects. Such movements as the Sunday schools, the Young Men's Christian Association, and temperance, antislavery and Bible societies were operative outside rather than within the denominations, although, as a matter of fact, most of their supporters were church members.

That there was a degree of restlessness and dissatisfaction in certain sections of church life over the prevailing divisions is shown by the rise of union movements both in Britain and America. These usually took the form of new church bodies, virtually fresh denominations, whose motive was found paradoxically in protest against denominationalism. Little room was found within the religious bodies of the time for the

utterance of such a message, and the result was the formation of a number of groups dedicated to the advocacy of Christian union as a fresh adventure. Examples of this concern for the reunion of Christians are found in the enterprises projected by such men as Greville Ewing, John Erskine and the Haldane brothers in Scotland and Ireland; the so-called O'Kelley Secession among the Methodists in Virginia; the Christian union body led by Abner Jones among the Baptists in Vermont; the organization of the Washington Association by Thomas and Alexander Campbell in western Pennsylvania and West Virginia; and the formation of the Christian Connection by Barton W. Stone in Kentucky.

These were all efforts to realize some larger measure of fellowship among Christians. Most of them ceased to exist as distinct bodies after a time and were absorbed into the existing denominations. The last two named, the one developing into the body now known as the Disciples of Christ, and the other becoming the Christian Church (recently united with the Congregationalists) have continued to the present period maintaining their plea for the unity of the churches and unquestionably generating sentiment favorable to the idea.

IV

Thus far there seems to have been little thought of realizing union otherwise than through the creation of new denominations committed specifically to that purpose. The project of promoting concord by actual efforts in cooperative activities or in local communities appears to have suggested itself only at a later period. It was an era of mutual suspicion and aloofness on the part of most of the Christian bodies, and frequently the spirit of aversion was most evident among groups closely related in origin and cultus. For example, among the fourteen varieties of Presbyterians in western Pennsylvania the efforts made by one minister to promote a united observance of the Lord's Supper, although only members of various Presbyterian churches were to be invited, was regarded as so unorthodox that the offending preacher was cited before the synod of Pittsburgh for heresy. In such an atmosphere the prospects for any degree of unity were meager indeed. A long delay was foreshadowed before Christian union could have any adequate recognition at either the bottom or the top of church life.

The first tentative effort at unity on any competent scale was the organization of the Evangelical Alliance, which took form in England

in 1846 and was copied in the United States in 1867. It was a purely voluntary body of ministers and laymen of the various Protestant communions. It met at two-year intervals and discussed matters of current interest to the churches, such as evangelism, temperance, missions, Sabbath observance and social service. It was not a representative body in any sense. Anyone interested in the programs was free to attend. The fear of centralized authority prevented any approach to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Those in attendance spoke only for themselves, and no resolutions were passed which laid obligations on any denomination, congregation or individual. Yet the gatherings registered a long step toward cooperation, and out of them grew an increasing demand for the organization of accredited representatives of the denominations which were prepared to join in a movement capable of speaking for united Protestantism on urgent contemporary themes. As a result, a convocation of delegates from the various communions met in New York in 1905 and discussed plans for the creation of an authentic body of members selected by the judicatories of the participating Protestant denominations. The body so chosen met in Philadelphia in 1908 and organized as the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America. This body included the delegates chosen by thirty Christian communions, to the number of some four hundred, in accordance with the numerical strength of the respective denominations. It has continued to meet, at first quadrennially and more recently at intervals of two years.

It was clear that the era of distrust and antagonism among the Protestant groups was yielding to one of understanding and cooperation. It needed little argument to make evident the fact that such a united body could speak with a degree of moral authority and could undertake activities impossible to a single denomination. During the period of its existence the Federal Council has performed in behalf of the churches an increasing number of ministries through departments, commissions and committees, dealing with such important interests as evangelism, international friendship, race relations, social service, relations with European churches, research and education, and other matters to the number of more than a score.

The same impulse that led to the organization of the Federal Council has inspired more than fifty states, counties, cities and towns to organize church federations or councils of churches on the general plan of the national body, although completely autonomous in their adminis-

tration. These more local bodies perform in the interest of united Protestantism the same ministries undertaken by the larger council, and others as they may desire. This is one of the many examples of church union from the top down.

When once it was discovered that Christians no longer needed to foster the important interests of the kingdom of God in isolated denominational groups, a variety of cooperative and interdenominational projects were inaugurated dealing with the dominant concerns to which all the churches are committed. The list of such agencies which have come into existence during the past half century is surprising and encouraging. Among them are the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, the young people's Christian societies, beginning with the Society of Christian Endeavor; the Foreign Missions Conference; the Committee on Cooperation with Latin America; the Women's Board of Foreign Missions; the Religious Education Association; the Home Missions Council; the Council of Women for Home Missions; the National Council of Federated Church Women; the International Council of Religious Education; the Council of Church Boards of Education, and others of similar character. Nearly all of these various bodies are related to the Federal Council in cooperative or consultative ways, thus promoting economy of interest and resources in the Christian adventure. There is a growing conviction that they ought to be still more clearly articulated with the Federal Council, and perhaps ultimately absorbed in it. In this manner certain duplications and overlappings could be avoided, since the major interests of these bodies are common.

Perhaps the most impressive illustration of the spirit of unity is the number of organic unions which have been formed between denominations of similar character during recent years. Among them have been the union of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the Cumberland Presbyterian Church in 1906; the Northern Baptists and the Free Baptists in 1911; the General Synod, the General Council and the United Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, in the United Lutheran Church in 1918; the Congregational and United Brethren Church in 1919; the Presbyterian and the Welsh Calvinistic Methodist Church in 1920; the Evangelical Association and the United Evangelical Church in 1922; the Congregational and Christian Churches in 1931; the American Lutheran Church, formed out of three synods in 1932; and the Evangelical and Reformed Church, formed by the union

of the Reformed Church in the U.S.A. and the Evangelical Synod in 1933. These and other unions have taken place within the past thirty years. Others are in contemplation, as between Presbyterians, Methodists and Baptists, separated along geographical lines by the issues of the Civil War.

V

The influence of such unions from the top upon the convictions of widespread sections of the church is very great. Local movements toward unity are deeply affected by the attitude of denominational bodies. This places a heavy responsibility upon denominational leaders, whose reactions to the entire subject of Christian union are watched with interest and anxiety by numbers of church members who are concerned regarding the division among Christians. It is time the churches of all patterns awakened to the weakness, and often the absurdity, of denominational rivalry. A visitor in one American city reported four churches of the same denominational name occupying the four corners at one street intersection. Such conditions are the cause of scandal and weakness, whether in churches of related character or in the general Protestant field. Dr. Mott rightly insists that the movement toward union must go much farther, or else it has already gone too far.

While the churches in the United States have been learning in some degree the need and practicability of greater unity, Christians in other lands have been moved by the same spirit. In Scotland the United Church and the Free Churches united in 1900 under the title of the United Free Church. The cooperating churches in Japan, China, South India and the Philippine Islands have come into fellowship under the name of the Church of Christ in their respective lands. Three major communions of Canada, Presbyterians, Methodists and Congregationalists, united in 1925 to form the United Church of Canada. The Church of Scotland and the United Free Churches joined forces in 1932. The Methodist bodies in Great Britain have also united. And mention must not be omitted of the great interdenominational gatherings, such as the Sunday school and missionary conferences, and those on Faith and Order, and Life and Work. Such movements toward cooperation and union are symptomatic of the change from centrifugal to centripetal tendencies in the church life of our time.

In the presence of this growing urge for a closer unity, and in recognition of the earnest efforts made by the two intercommunional bodies

just named, it is the conviction of a growing number of Christian leaders that the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America should adventure in this direction as it has in many others. Naturally there are three attitudes among the denominations as among individual Christians on this subject of unity. The first is one of opposition. There are those who look with disfavor on any change in the present denominational status. In some cases this is due to fundamental dislike of any modification in the prevailing order ; in others, it is due to official interests which might be dislocated. But Christianity is a growing, not a static organism ; and changes of opinion, structure and function may be anticipated, and should be judged in accordance with the direction and momentum of the enterprise. The second attitude is one of mild approval but of practical indifference. Here are found several of the denominations and probably the majority of church members at the present time. These are convinced that there should be a closer fellowship among Christians and that the progress of the gospel, both in the home areas and the non-Christian lands, is greatly hindered by the present sectarian divisions. They hope that at some future time this unhappy situation may be remedied. But they are measurably content with the conditions now existing and are disinclined toward any efforts to bring them to an end.

There is another company, a minority as yet but rapidly increasing in numbers, which is committed to the belief that Christian unity is the needed remedy for the ills of the church and of the social order, and is pledged to some participation in the adventure of bringing it to pass. They believe it is the next inevitable step in preparation for the coming of the kingdom of God in sufficient power and fulness to realize the ideals of Jesus in the world. Furthermore, they realize that this is the only generation in which they are to have the divine opportunity to work at the task. They are not sure that they understand the technique by which that unity is to be realized. They have no blueprint of the church as it is to be. But they are convinced that God wills unity, that it is the passion of our Lord, and that by prayer, conference and unflinching loyalty to this purpose, much may be accomplished of a character favorable to this consummation.

It is for this reason that there is fervent and increasing demand that the Federal Council of Churches, which is our only agency for interdenominational leadership in the broad areas of church life, shall justify its position and generalship by charting the paths by which unity

may be more adequately pursued and more definitely attained. It is an anachronism that the organization which more than any other has been the interpreter and exemplar of the movement for unity among the churches should feel itself inhibited from definite leadership in this gravely needed project merely because certain timid groups, either individual or denominational, are apprehensive of results. The council needs an outstanding department or commission devoted to this subject, for the study of the entire ground of unity, for periodic reports upon the progress of the movement in various areas and on various levels, and for suggestion to communions and localities concerned with the problem as to the wisest methods of meeting the emergencies which present conditions involve. The Federal Council need not commit itself to the aggressive promotion of any particular plan of church union. But it would seem to be called upon by a multitude of concurrent circumstances to gather and make available the facts regarding this momentous interest, as its departments of international good will, of evangelism and the like deal with other vital interests.

VI

Various plans have been suggested for the realization of the unity for which the Master prayed, which the apostle Paul postulated as the sign of outgrown immaturity on the part of believers and which is an evident essential of an efficient church today. It is often insisted that the unity of which our Lord was thinking was one of spiritual character, an inner unity of mind and heart. No one would question this statement. But it is manifest past all misreading that the unity contemplated by Jesus was of a nature to be witnessed by the world as an evidence of his divine legation. This is the reason why nothing less than some form of organic union is required. Yet this need not be construed in terms of an overhanging ecclesiasticism, a uniformity of belief and structure. From that order of regimentation Christianity was delivered by the Reformation.

There is conceivable a unity which combines the elements of coherence and diversity. Several fruitful plans have been suggested. Dr. Stanley Jones has presented the idea of a united church, the Church of Christ, with denominational branches. This is worthy of careful consideration, although it still perpetuates the unfortunate denominational pattern. A federation of denominations, after the model of the national union of states, is another interesting conception, but with the

same limitation. It would appear that no effort to limit the body of Christ to a human creed, a definite ritual or an institutional pattern can ever be effective. One may have the most brotherly and sympathetic appreciation for those who insist upon one or another of these features as essential to the united church, but the effort to construe Christian unity in these terms is unconvincing. There must be in the church of the future the elements of unity, diversity, equality and liberty. All these Protestantism possesses in the fundamentals of its life. There is no uniformity that is obligatory in any of the free churches today within the wide areas of essential Christian truth. There is as wide a difference between the convictions and preferences of members of any of the denominations, or even of a single congregation, as exists among the denominations themselves.

Christian unity is not to be achieved by any process of restriction or regimentation, but through loyalty to the basic truths of the gospel and conformity to the Master's program of life. Within wide diameters these have never been in doubt among the friends of our Lord. The united church will include those who hold to authority and those who believe in liberty, those who emphasize individual salvation and those who preach the social gospel, those who find comfort in sacramental grace and those who trust rather to a personal religious experience. These and many other apparently conflicting elements will be accepted features of the Christian society. When once the unity of the *church*, rather than the diversity of the *churches*, is envisaged, the larger unity for which Christendom waits will come to realization.

Meantime the Protestant churches, the most numerous and vigorous of the five divisions embraced in the wider Christian group—the others being the Eastern Orthodox, the Roman Catholic, the non-evangelical liberals, and the miscellaneous unattached bodies—have before them the privilege and obligation of realizing for themselves and of exhibiting to others the unity which they actually possess. This unity, if manifested in their larger cooperative organizations down through the denominational levels to the communities where the people live and worship, will go far toward making possible the achievement of that objective to which the Christian enterprise through all the centuries is dedicated.

Herbert R. Wieman

THE PROPERTY BASIS OF LIBERTY

By ROSS J. S. HOFFMAN

WHEN this essay was first proposed, it was suggested that my topic should be "The Property Basis of Freedom." I have chosen, it will be observed, to substitute the word "liberty" for the word "freedom." I do this not for any reason of preference in diction, nor because the two words are not legitimately interchangeable in usage, but simply because the substitution enables me, in the particular case of this subject, to write with somewhat greater precision.

Between these words, as used here, there is an important difference. Liberty denotes that set of conditions or circumstances wherein a person may act from choice, as it pleases that person—the sphere of unconstrained action, in which one meets with no external human compulsions or prohibitions. Freedom, on the other hand, is a subjective conception. It designates a consciousness in us of what we are, an inner illumination of our nature whereby we know ourselves as moral agents, able to discern right and wrong and to exercise the power of moral choice. In this sense no man is free who does not know himself as a being possessed of free will. Jesus, it will be remembered, did not say the truth would set us at liberty, but that it would make us free. For liberty may be conferred from without, as a slave is emancipated or a prisoner discharged, but freedom can be had only by men who know what kind of creatures God fashioned them to be.

Now the reason for making this distinction of word meanings should, I think, be readily obvious. For it is this: there must not be any suggestion here that property ownership, which can secure men against tyranny in the state, is a generative cause of that self-knowledge which is freedom. The roots of freedom are in the spiritual order, not in the social-economic system; and it would be quite erroneous to fancy that any restoration of diffused property-ownership could of itself effect the return of the spirit of freedom which was the mark of our society in its Christian past. That spirit will return when our religion returns; nothing else can bring it back. Indeed, any belief that such a result could issue merely from a rearranged property system would imply

acceptance of one of the characteristic falsehoods of positivist and Marxian sociology.

Let it then be clear that the question here has to do with the sphere within which members of the human community can act from choice instead of compulsion, and concerns the relationship, if there be any, between such a sphere of unconstrained action and the private ownership of property. That is the one question to be explored, although I shall touch also upon such cognate matters as the rational argument for private property (as distinct from the pragmatic argument), and the necessity of a revived consciousness of freedom if our society is to become again a society of owners.

I

We proceed then to a discussion of this question, bearing well in mind that property ownership means the ownership of productive property, not mere title to one's house in a city block, nor to the clothes on one's back, nor even to dividend shares in an enterprise over which one has no directive control. All these are certainly forms of property, but our discussion here is of the private ownership and control of the means of production. Now what has that to do with liberty?

Communists and socialists tell us, of course, that it is flatly opposed to liberty. They say there can be no real liberty for men until all privately owned productive property has been abolished; and some such notion seems vaguely present also in the minds of many modern "liberals" who talk thickly about the conflict between "property rights and human rights." But when such people talk of property they are usually contemplating the proletarian scene and the big corporate properties of industrial capitalism; and it is significant that they talk much more of the exploitation than of the enslavement of human beings. For their case against the present order is not so much that the masters of capitalism repress the free action of men as that the rich are too hard on the poor.

Indeed, when these people of the left use the word "liberty" they do so loosely, not meaning the condition in which human beings may act from independent choice, but meaning rather an increase of leisure and consumable goods for the masses. The real crime which industrial capitalism has done against liberty, namely, the destruction of its basis in diffused property ownership, they do not seem to resent at all. They talk of higher wages and shorter hours, of nationalizing this and that

instrument of production, of various forms of social insurance, of better housing, of increased social services—yes, of the “more abundant life”—but they do not talk much of liberty, unless it be to use that noble word in the sense of the political right to agitate publicly for these essentially servile ends. For the truth is that the objective of nearly all this collectivist striving is not a liberty appropriate to men of free will, but a smoothly operating economic mechanism for the satisfaction of unlimited material appetites.

To such a pass has come the great movement for human liberty begun a century and a half ago. The effort to restore the Republic (that public thing which is distinguished from the private thing, and also from the royal thing) gradually becomes an effort to create the Soviet, which might be defined as what results when the public thing swallows all private things; when it strips men of all but their status of citizenship and then degrades that status; when it standardizes and isolates men, defenseless before public power; when it transforms a hierarchical federation of personal, family and group autonomies into a single mass community. How great has been our fall from the old republican idealism! The liberals of an earlier day who fought and shed blood for liberty, knowing what it is and why men should have it and affirming a creed of natural rights upon which no power could trample lawfully—these liberals have passed away. And in the wake have come their epigoni, men of a different creed or of no creed at all, men who commonly equate liberalism with the most unprincipled kind of sociological adventuring.

II

The old liberals who brought back the Republic knew very well the meaning and social-political value of property. They knew where lay the economic bases of the liberty they desired to establish. The French of 1789 wrote into their Declaration of the Rights of Man that “property is an inviolable and sacred right.” The Virginia Bill of Rights put “the means of acquiring and possessing property” at the “base and foundation of government.” The Massachusetts Bill of Rights contained the same declaration in substance, and indeed all the documents of the early liberalism reflect a clear awareness of the close bearing of the doctrine of property on the doctrine of liberty. The sociological thought of this liberalism, best exemplified perhaps in the ideas of Jefferson and Condorcet, was what may be called distributist today, in

that it envisaged a widely diffused ownership of the means of production as one of the surest guarantees against all forms of human tyranny. And it is an historical fact (deeply significant but often forgotten by social theorists of our day) that wherever the republican liberating movement swept, it tore landlord feudalism and economic monopoly to pieces and left standing a society of citizen owners.

It was, I think, one of the great misfortunes of our history that the fruits of this victory were not adequately guarded by a competent political power; in other words, that the liberal state lacked the power to defend the new social order. The old liberals, having won a hard battle against royal absolutism, were suspicious of all strong government and held to the view that the best government is the least government; which is not a truth, but a half-truth, and exactly the kind of half-truth that goes down with men who neither reflect upon human nature nor have understanding of the organic relation between the social order and the state. The whole and therefore the real truth is not that the least government is the best government, but that the best society will have the least government. The state is a reflex of the social order; it is not the other way round. To say of the state what Jefferson said is not to utter a universal and timeless truth, but simply to voice a political opinion which takes for granted the existence of a society of free, independent and just human beings.

So that the old liberal political doctrine was only as valid as the old liberal concept of human nature. Hence it was that even as the old authoritarian regimes, despising man greatly, expected too little of him, the revolutionary rebels, praising man unduly, expected too much of him. They fancied it was his nature to be good if given liberty, and that a free social order therefore would require little policing. They did not realize at all that the social order of distributive property, unless guarded by competent public power, would be disrupted by competitive greed working through industrial capitalism. But that, as we know, is what happened, and it has brought about today, over vast areas of the West, a society of big business and proletarianism, in which for an increasing majority of men the hope and desire for property—even the very concept of property—have nearly vanished. Such is the position, indeed, that a defense of property today is more likely to be received as a capitalist tract against socialism than as a plea for the rights of man.

Now all this change in the social-economic order has been accom-

panied by the decline of liberty, that is, by the return of enormous power exercised by some men over others. I do not refer to the despotic strait jackets fastened upon men by political dictatorships (although that is part of the picture), but rather to the power of employers, landlords, bankers, bureaucrats, politicians, trade union leaders and the like, to restrict the area in which human beings may act from choice instead of compulsion. There is everywhere a vast increase in the organizing of men, and the organizing does not result from the volition of the organized but is imposed on these by others. Compulsory disciplines and—if I may use the much prostituted word—regimentation of human beings by political and economic powers grow from year to year; and although much of it is necessary if contemporary civilization is to be spared violent disaster, and some of it is in fact salutary and desirable, the net effect of all of it is to narrow the bounds of liberty.

III

Surely it must be agreed that this is so. I know that many who profess not to despise liberty regard its decline as the price we must pay for "progress"; perhaps it is; I do not question here the necessity or wisdom of the payment. But if it be said that there has been no actual decline of liberty, but only a substitution of one kind of liberty for another, and that this is shown by the fact that you hear no great outcry against vanishing liberty, such a statement must be denied as false. For the evidence of failing liberty is not to be refuted by urging that men would surely complain of it. As a matter of fact, one hears discouragingly little grumbling of the sort; probably a vast number do not care about the matter. For men do not always prize liberty; they may or may not, depending upon their ultimate desires. There have been contented slaves, and there have been people with liberty but little apparent happiness; for liberty is a weighty and sobering responsibility, suited to the dignity of man but not always conducive to his joy.

No, you cannot argue rightly that liberty survives because so few experience any pain in its passing, for the spirit of servility has grown among us and it is a drug to deaden that pain. Whoever looks with critical eye at the character of modern society, wherever this has been made over by industrial capitalism, will note the spread of all that is characteristic of servile men: distaste for responsibility, preference of pleasure and material comforts to personal independence, a debased concept of human nature, a great weakening of the will and a sharp de-

cline of voluntary associational activity. With all this goes a far-reaching decay of genuinely private life, a great dissolution of the private sovereignties of home and family, in which human beings are formed and may come to know themselves in security and moral freedom.

And there is the additional fact, equally obvious, that the masses no longer display that multiplicity in taste and action which results from the exercise of choice; standardization sets in steadily, in all departments of life; and this is most intimately connected with the loss of the economic bases of liberty. For as Hilaire Belloc has recently written, "Deprived of economic freedom, the family, and in some degree the individual, lack the power to express that diversity which is life. In the absence of economic freedom there must weigh upon any human society a dead and mechanical uniformity, increasingly laden, and heavy, and stifling, in proportion to the absence of freedom." One has but to look at houses, furniture, clothes, popular literature and amusements, and numerous other aspects of the culture of the masses, to note how striking this mark has become in contemporary Western society. Throughout all history it has been the sign of the decay of liberty.

Now there is a very clear and simple reason why the old distributive property system and liberty arose, flourished and declined apace in our civilization. So obvious is it indeed that one would hardly bother to state it, were it not for the fact that so many persons appear either to have forgotten it or never to have grasped it at all. And it is that concentrated ownership of the means of production, whether in the state or in a few rich men, must make wage slaves of the great majority of men. They may be well paid slaves, they may be housed and fed a great deal better than men possessed of liberty; but they have not the power to order their own lives save on sufferance from their masters. They cannot oppose their will to those who own and control the means of production without risk of their livelihood; they cannot maintain the balance of forces which is required if there is to be liberty in the social order; they cannot act in self-defense without resorting to revolution in the state. In short, they cannot stand on their own, because they own nothing on which to stand.

All this was perfectly obvious to the liberals of a century ago, as it is obvious to clear-headed communists today; but it is not obvious to the sociological adventurers who (without the slightest regard for first principles in economics or politics) hail every new step toward servile

collective security as an increase of "liberty" for the masses. These people indeed either have never thought at all about the significance of well divided property, or when confronted with what seems to them an odd reactionary notion, fail to understand it. Thus my collectivist opponent in a recent debate sought to refute the property argument for liberty by citing this and that person, present in the hall, who did not own property but yet enjoyed liberty; which proved no more than that he had not understood the distributist thesis. For it does not follow from that thesis that each person, nor even each family, cannot have liberty without owning some part of the means of production. The point is not that if you would be free you must own, but that you must belong to a community wherein ownership is widely diffused, and wherein, on that account, a genuine citizenship and an honest public opinion can flourish. In such a community there will be liberty, for the units of society will be able to react against one another, against the state and against monopoly; but that every one in the state must be an owner of some productive property is an unreal and inhuman conception. "The proprietary (or distributist) state [to quote Mr. Belloc once more] neither can, nor should be complete; for it cannot of its nature be mechanical. There will be many comparatively poor, and some comparatively rich. There will presumably be some proportion of dispossessed. But property, and its accompaniment, economic freedom, will be the mark of society as a whole."

IV

There are, I believe, encouraging signs today of a clearer recognition of the necessity for maintaining and restoring well divided property if liberty is to remain as a mark of American society. Our own part of the Western world has undoubtedly been much disrupted by industrial capitalism and proletarianism, but a large section of the population retains the sense of ownership and the desire to own. There can be, I think, little doubt that among the millions who voted recently for Mr. Roosevelt there were many who did so not because the so-called New Deal is in part collectivist, but in the hope that its ultimate effect may be exactly the opposite. The President's own ideal vision of America was revealed very clearly in his campaign addresses, in which one heard the distributist note sounded quite distinctly. The property question indeed was much discussed (although not very luminously) in the 1936 campaign, and the prospect is that the debate will continue and will attain greater clarity.

Such a prospect offers hope to those who value liberty enough to reflect upon what it is, what its foundations are, and how these may be preserved against the collectivist and servile drift of contemporary society. For it promises some further lifting of the fog of pragmatism that has lain upon our minds and some rediscovery of where lie the sources of many values which we may still prize greatly but yet are in danger of losing, because, forgetting how we came by them, we have thoughtlessly neglected the basis upon which they rest.

If this clearing of minds does indeed come about, we shall find that more is required than a few New Deal measures to preserve and restore the property basis of liberty. We shall find that a return to rational philosophy also is called for, because it will not do merely to justify property with the pragmatic argument that liberty requires it as a basis. The right intellectual argument here is not a Benthamite sophistry, but an appeal to reason and nature. I mean that if we would make the case for property a really valid one we must say, as Pope Leo XIII said, that "when man spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his own personality; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own and should have a right to keep it without molestation." That is the real case for private property, and it would be valid even if well divided ownership actually worked against liberty.

But the most important truth to be found and brought to light is that property will neither be kept nor restored unless men desire and will that it should be so, and that almost nothing therefore can be done toward this end without a change in the spiritual order. All mechanical revolutionary schemes for redistributing ownership must fail unless that change takes place, for you cannot make owners of men who do not want the responsibility of owning. Precisely as bolshevist collectivism and the capitalist collectivism of the servile state require the extinction of the traditional man, who cared deeply about property and the liberty which it secures, so does a distributist society call for his restoration. And that brings us back to what was said at the beginning of this essay when I made distinction between liberty and freedom. There cannot be a society of owners unless there be a desire for liberty, and there cannot be any strong desire for liberty without a restored consciousness of freedom. Men must know themselves for what they are, and for what end they were fashioned, if

they are to keep or to have again that knowledge of freedom which externalizes itself in liberty.

This is a truth which even the old liberals, with all their love of liberty, for the most part did not know. They were fired by a vision that could come only to men of the Christian West, but they did not know why they had come to be the kind of men who could have such a vision. We who have witnessed so great a ruination of their noble work have little excuse for not seeing what they missed.

Ross Hoffman

DOOM

(After Isaiah)

BY AMOS N. WILDER

THE age is febrile and beside itself :
Ridden by ten thousand passions, unawares
Fallen upon alienation ; 'tis a house
By seven disastrous demons dispossessed
Who hold unreckoning carnival and trade
In dyes and linens and the souls of men.
The generation is adulterous :
Its vows abjured in hoarse rapacity,
Its faiths all sponged in truculent despair.
It runs on heartless courses, and pursues
Insensate quests and strange obsessive cares.
This people is accursed and knoweth not
The law, but plunged in brazen cecity
Calls peace what is not peace and darkness light,
Shouts on the housetops while the parapets
Crumble and fall before the battering rams.
Too soon the chariots roar about the streets,
Too soon the incendiaries fly like fiends
With torches in the alley-ways. Alas !
The palaces, the ivory summer houses,
The cedar work and gay partitions blaze ;
And of the temple stones that housed the Presence
No longer one upon the other left.

THE VATICAN AND THE ETHIOPIAN WAR

By GAETANO SALVEMINI

IN THE French paper *L'Aube* of April 1, 1935, the well known ex-leader of the Italian Christian Democratic party, Don Luigi Sturzo, discussed the problem whether Catholics could regard as just the war which Mussolini was then threatening against Ethiopia. In his opinion this war raised "a problem of conscience and public morality—of that morality by which nations live." He pointed out that according to Roman Catholic teaching, war is just and legitimate only when resorted to in self-defense, and, even then, only after all other means of self-defense have been exhausted. There existed between Italy and Ethiopia a treaty of 1928 which pledged the two governments to settle their differences by conciliation or arbitration.

Moreover, both governments were members of the League of Nations and as such were bound to try conciliation and arbitration before resorting to war. The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, repeatedly had declared his readiness to submit to arbitration all questions between Italy and Ethiopia. Thus a way of avoiding war was opened. "Why did the fascist government refuse the arbitration proposed by the Negus?" This was the essential point which Catholics had to bear in mind when deciding whether the threatened war was going to be a just war or not.

I

So far as I know, no Catholic authority in Italy or elsewhere has ever questioned Don Sturzo's thesis. But an isolated Italian priest, an exile from his country, is not the Catholic Church. Where moral teaching is concerned, the church consists of the pope and the episcopate.

What was the attitude of the Italian episcopate and Pius XI on the Italo-Ethiopian war?

A survey of two or three Italian daily papers reveals that the following Italian archbishops and bishops made declarations in favor of Mussolini's policy of war: cardinal archbishops: Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Palermo, Turin; archbishops: Ancona, Bari,

Benevento, Brindisi, Cagliari, Catania, Catanzaro, Chieti, Cosenza, Fermo, Gorizia, Manfredonia, Matera, Messina, Monreale, Perugia, Pisa, Reggio Calabria, Rhodes, Sassari, Siena, Sorrento, Syracuse, Taranto, Trent, Udine, Urbino, Zara, and the vicar of the temporarily vacant patriarchate of Venice; bishops: Alessandria, Alghero, Anglona-Tursi, Ariano, Arezzo, Ascoli Piceno, Ascoli Satriano, Assisi, Avellino, Belluno, Brescia, Caltagirone, Caserta, Castellaneta, Cava dei Terreni, Cerignola, Chiari, Chiavari, Chiusi, Città di Castello, Civita Castellana, Civitavecchia, Cremona, Ferentino, Fiume, Foggia, Fossombrone, Imola, La Spezia, Lecce, Leghorn, Macerata, Massa Carrara, Mileto, Montalto, Nocera Umbra, Nola, Noto, Ogliastro, Osimo, Padua, Piacenza, Pistoia, Pola, Potenza, Recanati, Reggio Emilia, Salerno, San Miniato, San Severo, Sora, Teano, Teggiano, Tempio Pausania, Teramo, Terni, Tivoli, Todi, Tortona, Trapani, Trieste, Tropea, Ventimiglia, Verona, Vicenza, Vigevano, and Viterbo. The list of one hundred and three is doubtless far from complete.

One must further notice that declarations of loyalty to Mussolini were made at the opening or the closing of numerous diocesan conferences, eucharistic congresses, Catholic action assemblies, and Catholic student meetings, held in Italy from the spring of 1935 onward, and attended by members of the episcopate. One illustration may suffice. On September 5, 1935, a national eucharistic congress was held at Teramo attended by a papal legate, nineteen archbishops and fifty-seven bishops. At the opening session the congress passed by acclamation a message to Mussolini in which "Catholic Italy" prayed for the "ever increasing greatness of the beloved mother country, rendered more compact and stronger by your government." On that day the council of the League of Nations was meeting in Geneva to discuss the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.

In October, 1935, the Catholic fascist daily paper of Vienna, the *Reichpost*, gave for the attitude of the Italian higher clergy the following explanation which was seized upon and endorsed by the *Osservatore Romano*, official organ of the Vatican, on October 25: "Just as a Christian mother blesses her son who leaves for distant and dangerous regions, so the church gives its sons, leaving for war, the viaticum of its prayers and wishes for both body and soul. Ignorance and ill will alone can distort this fact." Unfortunately, the Italian bishops did not confine themselves to imparting blessings. They de-

livered addresses and wrote circular letters justifying the war, urging people to discipline and sacrifice, and protesting against sanctions, the League of Nations and Great Britain. They attended or sent their delegates to ceremonies in which war propaganda was carried on.

For instance, the Cardinal Archbishop of Milan, on October 28, 1935, speaking in the cathedral after the reading of the Gospel, exalted the "valorous armies which, in intrepid obedience to the command of their country and at the price of their blood, open the doors of Ethiopia to the Catholic faith and the civilization of Rome." "At this moment on the fields of Ethiopia the Italian flag carries in triumph the cross of Christ, breaks the chains of the slaves and makes straight the way of the missionaries of the gospel."

The Archbishop of Brindisi, on November 18, 1935, condemned "the action which Great Britain's cold egotism and haughtiness have organized to injure Italy and to support the semibarbarous and slave owning king, who holds an unpopulated and miserable territory four times the size of Italy." The Archbishop of Taranto, on February 23, 1936, celebrated mass in a submarine and delivered an address "rendering homage to the memory of the fallen and extolling the glorious Italian army."

On October 2, 1935, the eve of the day when the Italian troops began the advance into Ethiopia, all Italians of all classes, ages and sexes were summoned together in all cities, towns and villages with great clamor to listen to a speech by Mussolini over the wireless and greet it with unanimous enthusiasm. The most effective contributors to the colossal din were the bells of all the churches in the land. According to canon law, church bells may not be used for profane purposes except with the explicit permission of the bishop, or in case of public emergency, or if the use of the bells is justified by accepted local tradition. The display of October 2 was prepared days ahead with meticulous care. An official communique to the press of September 15 announced that the bells of all the churches would play their part, as the bishops had all "given orders according to the wishes of the political authorities."

Another characteristic feature was the offering of gold and silver by the clergy in order to help the government to meet the financial strain of the war. For example, on December 8, the Bishop of Civita Castellana, speaking in the presence of Mussolini, said: "I thank Almighty God for permitting me to see these days of epic grandeur."

The applause having subsided, the bishop "approached the head of the government [Mussolini] and, slipping off his gold pastoral chain, handed it to him with the fascist salute." Then the Bishop of San Miniato stepped forward and "solemnly declared to the duce that for the victory of Italy the Italian clergy was ready to melt up the gold of the churches and the bronze of the bells."

Only one who wilfully shuts his eyes can regard the action of the Italian episcopate as consisting in purely religious ministration to the soldiers.

II

Had Pius XI instructed the Italian bishops to abstain from warlike propaganda, they must needs have done so. To be sure, the "discipline" of which Catholics boast so much as contrasted with Protestant "anarchy," leaves room for a fair amount of "anarchy," provided open scandals are avoided. But we may be sure that seventy-nine bishops did not rebel wholesale against express prohibitions coming from the pope.

Even more striking testimony of the papal trend of ideas is the attitude of the cardinals of the curia, that is, those cardinals who live in Rome in immediate touch with the pope. On December 28, 1935, one of these high members of the papal court, Cardinal Laurenti, addressed an audience which contained three other members of the curia, Cardinal Cremonesi, Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi and Cardinal Caccia-Dominioni. Two men, he said, alluding to Laval and Hoare, had met to discuss a peace plan; both "were well disposed, especially one of them"; but "a hidden hand" had wrecked their endeavor. The "hidden hand" would appear to be freemasonry which, according to popes, cardinals and fascists, is the root of all evils which afflict humanity. Be that as it may, the words of Cardinal Laurenti show that the Hoare-Laval proposals were regarded favorably by the Vatican and their failure attributed to sinister influences.

On February 23, 1936, Cardinal Pacelli, secretary of state to Pius XI, entered the fray. Before an audience of high personages, he began with eulogies of the supreme pontiff, the king and Mussolini. He then went on to deliver a harangue on the "sacred destiny of Rome." Rome has a standard—that of the cross; Rome has a method of government—the moral teaching of Christ; Rome gives the world the example of conciliation and concord between church and state; from Rome

come the words of life which spur on to "holy conquests." "No city can or will ever excel the destiny of Rome."

The grandeur of Rome which Cardinal Pacelli extolled was a religious grandeur. The conquests of Rome were religious conquests. No word did the speaker utter about the Ethiopian war. But suppose that during the World War the secretary of state of Benedict XV had pronounced in Vienna a discourse on the "religious" achievements and destinies of Catholic Austria. What would the world have thought? It would undoubtedly have drawn the conclusion that the Vatican was making a gesture of solidarity with the rulers of Austria. If Benedict XV had protested that his secretary of state had spoken only of Austrian "religious" achievements, the world would not have given credence to such a plea.

Among the audience on February 23 were four cardinals of the curia, La Puma, Salotti, Laurenti and Serafini. Putting together the cardinals, both of the curia and dioceses, who, according to the papers we have been able to consult, directly or indirectly took part in fascist demonstrations during the Ethiopian war, we find that they numbered fifteen. So many cardinals, especially cardinals in the immediate entourage of the pope, could not, we may be sure, have been acting against his wishes.

III

Speaking to the college of cardinals on December 24, 1934, Pius XI "invoked peace, blessed peace, prayed for peace," and he added: "If, by any chance, there should be some who, owing to a fresh outburst of homicidal and suicidal mania, truly prefer war to peace, then we have another prayer which it will become our duty to utter. We should have to say to the blessed Lord: Scatter the nations that seek war." On April 1, 1935, he repeated his prayer: "Should the people of the world again take up arms against one another, should the blood of brothers again be shed, should destruction and ruin again be shown on the earth and the sea and the air, it would be a crime so enormous, a manifestation of savagery so insane that we should consider it quite impossible. . . . Should anyone dare to commit so nefarious a crime, then we could do no less than to utter again to God with heavy heart the prayer: Scatter the nations that seek war."

What people had he precisely in mind when making such utterances? Was it Hitler, who in November, 1934, had denounced the

clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which forbade the rearmament of Germany and who, in March, 1935, had restored compulsory military service? Was it Japan, who in the Far East had been for two years occupying Chinese territory? Was it the governments of Paris and Moscow, who were negotiating an alliance which, according to Hitler, was "encircling" Germany? Was it Mussolini, who was refusing to submit to arbitration the Wal Wal incident and who on February 18, 1935, had begun to ship thousands of soldiers to East Africa? Was it Haile Selassie, who did not surrender unconditionally to Mussolini's demands? The pope did not divulge whom he meant. Anyone was free to pass the hot potato to his neighbor.

On May 25, 1935, Mussolini, addressing the chamber, declared that henceforth the problem of Italo-Ethiopian relations had been reduced to "its baldest and most radical terms"; the situation "imposed upon fascist Italy the fulfillment of imperative duties." He was ready "to assume all responsibilities, even the supreme responsibilities." Toward the middle of June 164,000 men had already been massed in East Africa. On June 15, 7,000 veterans of the World War were gathered in Rome from all parts of Italy in one of those mass demonstrations by which Mussolini was seeking to arouse the war spirit of the people and at the same time to show foreigners that Italy was unanimously behind him.

These circumstances should be kept in mind when one learns that Pius XI granted an audience to these veterans, celebrated mass in their presence, and addressed them in words reminding them that "recently," that is, during the World War, they "had given a shining proof of their valor" and exhorting them always to distinguish themselves "in all paths of life." These men had every right to think that Pius XI when praying God to "disperse the people who want war" was thinking precisely of the Ethiopian people against whom many of them were soon expected to fight.

On July 28, Pius XI felt an urgent need to proclaim the "moral worth" of "a great Italian" whom no one had ever heard of before. This was Brother Justin de Jacobis, who had preached the Catholic faith in Abyssinia from 1838 to 1860 without suffering harm to a hair of his head and had died a natural death there at the age of sixty. The proclamation of "moral worth" is the first stage in the posthumous career of those Christians who have given proofs of exceptional virtue during their lives and worked miracles after their death. The next

stage is beatification, and the third and supreme stage is sanctification. Brother Justin can hardly have performed many miracles in view of the fact that seventy-five years elapsed before Pius XI admitted him to the first grade in the career. What significance would the canonization of Joan of Arc have taken on if Benedict XV had chosen the years of the World War to perform the ceremony? Why did not Pius XI wait for quieter times to extol the virtues of his friar, when the ceremony would not have been construed as propaganda for Mussolini's war?

During the ceremony the pope noticed that there were clouds in the sky of Abyssinia. But "he hoped, always hoped in the peace of Christ, in the kingdom of Christ." Was Pius XI still hoping that war might be avoided not only in the kingdom of Christ but also in Ethiopia? Whatever he hoped he immediately added: "In any case, we hope that nothing will be done that is not in accordance with truth, with justice and with charity." In this context "in any case" (in Italian, *comunque*) could only mean "if war breaks out." If war broke out, did he expect truth, justice and charity to be practiced on Haile Selassie by Mussolini? Like the Delphic oracle Pius XI propounded a riddle.

IV

On August 27, 1935, Pius XI addressed in French an audience of nurses who had met in Rome for an international convention. He entreated them to pray that war might be averted: "The mere thought of war makes us shudder." Who should spare the pope these shudders? He left this point wrapped in mystery. In compensation, he drew attention to the fact that "in foreign countries already there was talk of a war of aggression." (The French original text has "*à l'étranger*"; the Italian official translation, "*all'estero*.") This expression, "in foreign countries," reveals in a flash that Pius XI had forgotten that he is the head of an international organization, the Catholic Church. He regarded the world as split up into two camps: Italy, the pope's country; and the "foreign countries."

The pope went on to say that he refused to believe that the talk in foreign countries of a war of aggression and conquest could be justified: "This is a supposition on which we do not even wish our thoughts to dwell. A war that would be merely a war of conquest would be truly an unjust war. That is something beyond imagination. That is something monstrously sad and horrible. We cannot contem-

plate the possibility of it. We dismiss it deliberately. We do not believe, we do not wish to believe, in an unjust war."

What exactly did the pope mean? Was it that if Mussolini went to war, this would be an abominable crime, but Pius XI refused to believe such a crime possible? Or did he mean that he could not think of Mussolini as capable of such a crime, and that, therefore, if Mussolini were to go to war, his war would have some just reason, would not be "merely" a war of conquest, but also a war of self-defense? Both interpretations were possible. The Delphic oracle left the choice to its hearers.

After thus energetically rejecting the untenable belief held "in foreign countries," the pope felt it incumbent upon him, as impartial judge, to give Mussolini's point of view: "On the other hand it is said in Italy that the war would be a just war because in self-defense, to secure the frontiers against incessant menace, a war necessary for the expansion of a daily increasing population. A war undertaken to defend a country or obtain for it material security—such a war is its own justification." This thesis did not meet with indignant rejection like the talk in foreign countries. The pontiff merely declared: "We cannot do otherwise than reflect upon it." Obviously it carried great weight with him.

In his meditations Pius XI did not give any place to the arguments of Haile Selassie. Ethiopia, like the bird of the air, was cared for by God alone. The outcome of the meditations was that Pius XI had nothing to say against Mussolini's case and confined himself to giving vent to a pious wish: "If this need for expansion may exist, and if there exists also the need of defending the security of the frontiers, we cannot but hope that a solution of all difficulties may be arrived at by other means than war."

Haile Selassie, too, was anxious to avoid war, and for that reason was willing to submit the dispute to arbitration or conciliation, while Mussolini was rejecting all other methods than war. The pope ignored this fact, though it was essential to a moral judgment of the situation. To fill this gap in his system of thought he asked how war might be avoided. He found the problem very difficult: "It is obviously not easy to say how, but we do not believe that it is impossible. This possibility must be explored."

Here he reminded his hearers that whoever revindicates a right is bound to accept limits and moderations: "One thing seems to us to be

beyond doubt, that if the need for expansion is a fact that must be considered, the right of defense has limits which must not be outstepped if defense is not to put itself in the wrong." On such a basis the Italo-Ethiopian dispute might be settled without war.

Mussolini, however, might not have wished to put limits to his right of self-defense. What was to be done, then? The pope faced this question and answered: "In any case"—another terrible "in any case"—that is, even if Mussolini were not to allow limits to his right of defense, "we pray God that he will strengthen the endeavors of the far-seeing men who understand the exigencies of the true happiness of people and of social justice, of those men who are doing everything in their power . . . to bring about peace."

These men were M. Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare. Pius XI was praying for their success because he saw that their intentions were good: "They are doing everything in their power, not by threats which can only aggravate the situation by exasperating people's minds and make it from day to day more difficult, more threatening; not by delays which are nothing but a waste of precious time; but with humane, kindly intent, with a sincere intention of averting war."

Who was at that moment being threatened with sanctions by the League of Nations, who could be exasperated by these threats, who was refusing delays which could mean a waste of precious time? Who else but Mussolini? The league must not exasperate Mussolini by threatening him with sanctions nor make him waste precious time in dangerous delays.

To anyone reading without close attention, Pius XI's address to the nurses gives the impression of condemning not only war but also this particular war as an abominable crime. In actual fact it does not condemn the imminent war. It condones it as a war of self-defense. In addition it puts in a plea for indulgence and leniency, should Mussolini, in the exercise of his right of self-defense, exceed the limits of moderation. It reveals its true significance only to those who analyze it with the care of a philologist dealing with an obscure text or of a foreign office secretary examining a diplomatic document. It is a masterpiece of skill and subtlety on the part of Pius XI and his secretarial staff.

The meditations of Pius XI on August 27 bore more mature fruit a few days later.

On September 7, at the very moment when the assembly of the

league at Geneva was about to discuss the Italo-Ethiopian quarrel, fifteen thousand ex-service men, almost all French, gathered in Rome. It was a demonstration of Franco-Italian solidarity in support of the Ethiopian policy of Laval and Mussolini. Pius XI addressed the pilgrims. Once more he announced that he was praying for peace: "This is a particular and essential duty without which it is impossible to conceive of a pope." But he had other aspirations besides peace: "Together with peace we desire that the hopes, requirements and needs of that great and good people, our people, may be recognized and satisfied, that its rights be recognized and assured, but with justice and peace." The needs and rights of the Italians—needs of expansion and rights of self-defense—were no longer matters for meditation, as in the address to the nurses, but facts of which there was no longer doubt. Justice and peace were brought in at the end to sugar the pill.

On the following morning the ex-service men went to pay homage to Mussolini. Mussolini told them that "the Italian people desired peace on condition that it be accompanied by justice." That same afternoon, at a demonstration of fifty thousand fascist youth, he declared: "We shall march straight ahead." The Rome correspondent of the London *Morning Post*, September 9, 1935, expressed his conviction that "peace and justice" meant the same thing for both Pius XI and Mussolini: "Pope Pius XI and Mussolini have both made reference to a desire for peace, and both added that peace must be attended with justice." Who can say that the correspondent was mistaken?

V

On October 2, 1935, when the bells of all the churches in Italy rang out to mobilize the people for the big show, the bells of Rome did not fail in their national duty. The Rome correspondent of the London *Times* stated that "a thousand belfries" had filled the air with the sound of their bells and that even the great bell and the five minor bells of St. Peter's had tolled.

The diocese of Rome is the diocese of the pope. The basilica of St. Peter's stands within the territory of Vatican City. Among the many glories with which the admirers of Pius XI and Mussolini credit their heroes, the most conspicuous is that of clearly specifying in the "treaty of conciliation" of February, 1929, that Vatican City, the center of the international and supernational Catholic Church, is

exempt from all Italian jurisdiction and its sole and independent sovereign is the pope. If it was true that he allowed the bells of St. Peter's to toll together with the bells of Rome, Pius XI became guilty of a plain act of partisanship.

Therefore, the *Osservatore Romano* stated that there was no truth in the assertion that the great bell of St. Peter's had been rung; of the five small bells, no more than two had given signs of life by sounding at 3:45 P.M., and that because it was vesper hour.

As a matter of fact, whoever consults the manual of rites of St. Peter's Church will find that vesper hour on October 2 falls at 4:15 P.M. and not at 3:45 P.M. The writers of the *Osservatore Romano* tried to conceal the pope's responsibility by a denial of a fact which they well knew to be true. They lied *ad majorem Dei gloriam*. A Roman lady whose home has for many years been in the vicinity of St. Peter's and who knows the habits of those bells as well as the routine of her own house, has assured me that the vesper hour is announced by very few peals of only one of the small bells; on October 2, 1936, all the bells rang out long and loud together with the other Roman bells throughout the entire period of the "mobilization."

As far as the bells of Rome were concerned, the *Osservatore* asserted that the correspondent had "mistaken for all the bells of Rome the peals of the bells of a few churches which had *their own special reasons* [italics mine] for participating in the signal for mobilization." We need not debate whether the tolling bells numbered a thousand or not. What matters is that Roman bells took part in the demonstration and that the diocese of Rome is the diocese of the pope. If the bells had "special reasons" for so doing, their "special reasons" must have been the "special reasons" of Pius XI. Had he not given his consent, those Roman bells would not have sounded.

The Hoare-Laval proposals were made public on December 13, 1935, and provoked all over the world a hurricane of protest which swept away Sir Samuel Hoare. On December 16, Pius XI alluded to those proposals in the following terms: "We do not wish to allude to conflicts which disturb not only Europe and Africa, but, one might say, the whole world, because in this great uncertainty of events and men, there is danger that our words, whatever they may be, will be either not understood or deliberately distorted." But he had only to speak clearly and he could neither be misunderstood nor deliberately distorted. Like Mr. Baldwin, he sealed his own lips not because he

feared to be misunderstood, but because he did not want to reveal that the Hoare-Laval proposals were approximately the same as he, Pius XI, had transmitted to M. Laval on behalf of Mussolini. These proposals ought to have been called the "Mussolini-Pius XI-Laval-Hoare proposals." The peace for which Pius XI had prayed and hoped till now, the peace with justice, charity and truth, was Mussolini's peace.

In May, 1936, the Italian troops occupied Addis Ababa. If Pius XI had confined himself to rejoicing over the end of the war, no objection could have been raised to his happiness. But on May 12 he so far lost control of himself as to rejoice over "the triumphal gladness of a whole good and great people for a peace which it trusts will be a valid factor and prelude of true peace in Europe and the world."

What would the world have said at the end of the World War if Benedict XV had rejoiced not only over the end of the war but over the triumphal happiness of the great and good peoples of the Entente powers, even if he had credited them with the desire for a true peace?

The Italian people is neither more nor less good than any other people. But the moment to describe belligerent peoples as "good" is not when the blood shed by them in a war is not yet dry. It would be unfair to make the Italian people responsible for the use of poison gas in the last phases of the Ethiopian war; the people have no say either in war or in peace. But when Pius XI rejoiced at the triumphal gladness of the "good" Italian people, he knew that the use of poison gas had shocked the whole world. The word "good," used at that moment, was a challenge to the moral conscience of the world.

At his death in 1903, Leo XIII left a political testament for the college of cardinals and his successor. In this document he urged that only one way lay open for the Holy See to preserve its independence in respect to the Italian government—it must always remain at enmity with the government. The day the Holy See gave up its uncompromising attitude, it would irretrievably fall under the influence of the Italian government. The supernationality of the Holy See would be manifestly diminished to the profit of Italy. Catholic unity would be endangered. In the Ethiopian affair, Pius XI has shown that Leo XIII's forecast and foreboding were not without foundation.

G. Salvemini

THE POWER OF GOD AND THE WISDOM OF GOD

BY ROBERT LOWRY CALHOUN

NO PAPER in this discussion has been more illuminating than Professor Wieman's on "Faith and Knowledge." The care with which he has examined nearly a dozen major issues between us has clarified the whole field of inquiry and augmented in very important ways the range of our explicit agreement. The differences which persist are in no sense merely verbal differences, nor minor ones; but it becomes increasingly clear that they are diversities of analysis, and not contrarities of temper and direction. It is the same God we are trying to think about, though our modes of thought are not the same.

In this paper I will comment very briefly on some aspects of "Faith and Knowledge," and then will attempt a more positive statement of the view which all along has seemed to me theologically the most promising.

I

Two main areas touched by Wieman's paper should be noticed here. The first is the nature of knowing and believing, and the role of faith—a matter still unsettled between us. We seem to agree that belief in some sense is a factor in our knowledge of existing things and events, inasmuch as not only sense data and concepts but also a swift interpretative act, "shaped by automatic organic reaction," enters into such knowledge. This I am accustomed to call belief. And whether it be called by that name or some other, it is clear that every such act ventures beyond the present data as such, and affirms more than is at any moment actually given. It follows that "all knowledge of existing things is probable only." So far we agree.

But on two further points we disagree: the nature and relations of logical and analogical inference, and the relation of personal faith to knowledge. As to the first, I can merely take an exception here to Wieman's analysis (in the fourth section of his paper), and hope that elsewhere the issues can be examined more fully, as they deserve. It

seems to me that in treating "direct observation" of fact as one link in "the most rigorous kind of rational inference," he is weaving into his account of strict hypothetical reasoning a factor which belongs rather in an account of empirical exploration, whose outcome (as he freely agrees) can be "probable only." This commingling tends to break down the basic distinction between purely formal inference, which may indeed be rigorous, and empirical inference which, as we agree, is never rigorous, but which can achieve only a greater or less degree of probability. Within the field of empirical inference, Wieman rightly distinguishes between critical and uncritical inference concerning matters of fact, and this is naturally of capital importance; but it does not touch the basic theoretical issue between us. I too should insist on the need to base empirical reasoning so far as possible on penetrating rather than superficial analysis, and I have no more fondness than he for the uncritical associations of ideas which often pass for "argument by analogy."

My primary point has been, not that superficial reasoning is good reasoning, but (1) that even the most painstaking and clear-headed empirical inference is pervaded by an analogical factor, (2) that the implicit pattern of such inference, even at its best, is analogical, and (3) that in such inference about the universe at large or about God, the analogical pattern seems to me especially clear. I grant readily that there is a legitimate and indispensable sort of knowledge "by definition" which is indeed rigorous; but such knowledge is purely formal, and can refer to existing things and events only hypothetically. "If anything of the sort here defined does exist," we may say, "then it must display such-and-such characteristics." But when we pass from hypothetical to assertoric judgment, and say, "So-and-so does exist, both here and away yonder, with such-and-such characteristics," we abandon logical rigor for empirical assertion pervaded by analogical assumptions of the type: *Tout comme ici*.

To justify this view would require much detailed argument, so I must leave it here undefended, and pass to the next point: the relation of personal faith to knowledge. In empirical knowledge, as we have seen, one factor is belief, in the sense of an interpretative act which goes beyond what is immediately given. But there is also a legitimate mode of faith which goes beyond the limits not only of what is given, but of what is known, in any exact sense of that word. Wieman's own illustration will serve. "If I have knowledge that a certain man is

trustworthy, that alone is not faith. But if I commit myself to that judgment by leaving a child in his keeping, and go off without anxiety, that is faith. What makes it faith is not the element of uncertainty but the element of self-commitment. Such faith does not require any belief that goes beyond knowledge." This seems to me clearly mistaken, if the knowledge referred to here be understood as even approximating that of the more precise empirical sciences; that is, knowledge the probable error of which can be calculated and declared negligible. Empirical scientific and quasi-scientific judgments relate typically to statistical groups, not to individuals. A bonding company can tell with some accuracy that so many bank tellers per thousand are likely to embezzle funds; that married men as a group are likely to be better risks than single men as a group; and so on. But it cannot know outright that "a certain man is trustworthy." Nor can I. If I actively trust any one, even my closest friend, such action does require "belief that goes beyond knowledge." Subjective certitude or freedom from anxiety, in such a case, must not be confused with objective certainty. Wieman really recognizes this in what he says about "a pebble on the beach or God in the universe" as "bound to do things to us that we cannot foresee." To know that this is so, and thus to be generally prepared for one-knows-not-what and, it may be, free from anxiety, is a good thing. But it is a different thing from having definite knowledge so inclusive that faith need not go beyond it. Faith in God seems to me necessarily to go beyond all that I can possibly know. And this also, for unfinished creatures like us, is good; since thus we grow.

A second area which calls for brief comment is the nature and relations of process, activity, substance and being. Here I rejoice to find that Wieman and I are much closer together than I had suspected. Concerning process and activity, it appears that I did not make clear in earlier papers what I meant. I did not mean that all process is passive, nor even that any process is wholly passive; but that among processes, there are highly important differences as regards "tendency to initiate or produce change." Granted that in a given system—gravitational, electromagnetic, metabolic or other—every actual process in some way modifies every other, it still remains true that some of these processes modify their neighbors more than they are themselves modified. For example, a tree which casts a dense shade modifies the shaded plants around its base more profoundly than it is modified by them, or by its own shadow. The sun, moreover, modifies both tree and plants more than it is modified by either. It is this asymmetrical distribution

of influence among processes, and the superiority of some groups of processes over others in exerting such modifying influences, that I am concerned to stress. When Wieman speaks of a plurality of "systems" each having "requirements" which must be met by the processes included within it, he too is recognizing in another way this asymmetrical or hierarchical character of reality. And he would hold also, as I do, that God is supremely active; not merely a process, but an agent modifying other processes more profoundly than he is modified by them.

This same asymmetry is involved in the distinction between activity and substance, of which the latter is basic to the former, though continuous with it. Here I acknowledge with enthusiasm the precision of Wieman's analysis in the eighth section of his paper. All three of the partial meanings of substance which he defines are wholly in line with what seems to me true, and I too should seek to combine them as he suggests, with some differences of expression. His thought has been of great value to me here. Whether he may be inclined now to go with me in a still further step, I do not know; especially since in trying to press further, one moves toward the unmanageable ultimates before which human imagination and thought have always met defeat.

Let us glance back over the argument thus far. Among processes we have agreed to notice especially activities, and in the midst of activities the substantial agents or substances in which they center. Among substantial agents, we agree further, God is supreme, as at once the most inclusive and the most fundamental system of activities in existence, and the eternal form of "the greatest possible organic unity" that can ever be: an organic unity as yet but very incompletely actualized. Now in this last statement as it stands, there is an unbridged gap between actual existence and unactualized possibility, present flux and unachieved form, the now enduring and the timeless which does not yet exist. For process as such cannot lay hold on form, nor form as such control nor even come to birth in process. How is this gap to be bridged? Not in any way that I am able to imagine clearly, yet somehow in the ultimate nature of being it *is* bridged. A factor must be there which transcends process, somewhat as form does, yet which has concrete power of control, as form by itself does not. There must be, in "the uncomprehended reality of God's total being," some unwavering grasp or vision ("prehension"?) of forms not yet actualized, with unwavering power to influence the multitude of fluid "actual occasions" as they rise and ebb.

That such a factor is called for seems evident from the character of

Wieman's analysis of substance, which so far as it goes I accept. What the nature of such a controlling factor may be seems to me tantalizingly suggested by the character of mind—of which more in a moment. But just as Wieman rightly insists that fluent activity and form are but aspects of God's being, and in neither case the whole of it, so I should insist that the steady grasp of unactualized forms (called in ancient times the eternal Logos of God) is also not the whole of God's being. God is all of these, and surely more. *What* more the mystics, perhaps, have begun to see darkly; but even they cannot say.

II

Let us now turn directly to the basic theme of this whole discussion: whether mind can be thought of as a factor in the being of God. One source of confusion hitherto has been that Wieman and I have not yet agreed on what we mean by mind. So I wish to begin here by trying to indicate what I intend by the term.

Mind can be thought of, in general, as revealed in a certain mode of organic behavior: to wit, sentient behavior, of which awareness, awakeness or attention may be taken as the distinctive note. The most clearly accessible cases of such behavior are, of course, the lives of human persons, and it is natural that mind has been conceived usually as exhibited by men. I do not mean bare intellect. Manipulation of abstract ideas is, of course, one of the processes which mind properly denotes. But such manipulation takes place, humanly speaking, in a context of feeling, sensory intuition, imagery and active impulses of many sorts. How many of these factors are uniquely characteristic of the human organism we do not know. Presumably the make of our sense organs and the arrangement of our metabolic and neuro-muscular systems have a crucial bearing on the detailed character of our experiences; and other sentient organisms must have views very different from ours. But unless one regards the sentient behavior of men as an isolated phenomenon, quite discontinuous with the rest of nature, it seems proper to seek in such human behavior for a working notion of mind which may throw light on the nature of extra-human reality.

I suggest that for our present purpose, sentient behavior such as ours be considered in three main phases: immediate awareness, interpretative cognition and purposive effort, and personal interaction. (1) The first is at once the simplest, the most fundamental, and in some ways the most profoundly significant of all. It is not by any means the easiest

to recognize, and in human experience it probably is never found alone. The second phase, though more complex, is much more easy to recognize, partly because it occupies the foreground in overt practical activity, and partly because it is itself reflective, whereas intuition is not. With some effort, however, immediate awareness or intuition can be identified as a primary factor in every sort of sentient experience known to us. It is just *apprehension* as such; the simple noting, without affirmation or denial and therefore without reflection, of present data—blue color, piny odor, non-identity, euphoria, trend leftward, or what not. Such intuition is involved in sense preception, memory, imagination, intellection, feeling, and in all sentient effort, orientation or directedness. Without it, any talk of “mind” loses its natural meaning; though, once more, in human experience it is one factor in mind, not the whole of it.

Now intuition, or immediate awareness, points, metaphysically, in two directions: toward its objects, and toward its own existential roots and locus. Its objects are timeless forms or essences or data on which its gaze is bent, as a moving beam of light picks out now this, now that still shape in a darkened landscape. Its existential rooting or locus is in a system of vital urges and movements which it appears to guide, as the exploring searchlight guides a liner through the dark. These vital urges and movements need not be thought of as themselves all mind; but mind when it emerges in the midst of them is relevant to their nature as well as to the forms or essences of which it is aware. Animal drives and sensitivities thus provide one suitable vantage ground for intuition, and they appear to be in some measure amenable to its insights. If not, then it is in the strictest sense useless, and practically irrelevant. It should, no doubt, be said that even if mind were only a curious phosphorescence of animal drives which remain, for all practical purposes, stone-blind, it would not necessarily be without value, as an interesting and often beautiful phenomenon. But this latter view is neither Wieman's nor mine, and I shall argue here on the assumption that awareness does make differences in practical behavior.

If this be allowed, it follows that intuition such as we have been considering provides a special kind of tangency between timeless forms and the temporal processes of actual life. Intuition is itself, psychologically, a system of enduring processes. Like all actual processes it has intrinsic pattern or form. But unlike, let us suppose, a simple gravitational, electromagnetic or metabolic process, it not only has pattern:

it "sees" patterns, and selects among them—both patterns which are actualized in its existing environment, and patterns which as yet, save for their being present to the intuition itself, have no locus in actuality. Some of the forms thus "seen" are thenceforth intentionally pursued by the observer who has "seen" them at first as non-actual ideals or possibilities; and through such intentional pursuit they come to be more or less fully naturalized in actual existence. This practical pursuit involves mind in its second phase.

The crucial point in all this, for our present argument, is the rooting of intuition in actual activities in such wise that its apprehension of timeless (and therefore inactive) forms can serve to mediate the entrance of such forms into the stream of actuality. To this point we shall return.

(2) Meanwhile, consider briefly the second phase of sentient behavior, with which the foregoing discussion has now confronted us: the phase of interpretative cognition and purposive effort. In this phase the presence of animal drives is much more plainly discernible. As to ordinary human cognition, we have already seen that it involves "interpretation . . . shaped by automatic organic reaction." We select and interpret data under the stress of concrete interests, preferences or wants. As to purposive effort, quite the most obvious feature of it is the push and strain of tendencies to overt practical action. Now push and strain and "automatic organic reaction" are not, one may suppose, uniquely and wholly mental, even though I come to know them at first hand "just in those instances in which I consciously do something, or am aware of something done to me" (CHRISTENDOM I, 596). But as cognitive and purposive, such activities and sensitivities involve the peculiarly mental factor of intuition which we have been discussing. Purposive effort, exemplified in self-directed activity and in productive work, is guided by apprehension of forms that are now possible and are yet to be actualized. Otherwise, the effort would be not purposive but "blind," in the sense of tending toward the actualization of ends which the striving organism in no way foresees, and the achievement of which is wholly due, in the final analysis, to chance or to the action of controlling factors other than those within the organism itself. Interpretative cognition, exemplified in perception, knowledge and opinion, involves the accumulated deposits of many at least partially non-mental activities, perpetuated as habits, metabolic changes, and so on. But to be cognition, it must include intuitive insight also. In so far as

certain activities are taken up into ordinary cognition and purposive behavior as components which in other contexts might be clearly non-mental, it seems to me not improper to include them, when thus intimately associated with intuition, in the second phase of mental behavior or mind. Intuition remains the hallmark of mind, but it is not the whole of it.

(3) Personal interaction as a third phase of mind is, like intuition, less easy to identify than the more utilitarian phase just discussed. Perceiving a person involves mutuality or reciprocity of a different sort from the simpler stimulus-response linkage between a subject and an impersonal object of knowledge. It involves not merely cognition and purpose—that is, responsiveness with insight—but responsibility. As Santayana says, “When a man believes in another man’s thoughts and feelings, his faith is moral, not animal.” Personal recognition and interaction include all the factors of mental behavior already noticed and, besides these, *obligation* of a peculiar reflexive kind. Profound moral imperatives are more illuminating of personal relationships than ordinary cognitive judgments. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” “Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.” These are typical expressions of clear personal awareness and fellowship. They imply, of course, not the separation of persons from everyday reality, but just the opposite: the compresence of two or more persons in a context full of things to know and do together. They imply that each person sees and believes and acts from his own unique point of view, and that at the same time communication and cooperation with others are possible. They imply that social organization has progressed and cultural *milieux* have developed far beyond the point at which the naked struggle for survival first yields room for sympathetic acknowledgment of others, not merely as instruments or objects for one’s own satisfaction, but as other selves with intrinsic worth. Obligation, among persons thus aware of one another, is different in kind from extraneous necessity or compulsion. It is a freely acknowledged *ought*, in obedience to which one’s own fullest reality as a person is achieved.

III

These are some of the aspects of mind as we know it among ourselves. Now what warrant is there for trying to think of God in such terms as these? I will suggest three arguments, though none can be developed

here in any convincing way. (1) The most basic, to my mind, is the need, already noticed, for an effective and selective bond between timeless forms and fluent processes. If the unifying activity which Wieman (I think rightly, though too exclusively) attributes to God be closely examined, it will appear very clearly that such activity involves the perpetual mediation, into the existential stream, of forms selected from among the infinitely numerous forms which are timelessly possible but not yet temporally actual. Such mediation must be effected, I conceive, by a factor which transcends the flux of events that have transpired up to any given present; since by definition the forms yet to be actualized have not yet any place in actuality, and must therefore be selected and mediated to the flux by a factor which in some way transcends it. This factor cannot be, moreover, itself simply a form or system of forms, whether actualized within the flux, or unactualized, or partly the one and partly the other. For any form localized within the flux cannot extend to forms not yet actual, being just the pattern of that portion of actuality which it characterizes; whereas non-actual forms, whether simple or complex, cannot have the concrete power of mediation or control which God is held to exercise, else *all* non-actual forms would exercise such power at once, and chaos would result.

The mediating factor needed, then, is active and actual, not merely formal; yet in some way transcending the flux of temporal events. And I think no better way has been found to approach the impossible task of defining such a power than the ancient way of declaring it the eternal Logos of God. "Eternal" here does not mean timeless in the way abstract forms are timeless. It means primarily *unwavering*: immune to beginning and fluctuation and passing away. The Logos is alive, and therefore not static; but its aliveness and its grasp of intelligible forms are unwavering and incorruptible. It is contrasted with all particular things which come to be and after a while are not. The Logos, the Wisdom of God, has ever in clear view the archetypal forms of things past, things present and things to come and steadily mediates them into the temporal world which, as the Power of God, the Logos perpetually creates, orders and sustains.

This conception seems to me warranted, so far as such ventures may claim any warrant in human experience, by the character of intuition as known to us. Intuition, we have seen, is an enduring, temporal process, which is rooted in actuality yet contemplates timeless forms. When intuitive attention is most intense, as in absorbed thought, aes-

thetic rapture, mystical ecstasy or engrossing work, the object may so fill the observer's vision that his experience loses the familiar inward sense of fluctuation and approaches subjective unwaveringness; as though his "specious present" were extended beyond normal limits, and his experience were all a steady—though not an abstract, timeless—*now*. Such may be the grasp of an artist on the vision of his unpainted picture, his unwritten symphony; or of a plain man on some cherished hope by which for a time his life is guided. And such appears to me the closest approach we can make to the living border of temporal existence, across which timeless forms are somehow ushered in and out. Both Wieman and I agree that God exerts supreme control over this perennial ingress and egress, though his control is never absolute. My first thesis here is that intuition seems to offer, in its nature as apprehension, the best clue we have to the mystery of divine world-making. More fully developed, this might become a kind of "cosmological argument."

(2) My second thesis is that the character of the world-process suggests conscious and purposive, rather than non-conscious and non-purposive control, though by no means the complete realization of such conscious purpose. This obviously refers to the second phase of mind noticed above, and might be developed into a simple sort of "teleological argument." Since this is already familiar ground in the present discussion, I will not work it out here even in outline. Let me say only this one thing. Wieman, like me, attributes to God a dominant role in the ordering of the world for good. That role seems to me to imply a conscious apprehension of the larger good which is always yet-to-be, and a purposive shaping of natural and cultural changes toward its fuller realization. The alternative to such conscious guidance would seem to be some automatic process, such as an invariable tendency toward unification. Sometimes Wieman writes, indeed, as though he had in mind just unification, as a kind of cosmic tropism. But for at least two reasons, I am sure he does not mean that: he has expressly, though not often, ascribed to God "cracking and shattering" (that is, disunifying) action; and the unification which most interests him is that which takes place among human persons, who would never have appeared in this world at all except that differentiation as well as unification has been going on through incalculable time. But if God acts discriminatingly and not automatically, now joining together and now putting asunder as new circumstances arise, yet always working

toward the greatest possible good, such action seems to me best described as purposive—even though purpose here, like any human term, is necessarily inadequate.

(3) My third thesis, a kind of rudimentary "moral argument," sets out from the nature of mind in personal intercourse. We have seen that in confronting a person, one finds oneself under obligation, of a sort different from physical necessity. In infancy one does not feel it, with respect to either persons or things; but in becoming a mature self, one becomes aware of it inescapably. Now for several reasons I cannot myself escape the conviction that the ground of such obligation is supra-human. For one thing, I am subjected to the claims of divergent human loyalties, and must choose in the light of a norm other than individual attachment. Further, I am forced at times to oppose even the demands of my cultural homeland, with its traditions and its values which are dear to me. And I am confronted, finally, by moral demands which arise, so far as I can see, out of natural as well as out of human social relations: the demands for truthseeking, sound workmanship, preference for beauty, and the like. Whence spring these claims? Partly, no doubt, from human intercourse and its cultural matrices; but partly, I am convinced, from non-human, non-cultural grounds. A culture is indeed my nursing mother in things spiritual. Here Wieman has helped to correct a lack of balance in my thinking (see *CHRISTENDOM I*, 593). But unless there were in nature itself the grounds of truth and beauty, no culture could help me to see them; and indeed no culture committed to such values could itself have arisen and survived. Now in so far as my extra-human environment lays upon me obligations, of the sort which I am apt to recognize most quickly between persons, and in so far as the recognition of these obligations grows clearer and not weaker as I mature, I am constrained to acknowledge at least a certain congruence in this important respect between human personality and its non-human context.

If I should go further, as Wieman rightly does, and declare that my supreme love and devotion should be offered to none other than God, then it will be difficult to avoid recognizing that if these terms mean anything like what they usually mean, the God to whom love and devotion are due can hardly lack altogether the characteristics which usually call them forth. But these are characteristics which I discover first in my relations with persons, and though I may fairly hesitate to call nature or God a person, it seems to me not unfair to argue that the

God revealed through nature and through human cultures and persons is a God with whom the specifically personal relationships implied in obligation or responsibility should be maintained. Then the joining of the two great commandments into one will seem wholly right: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; and thy neighbor as thyself." For my theology, this one twofold commandment is normative, not for merely traditional but for religious and philosophical reasons; and it seems unavoidably to imply personality—another inadequate term—in God.

IV

So cursory a statement is certain to raise more doubts than it allays, and even if it were fuller, Wieman would have a number of objections to urge. Let me notice four.

(1) His aversion to humanism and to anthropomorphism of all sorts is far stronger than most of his critics have realized. I welcome this emphasis in his thought, and have no desire to substitute for it a bit of naive picture-thinking. But two considerations here seem to me important. One is that since God's work seems to us both in so notable a measure intelligible to men, and God's interaction with us so definitely conducive to our better knowledge of him, we must not represent him as so nearly "the Absolute Other" that our knowledge of him would become a hopeless paradox. The other point is that to think of God as helpfully symbolized or revealed by what we know as mind need not lead to naive anthropomorphism. Witness the schools of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics; the Alexandrines—Philo and Valentinus; the great Neoplatonists—Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus; and their legateses among the Arab and Jewish thinkers of the front rank—Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, Spinoza. Witness the philosophers of theistic temper in the Far East, whose works I know only at second hand. Witness the best of the Christian trinitarian theologians, ancient, medieval and modern. Dissent from their views one may, of course, in all sincerity; but dismiss them as uncritical anthropomorphists one cannot. From them, not from later and supposedly wiser men, we moderns have borrowed the very notion of God as *deus absconditus*, "the wholly Other." Christian theology at its best is not naive.

(2) In line with his distaste for all thought of God in terms of mind, though seemingly at variance with his emphasis of the *otherness* of God from man, is Wieman's reluctance to use the term "response" in char-

acterization of God's answer to prayer. It is too meager, he says, and too separative. God's interaction with man is unitive, tender and loving. I am not concerned to press overmuch for the term "response" here, though I think it in fact a good one. Surely it need not be the case that "response works only in the responder." Among friends it may take instead the form of very intimate intercommunication. I quite agree with Wieman at one point, however: that communion with God can be more intimate and more profoundly regenerative of the worshiper than any human intercourse could be. On the other hand, I must insist again that God's activity is not merely and always unitive. Even the answer to prayer has to be, at times, a rending and wrecking, a nay-saying, whose immediate effect is not unifying but disruptive. God's love is not all tenderness, else it would not be *holy* love. There are times when he answers man through frustration, defeat and disaster. And this discriminating, rather than automatic or uniform, answering is one of the reasons for my belief in God's wisdom as well as his love.

(3) Wieman's distaste for separation shows itself in another guise in his revulsion from the thought that mechanism can be the work of God. "Could any age save one made mad by machinery say that God is a maker of mechanisms?" Now machinery seems to me an excellent thing *in posse*, provided men learn to use it more excellently; which is more likely to happen if all of us seek to understand and appreciate it, good and bad alike, than if we fear and despise it. But all that aside, it seems to me quite inescapable that the development of the physical universe has involved the making of immense ranges of mechanism. And if God be the creator of heaven and earth, then it is hard not to think that he has created these mighty and intricate systems, with their external as well as their internal relations. "But external relations as such," urges Wieman, "are not created nor made by any power whatsoever. Hence God does not make mechanisms." *Sed non sequitur*. External relations as such are "not created nor made" by men either, according to the statement quoted; but in the same paragraph he had said: "Machines are made by men." In earlier papers (see CHRISTENDOM I, 440-442) he had indicated further that mechanisms are the work of mind; indeed its distinctive work. It is necessary for him, then, to deny that God engages in such work as this if he is to continue to maintain that the work of God is wholly other than the work of mind. But thus far, I confess, it seems to me that no sound reason for such denial has been adduced. As already remarked (CHRISTENDOM I, 341,

342-3), the logical terminus of such denial is Marcionism, which I still think Wieman does not mean to espouse. The alternative, on his own terms, is to affirm that in world-making, God has performed on a grand scale one of the productive tasks characteristic of mind—though doubtless that is far from the whole truth.

(4) A final objection relates to my belief that God can be Mind, and more. "Mind," says Wieman, "is a summit character in the sense that anything on beyond must be very different from mind. . . . God seems to be high above mind in the same sense that mind is above matter. If one objects to saying that mind is matter, then it seems to me he should object to saying God is mind." But neither of us holds, in fact, that God is merely "above mind" as "mind is above matter." Both of us hold that God's presence pervades reality in a very different way from what that statement implies. And neither of us need object to saying that a human person, for example, is at once matter, life and mind, though he is not simply nor completely any of these. Life indeed is other than matter, mind other than life, and personal selfhood other than mind. But all of these can enter into an inclusive system which is more than any one of them, and none of them wholly nor exclusively. It is in some such way, referring once more to the actual tradition of Christian theology, that one may intend the statement that "God is Mind, and more."

God acts then, I believe, with wisdom as well as with power: maintaining a steady intuitive grasp of forms that transcend actuality; adapting suitable means to selected ends, devising and transcending mechanisms, developing more and more richly interrelated organisms, overcoming evil with good; interacting with men in nicely discriminating ways of justice and mercy, which take account of individual differences of body and mind. God's wisdom is incommensurably greater than ours, involving intuitions quite beyond our capacities, yet not so "wholly other" as to be starkly unintelligible to us in its ways. God's full being, finally, includes we know not how much more than wisdom and power, which themselves have their ground in him. Wieman is right in saying: "God is more than we can think."

Robert L. Calhoun

THE OXFORD CONFERENCE

BY SIR WALTER MOBERLY

THOSE of us who grew up before the advent of the automobile find ourselves in difficulty when we have to cross a street. On the surface of our minds we are aware of the pace of modern traffic; but our habitual and semi-instinctive movements and judgments of distance were formed in a more leisurely era, and it is hard to adjust ourselves. In a rather similar way we are becoming aware, but find it hard to realize effectively, that we are now living in a thoroughly unstable world and that the survival, not only of particular individuals and institutions, but of civilization itself, is endangered. All our habits of thought and action were formed in a more stable order of things. More and more, however, we are being compelled to recognize a situation of which the younger generation is already only too conscious. In the Western democracies at least there is a widespread loss of nerve and a spirit of "defeatism." In a time of war and rumors of war the nations seem to be, almost visibly, rushing violently down a steep place to destruction; and though men's hearts are indeed failing them for fear, they regard the future fatalistically.

This pervading sense of insecurity does not affect alone the course of outer events. It is not only that the machine has become too complicated for human skill to handle, but there is no longer any certainty as to its purpose. Action is fumbling and ineffective because there is no clear and common objective. It is far truer of our age than of Carlyle's that our life's atmosphere has become one vile London fog and the eternal lodestars are gone out for us.

I

To the world thus politically, economically and morally bemused and distraught, what has the Christian church to contribute? It is humiliating to realize how little. The disquieting fact is not that in some countries Christianity rouses violent antagonism, but that so generally it evokes only a polite indifference and is regarded not as pernicious but as irrelevant to real life. The so-called Christian countries today resemble the eighteenth century deathbed at which, it was said,

"the element of religion was not absent but it was not insisted upon."

In sharp contrast to this is the temper of totalitarian countries such as Russia, Japan, Germany and Italy. There—and there only—people in general appear to be taking hold of the conditions of their lives and remolding them with hope and resolution and the exhilaration of a common effort and a common allegiance. They feel themselves on top of things and not that things are on top of them. Here are new faiths, which have the genuine characteristics of religions, for they claim and win the allegiance of the whole man. Indeed they elicit a joyous devotion and self-sacrifice, an enthusiasm and élan, and the faith that moves mountains. They have their martyrs and also their "holy wars." Their adherents have common and clear-cut beliefs about the nature of the world and of man and as to man's place and task in the world; and they hold these not as academic opinions but as burning convictions decisive for action.

But though communism, fascism and national socialism are religions, they are pagan religions, for they demand a supreme devotion to something other than God in Christ. Even where they are not openly or fiercely anti-Christian as in Russia, they are at least non-Christian. In those totalitarian countries in which Caesar is willing to make a concordat with Christ, it is Caesar-worship and not Christianity which is the living and dominating religion of the millions.

In face of these mighty forces the Christian case seems to be going by default. To the layman, the things which the theologians are saying, the controversies about which they busy themselves, appear remote and irrelevant to five-sixths of life; or, if they are not irrelevant, the theologians have failed to make their relevance plain. On the other hand, the layman himself lives in an intellectual muddle and has no clearly conceived or firmly held philosophy of life. He has often been brought up in the Christian tradition, and he still holds this in some degree of respect and sentimental attachment. He dislikes certain features in the new faiths, such as their apparent disregard of kindness, liberty and evenhanded justice; and he suspects that, if they prevail, something precious in his heritage will be lost to the world. But he has no constructive alternative to set against them. He shrinks from asking himself with any clearness or persistency, "What do I really believe?" "How much of the faith in which I was nurtured is true?" and "How sure am I of its truth?"

Thus even in nominally Christian countries there is a gulf between

convention and reality. In Great Britain, for example, there is an "established church." On public occasions, such as the daily opening of the sessions of Parliament, or the laying of foundation stones, or in private life at weddings and funerals, the convention is observed by the offering of prayer. But only a small minority of the citizens of Great Britain are convinced Christians in the sense in which vast numbers of Russians or of Germans are convinced communists or convinced nazis.

If this situation is to be remedied, the Christian church needs not primarily better propaganda, nor even greater devotion, but a new understanding of what it is that she exists to propagate. Today Christians are ineffective in action largely because they are worldly and disunited in principle. So far as the world is concerned, existing statements of the social gospel "cut little ice." They have no sort of corporate authority behind them; Bishop X and Canon Y and Professor Z proclaim, in the name of Christ, their own individual or sectional gospels, which are wholly incompatible with one another. Thus on a matter so vital and so urgently pressing on the minds particularly of the younger generation as war, the Christian church has notoriously failed to give any united guidance. Or, more commonly, in order to achieve unity churchmen relapse into platitudes and issue statements to which no one takes exception because they offer no practical guidance whatever. Thus even when the churches and their leaders are still listened to with respect, they have little determining force on national or international life. They have nothing of equal pungency and realism to set alongside the new faiths. These new faiths may be wrong, but their adherents know their own minds; they are definite, insistent and convinced. Christianity may be right, but its champions seem to sound only uncertain or discordant notes.

If the world is once again to be invited to try the Christian way, the first necessity is that Christians should themselves regain some clear corporate conviction of what that way is. Here our greatest danger is that we are likely to underestimate our present intellectual bankruptcy. The comparative failure of all recent attempts to present a Christian social gospel has been partly due to the tacit assumption that there is in existence a body of Christian principles, readily accessible and agreed upon by Christians generally, which has only to be applied. But in fact such principles are still to be discovered.

The saying of Chesterton that "Christianity has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and not tried," is true but it

is not the whole truth. As a way of life Christianity has also been found nebulous and has not been apprehended. In the two previous ages when Christianity has been a serious constructive force in the world of affairs—the Middle Ages and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—a Christian ethic was worked out with complete realism and in close relation to the actual world of time. Both those ages have passed away and those ethics are no longer applicable. As Troeltsch puts it, "If the present social situation is to be controlled by Christian principles, thoughts will be necessary which have not yet been thought." The new Christian social ethic must be based on a realistic study of, and insight into, the world situation of today.

Still more necessary and still more fundamental is a renewed apprehension of the essential Christian message about God. A very little inquiry is enough to show that all our differences and confusions concerning the social application of Christianity run back into deep theological differences and into confusions concerning the gospel itself. To take an extreme example, how is it possible that Karl Barth and Bishop Barnes of Birmingham should agree about Christian duty in relation to war or capitalism when they are so deeply divided in their understanding of God and man and sin and redemption? If the church is again to be a force in the world of affairs, it will have to rediscover its fundamental theology. What is the Christian view of man as compared with those, for instance, of Marx and Freud and expressed in terms equally relevant to current events and problems? What do we, really and for practical purposes, think about God and about his relation to events and to human effort whether good or evil? Why did he not prevent the World War? What do we believe he is doing about the present world situation and how is that related to what we and other people are doing or failing to do? In short, what do we really mean by divine providence? If Christians are to be effective again, they must be able to answer such questions unitedly and with clarity, and with a confidence at least as great as that of the missionaries of the new faiths.

Recent events in Germany have lately brought all these questions to a head. Under the challenge of the totalitarian claims of the state the German church is being compelled to think out afresh its mission, its status and its relation to the world, to secular life and to secular authority. Its thinking has to be done in conditions of urgency, of responsibility and of peril, when comfort, livelihood, liberty and even life may

be at stake. But the issues involved are vital to the whole Christian church, for the conditions of the church in Germany today may be those of the church elsewhere tomorrow. Moreover, the situation of the church in Russia and Germany and the emergence there of new and powerful rival faiths may well be due in part to past failure to provide a social gospel relevant and adequate to the bitter needs of today, a failure which is shared by the churches in other lands.

II

In these circumstances the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, which was set up after the Stockholm Conference of 1925, has for the past three years been preparing for a world conference of the churches to be held at Oxford in July, 1937. This conference in which all Christian churches, with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church, will be officially represented, will endeavor, by a concentrated effort of thought, discussion and prayer, to attain a new vision of God's will in relation to "Church, Community and State."

The conference will be unlike any earlier conference in the scale and intensity of the preparatory work. This work is being conducted by the research committee of the Universal Christian Council, under the leadership of Dr. J. H. Oldham, and has been in train for three years. The committee has been singularly successful in enlisting the services of several hundred of the leading Christian thinkers in different countries, who have contributed memoranda and have read and criticized the memoranda of others. As a result nine different composite books are in the course of preparation, most of which, it is hoped, will be published before the conference meets and will supply a quarry rich in material for the conference's use. Three of these are largely theological and deal with the presuppositions of the conference. Their subjects are "The Christian Understanding of Man," "The Kingdom of God and History," "The Christian Faith and the Common Life." Five have to do with the application of Christianity. Their subjects are "The Church and the State," "Church and Community," "Church, Community and State in Relation to Education," "Church, Community and State in Relation to the Economic Order," "The Church Universal and a World of Nations." There is also in preparation a volume on "The Church," which has a character intermediate between these two classes.

The conference will consist of three hundred delegates from the churches, one hundred co-opted members, fifteen ex officio members

and ten representatives of other ecumenical movements. Both the delegates and the co-opted members will consist of three numerically equal sections, coming respectively from America, Great Britain and the British Dominions, and the European Continent. Since in the nature of the case the delegates are likely to be mainly clerical, special care is being taken to secure that the co-opted members shall be mainly laymen. Among these there are to be representatives of universities (such as historians, sociologists, economists, jurists, political scientists and students of international law), of public life, of industry and commerce, of the working classes, of women and of the younger generation. The conference will be held in the Sheldonian Theater. In view of the extreme importance of keeping the utmost possible liaison between the conference itself and the larger Christian public, three hundred places will be reserved for further representatives of the churches as visitors or official delegates, and one hundred places for representatives of the various Christian youth movements.

The conference will last a fortnight. Much of the discussion during the first week will be divided into five sections, each of which will present a report for discussion by the whole conference during the second week. The subjects of the conference, one of which is allotted in the first instance to each of these sections, correspond roughly to those of the five preliminary volumes concerned with the application of Christianity to life. They are:

1. The Church and the Common Life (*Kirche und Volk*). This has to do with the relation of the church as a redeemed society to all those spheres of the common life, wider than the activities of organized government, in which Christians live their lives in common with non-Christians. In particular it is concerned with such spheres in so far as they are colored by nationality.

2. The Church and the State.

3. Church, Community and State in Relation to the Economic Order.

4. Church, Community and State in Relation to Education.

5. The Universal Church and the World of Nations. Here will be considered the problem of the relation of the church as a universal society to the claims of nation-states. And here, perhaps, in a special subsection, will be faced the burning question of the Christian attitude to war.

Each of these sections will be working on a draft memorandum pre-

pared in advance by its chairman (who has already been appointed) with the help of a small informal group of advisers. The memorandum will endeavor "to focus attention on those aspects of the subject which, in the light of the preparatory work and discussions, seem to be the most central, the most vital, the most appropriate for consideration by the conference and the most urgently calling for action." It is proposed that these memoranda and the reports which finally emanate from the conference shall bring out clearly the measure of common Christian conviction which, as against non-Christian religions and philosophies of life, may be found to exist. But it is hoped that they will state with equal clearness the major divergences of view which have manifested themselves, because this is the essential first step on the path toward a genuine as opposed to an artificial and purely nominal unity. The one thing that will be shunned like the plague is the finding of a formula!

Though the time of the conference must be largely occupied in discussion, it is hoped that all its discussions will be carried on in an atmosphere of prayer and will be conditioned by that atmosphere. If they are not, it is realized that the conference is foredoomed to failure. The daily morning and evening worship which has been planned, together with the special services on the Sundays, are an integral, and indeed the one really fundamental, part of the whole enterprise.

III

Obviously this program lends itself easily to ironical comment. "You tell us," it might be said, "that our civilization is threatened, that mighty pagan forces are abroad in the world, that the churches are ineffective and something more vital is required. But when it comes to the point, what have you to propose? One more conference; and the method of conference is not new nor do conferences commonly produce revolutionary results. What can a conference do but talk and pass pious resolutions, while the great world rolls on, uninterested and unaffected? Further, is not the program proposed for this conference unduly theoretical? It seems to be little concerned with immediately practicable schemes of action such as engage the attention of the layman as citizen or business man; but rather to be absorbed in difficult and obscure questions of fundamental sociological theory very remote from the immediate practical issues of the hour."

What can be said in reply? First, as has already been shown, the

Oxford Conference differs from any comparable conference of modern times in the quantity and quality of the intellectual preparation which will have preceded it. Naturally the spiritual preparation does not admit of measurement; but at least there is no illusion among those primarily responsible for the organization as to its crucial importance. Secondly, the apparently theoretical character of the program is due to no underestimating of the paramount importance of action, but to a conviction that the action likely to be required of the Christian church in the near future is something much more costly and revolutionary than will or can be undertaken without radical renewal, both intellectual and spiritual. For really fundamental action a re-examination of principles is required.

But in any case the conference is not an end in itself. It only marks the first milestone in the road that has to be traveled. We have our existing creeds only as the result of a long sustained intellectual effort during the early centuries. The specific character of the Catholic faith and its doctrinal implications were gradually clarified through its juxtaposition and careful comparison with the current doctrinal heresies of the day, such as gnosticism and Arianism. We now need the inauguration of a similar effort to work out the ethical and social implications of Christianity by an exact comparison of it with the current heresies of our own day, which are ethical and social, such as communism or fascism. But such a work must take many years, if not many generations.

Further, the business of interpreting the minds of different sections of the Christian church to one another, begun in the circulation of memoranda in the preparation of the composite volumes, and to be continued in the conference, is clearly going to be a slow one. In particular it is already clear that the Continental Protestant theologians on the one hand and the Anglo-Saxons on the other are living in almost entirely different mental worlds. Probably each section has very much to learn from the other. But before they can have a common social gospel, a process of assimilation is necessary in which no more than a beginning can be made by any single conference, however successful.


Again, for the success of the present undertaking the cooperation of a great body of Christian laymen is required. This cooperation is indeed wanted immediately. Before the conference takes place, in all the churches concerned there should be numerous study circles grappling with one or other of the subjects of the conference. When July

comes, there ought to be a wide Christian public that will follow the discussions intelligently and expect their results eagerly. The value of the conference must be determined largely by the volume of thought and work and prayer that is put into it. But owing to the shortness of time available, the chief contribution of the lay public can only be made after the conference. Yet that contribution is essential. Obviously, it is only the laymen who can implement any conclusions the conference may reach. They are needed, in Burke's words, not only as "auxiliaries for battle" but also as "counselors for deliberation." As has been pointed out by Dr. A. D. Lindsay, many of the errors into which the church has fallen in the past, in her attempts to evolve a social ethic, have been due to the fact that one set of people, the theological thinkers, have been attempting to tell another set of people, those professionally engaged in political or commercial life, what it is their Christian duty to do. But, ultimately, it is only the Christian statesman or business man who can evolve a Christian ethic for politics or business.

What is to follow Oxford? It is impossible yet to say. In any case the resolutions of the conference will have no kind of legislative authority. Any consequential action can be taken only by the participating churches or by individuals. But "it may be hoped that an ecumenical gathering, meeting in the existing grave situation, may be enabled by the grace of God to offer some guidance and helpful counsel to the churches in the perplexities of the present time." The influence of its pronouncements must depend on "the truth that is in them in accordance with the insight given by the Holy Spirit." But the future of the "Life and Work" movement and its resources, human and financial, must depend largely on the interest, enthusiasm and energy that Oxford may generate. After Oxford all things will be new; and all plans and all organization will be in the melting-pot. In any case, the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work is cooperating with the other ecumenical movements in the appointment of a joint commission to review the whole work of ecumenical cooperation since Stockholm and Lausanne and to make recommendations to Edinburgh and Oxford regarding the future policy, organization and work of the ecumenical movement.

The Oxford Conference will perhaps be unique in the paradoxical combination of humility and expectancy with which its promoters are awaiting it. It is a venture of faith, which may of course end in mere

talk. It is immensely and, from a purely human and rational point of view, even inordinately ambitious; for it is hoped that something may be achieved incomparably more important than the achievements of all previous conferences. But the only basis for such a hope is a direct reliance upon the grace of God. The belief in which the conference is being organized has been well stated by Pasteur Henriod, the general secretary, in his last report to the Universal Christian Council: "Human idealism and good will are powerless against the liberated forces of evil. Idealism tinged with Christian principles, or Christian principles adjusted to human religions, whether national or international, are not the heaven to which the gospel refers. . . . Unless men bow their heads before God and yield to him their will, their wisdom, their pride, their good will, there is no way out of chaos." So, in relation to the conference and to what may come out of it, those engaged in the work of preparation venture to hope for some just act of God, proportionate, not to the scanty human resources that are available, but to the greatness of the need and, possibly, to the completeness of our recognition of our own inadequacy.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. A. D. L. G." with a long horizontal stroke underneath.

THE COLLAPSE OF COTTON

By BRADNER J. MOORE

KING COTTON is tottering to a fall and, as with Humpty Dumpty, all the king's horses and all the king's men (the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Soil Conservation Administration) will not be able to put him back on his throne again.

Who shall rule the vast empire in his stead? He was neither a wise nor a fair ruler, for he played favorites, exploited the majority of his subjects and ruthlessly destroyed the natural resources of his kingdom. His reign leaves the South with her people impoverished and her fields devastated, eroded on the hillsides and pest infected in the river bottoms. How has this come to pass? Why could not the wealth produced through the years have been retained and fairly distributed among all classes engaged in the growing of cotton, so that this might now be a section of comfortable homes and prosperous people? And can anything be done to recapture the brilliant promise of the early years?

In order to answer these questions with intelligence, we shall have to glance over the history of the South from the days of its first settlement, and then look more closely at the several groups which are involved in the present crisis.

I

The Southern empire was built up on the institution of slavery following the invention of the cotton gin. Practical monopoly of this revolutionary invention by a small class, cheap virgin lands and slave labor made possible the great fortunes which became the basis of the South's aristocracy. As a result, there flourished in this section a culture unique in the New World, comparable only to the landed aristocracies of England and France during the same glamorous era of urban industrial development. The lord of the Southern manor sought to model his scheme of living after the patterns found in Sir Walter Scott's imaginative romances. Necessary slave-driving was delegated to overseers, who came from among the poor whites, at that time for the most

part farming the uplands which were too poor to support the institution of slavery. The plantation had to produce enough above the keep of the slaves to support the owner's household in the grand manner. When the soil's capacity fell below that requirement, it was abandoned to the poor whites. The system could not provide for soil conservation, nor did it need to with a surplus of virgin soil always at hand.

The slaves represented negotiable wealth which with emancipation was destroyed and so the war left the South economically prostrate. Without money or credit, with depleted soil, with only the primitive equipment formerly used by the slaves in cultivating the crops and with little or no agricultural knowledge Southern landowners must make a new start. The millions of recently freed slaves had to be put back to raising with the old equipment the only crop they knew anything about. So came into being the sharecropping system. It alone was able to meet the demands of the situation. The rich lands were in the bottoms needing to be cleared and only the ex-slave was sufficiently resistant to malaria to survive in the mosquito infested clearings. The swamps were prepared for cultivation with gruelling labor, while the undrained and stumpy deadenings prohibited the use of any but primitive tools. Cultivation called for an enormous amount of hand hoeing which, with picking, made cheap labor imperative.

The sharecropping system provided for a minimum of cash outlay while the crop was being planted and cultivated, and allowed for final settlement with labor on a basis of money returns. Conditions of servitude were not very different from those of ante bellum slavery, but the Negroes were easily satisfied if the end of the year brought them a little unaccustomed cash and a few articles of dress or entertainment in keeping with their needs.

At first there were few pests to bother the cotton, but as the same land was poorly farmed year after year in the same crop, it became infested with weed, insect and fungus pests, as well as depleted in natural fertility. Making cotton became less and less profitable while land values advanced and mortgage and tax rates grew higher, until there was little left for the landlord and his labor. Under the jungle law of survival of the fiercest, a bitter struggle followed. It was a struggle for economic existence among the merchant who advanced supplies to the planter while the crop was growing, the local banker who advanced cash on a crop and stock lien, the plantation owner, his riding boss and the croppers. And there was a struggle for advantage

between white and colored croppers, the whites having entered competition with the Negroes for employment on the plantations during the years of increasing demand for cotton. This last struggle was further embittered by race prejudice among these helpless pawns in the cotton growing game. In many instances the merchants and bankers were forced to foreclose their landlord customers to protect their accounts, while those owners who could do so secured loans from insurance companies and other loan institutions. Finally came the federal land bank to encourage the piling up of excessive mortgaged indebtedness throughout the cotton belt. Many lenders have been forced to operate plantations which they never wanted to own. It needs to be said that as relentless creditors the federal land banks took precedence among those Shylocks who would have their pound of flesh even if it killed the debtor.

The demands for prompt payment by these various lenders made it impossible to develop a diversified farming practice, since the whole section of the country is geared to cotton payment. Cotton warehouse receipts were almost legal tender, while there was practically no market for other produce. So the debt structure was pushed higher and higher on its insecure base, while productive capacity steadily declined and world markets for the staple began to melt away with economic collapse in foreign lands and with the successful production of cotton in South America, India, Egypt, China and finally in Soviet Russia. Prices advanced for the things which the cotton grower had to buy. The enforced use of fertilizers and of poisons in combating the boll weevil added to his difficulties.

The government's efforts to uphold prices through curtailed production helped a little in reducing the mortgage debt, but the decreased acreage in cultivation spelled bitter disaster to croppers, both white and colored, in loss of occupation. And the development of farm machinery and of practices which allow for greatly reduced hand work in the fields has also helped to precipitate a situation which seems to defy solution on the basis of past experience.

Immediately involved in this calamity are the following classes: (1) sharecroppers; (2) renting planters; (3) managers or riding bosses; (4) owners; (5) bankers and merchants; and (6) mortgagees. These groups have not been named in the order of importance. It is true that the situation of the croppers is most appalling, but the answer to the major problem cannot be found by disregarding the fact that the crisis threatens all alike. We may be certain that unless something

constructive is done, and done soon, this whole section of the nation will be involved in an unprecedented social and economic debacle.

II

The sharecropper class makes up a very large part of the population of the cotton growing section, except in the newer cotton provinces of the West, where machinery and migratory labor are extensively used. It is a class already pauperized, except for the few who live on fertile and well managed places belonging to owners with some social conscience. The agreement between the cropper and the plantation is to the effect that the cropper shall plant and work under the direction of the plantation owner or his agent. A one-mule crop, worked by one plow hand and one to three hoe hands, is from fifteen to thirty acres. Two or more plow hands in a squad call for additional mules and a larger acreage. The plantation furnishes the cropper with a house and a well, and he is free to cut his fuel from the plantation woodland. The usual house is a two-room cabin for a one-mule squad and four rooms for a squad working two mules. The houses are seldom painted, and fewer than half of them have glass windows. Open fireplaces are provided in the main rooms and flues for stoves in the shed rooms. The tenant may have a garden plot, hogs, chickens and a cow where the plantation can furnish pasturage. The tenant must build fences and shelter for his garden and stock. On some places the tenants are encouraged to keep livestock and have a garden. On others this frugality is discouraged as part of the managerial policy.

Medical attention is provided by the plantation, but the cropper is charged for such services as he may receive. In addition to the cotton acreage the cropper is allowed to plant an acre or two in corn for his own use. He pays money rent for the corn land and in many cases is required to sow cow peas in the corn to conserve fertility. Where fertilizers and poisons are used the cropper pays half the cost, plus a profit. The plantation furnishes the cropper with food and clothing for which he is charged "credit" prices. Some plantations furnish cash with which the cropper may purchase his supplies in nearby towns, though this is rare. The amount supplied is based roughly on the acreage cultivated. It used to amount to about fifty cents an acre per month, or two dollars and a half an acre for five months—from the beginning of March through July. During the years of prosperity following the World War this allowance went as high as a dollar an acre or six dollars for six months. Since the depression the amount allowed

for supplies has been squeezed down to a stark minimum. Many places set a record of eight cents a day for each person during the five months of cultivation. That is twelve dollars a month for a family of five. When the contract is signed a sum is also agreed on as Christmas money.

If the plantation breaks the ground for the tenant with tractors or large gang plows, the tenant is charged for the service, and he will also be charged if he requires any assistance in hoeing or picking the crop. He is given work on the plantation at such times as his crop does not require his labor, if the plantation has such employment to offer. There is usually no agreement as to rate of pay for this work, that being arbitrarily set by the management.

Nor has the cropper much choice as to whether he will accept work. He is ordered out, and unless he is sick or his crop needs him, he must obey. On well managed plantations discipline is strict. The tenant, his wife, children and other dependents must work as directed. Coercive discipline is maintained in many ways on different plantations. The strap is much less resorted to than formerly but is still used. Fines are often assessed against the tenant's share of the crop; supplies are cut down, and sometimes the whole family is evicted as a punishment for insubordination. The law is invoked where officers are amenable to the wishes of politically influential planters. Most riding bosses carry guns and will use them with little compunction where it is necessary to maintain authority. Always in the background is the threat of mob vengeance.

From a half to three-fourths of a bale an acre is produced in normal years, unless the land is very poor and little or no fertilizer is used. Eight to twelve bales to the mule is considered good production. An average of ten bales to the family with but one plow hand is more often expected than realized. The cropper is supposed to get one-half of the amount realized for the cotton he raises. The plantation either gins the cotton or has it ginned by someone with whom it has an agreement as to the price of cotton seed. The gin buys the seed from the plantation at an advance on the retail market price. The gin tolls are deducted from the amount the seed brings, and the tenant gets half the remainder, as a bonus. The cropper usually gets his seed money in cash, on which he is supposed to live while picking the crop. The sale of the cotton also yields the place a profit, as it is bought from the tenant for less than the market price. In sections where long staple

cotton is grown the premium paid for the extra lengths allows for a wider spread between these two prices.

The average one-mule cropper's full share of the proceeds of the crop will run from \$250 to \$300 on rich delta lands. From this is deducted his supply bill, or "furnish"; his doctor's bill, if any; half the cost of fertilizers and poisons; extra labor in crop; rent of corn land, and maybe pasturage; advance at Christmas time; and interest on indebtedness. The legal rate of interest may be eight per cent, but the plantation cannot afford to lend money at such low rates without security, and so a straight 10 to 25 per cent is often charged for all items without regard to the time elapsed when paid. When all these charges are deducted from the credit, very little is left for the year's work. The members of this presumptive cropper's family have had a bare existence on supplies and services worth about \$12 per person, and what they earned from labor outside the crop, at 25 cents a day for children, 50 cents for women and 75 cents for men. This, with the price of their share of the seed, not more than \$40 or \$50, brings the probable total to not more than \$150, and the unfortunate worker often comes out in debt. In this event, the debt is added to the charges against the next year's crop, if the tenant stays on the place. If he leaves, his scanty effects are held as security.

Very few croppers try to accumulate livestock because of the cost of feed and the likelihood of having it taken from them. On some plantations a fair settlement is had, but in every case it is the landlord's settlement. To question its correctness is to invite calamity, especially for Negroes.

Some of the croppers own their own stock and equipment and give a fourth of their produce for rent, but all seed, fertilizers, feed and poisons are charged to them, and they are required to work under the same strict supervision as the "half hands." It all comes to the same thing: a year's work from the whole family for a pitiable existence. These croppers are seldom on one place for more than a few years. They are forever looking for the ideal home and never finding it. One house is much like another, ugly and uncomfortable. If money is made one year, it is lost the next.

We have not space here to go into the matter of the potentialities of these hard-pressed people. It will have to suffice to say that they are human beings like the rest of us—some good and some bad, some wise and some foolish, all capable of development under more favor-

able circumstances. The Negroes are nearly all gentle in their manners, tractable and grateful when shown kindness and sympathy. The whites are of fine Anglo-Saxon stock. In youth they are generally well up to par physically and mentally. Beauty and grace are common among them, but poverty, ignorance and malnutrition soon render them physically unfit and mentally dull, and middle age has reduced them to human wreckage. The children of these tenants are getting better schooling than their parents had and some of them develop into capable young men and women, who, seeing the hopelessness of their parents' situation, strike out into other fields of endeavor. These practically pull themselves up by their boot straps to positions as teachers, ministers, riding bosses, store clerks and the like. The field for advancement is more limited for the children of the Negro tenant, but in spite of severe handicaps even some of these climb the steep ladder of advancement.

Most plantations prefer Negro laborers, because of the relative ease with which they may be controlled and because they are better satisfied with poor living conditions. While responding to kindness with loyalty, they can be kept in a position of subservience, known as "their place."

The whites, called "peckerwoods" or "rednecks," are considered best for outlying locations where close supervision cannot be given, as they are not so amenable to dictation as the Negroes, and they are usually more thrifty and can better be trusted with the care of stock and equipment. Moreover, as a group they stick to the depleted uplands longer.

Such is the traditional situation of the cotton cropper now threatened with annihilation. Power machinery supplanting the mule is reducing the number of hands needed to make the crop. The handwork of hoeing and picking can be done cheaply with labor hired by the day for a few weeks in the spring and fall. Ejected croppers move to the nearby cities and towns and are forced on relief because they know how to do nothing but the primitive work demanded by the plantation system, and there are no new opportunities for such employment. These ex-croppers can be hired to chop and pick the cotton for very low wages, while the relief agencies carry them between these short periods of employment. The promise of a successful mechanical cotton picker looms in the background as a threat that the fall work will soon be taken away, reducing a large part of these one-time settled

workers on the land to the nomadic status of Mexican laborers in the West.

The renting planter is in better position. He is usually white and may have been a successful overseer or manager who is trusted with running a plantation on a rental basis. He must have accumulated a little capital or won the confidence of someone who is willing to finance his venture. He may be a former owner who has lost his place and retained his stock and tools which he can offer as security for supplies on credit, or he may be a thrifty cropper who has got his foot on the ladder of economic success. In the latter case he is sometimes a Negro, but rarely. His crop is security for the rent, so that the owner takes little chance in leasing. This is often a better arrangement for the absentee owner than running the place with a manager. The renter skates on thin ice because his margin is narrow, and unfavorable seasons or poor markets may wipe out his operating capital and leave him with nothing. He has to work his crop as do the owners and is often unable to buy machinery, fertilizers and other supplies which make the difference between success and failure. This puts him at a serious disadvantage in a bitterly competitive game. If he can get land at low enough rent, he is better off than an owner who is debt and tax ridden, as most owners are. But he is more likely to be wiped out than the owner-operator.

The manager or riding boss is an unhappy but important minor factor in this fearful struggle. He is paid very little and is expected to perform miracles. He must work against depleted soil and crop pests, with poorly paid and dissatisfied labor, inadequate equipment and insufficient capital. He does the dirty work in manhandling the croppers and making shady settlements with them. He carries his life in his hands, as he is liable to attack at any time. He lives in a house that is often little better than the cabins of the croppers. His children have few advantages in poorly taught and overcrowded schools, and he is suspected of dishonesty by both those above and those below him. He and his are social pariahs, and the tenure of his position is very uncertain. Much of this criticism does not apply to a small class of well paid and highly efficient managers of large properties.

III

Now what of the owner? He is owner by courtesy because the title to the plantation is in his name, while the holder of a heavy mortgage

is really in control. First let us see how he came to be an owner, for we must realize that only a few of his class are deliberate and willful exploiters of labor. He may have inherited the plantation; he may have inherited money and invested in good land; he may have made his money in the city and fancied himself in the role of a landed gentleman; he may have had to take the place to protect a loan; or he may have worked himself up from the status of a renter. The owner may be a bank or other corporation lending money on first mortgages. In any case, he is responsible for the conduct of the business and his attitudes are industrial rather than agrarian.

The resident owner likes to think of himself as being in a feudal sense the friend and protector of his tenants, and he often sincerely believes that his treatment of those dependent on him is generous.

During flush times, when cotton prices were high, these owners expanded on borrowed capital and they owe as much as or more than their places are worth. Taxes are burdensome, interest on loans is high and principal payments are past due. New equipment is needed, tenant houses and other buildings are in bad repair, the plantation does not raise enough feed for its own use and each successive crop makes very little more than enough to pay running expenses. He cannot keep down his personal spending. Markets are uncertain, and any margin of profit remaining after meeting an absolute minimum of necessary obligations must go to the mortgagee in payment of defaulted interest, and after that toward principal reduction.

A number of owners have been able to refinance their loans through government aid, in which case the rates of interest and terms of payment, extended over a long time, have eased the burden. But in many cases insurance and loan companies, having loaned more than the security is good for, have insisted on full payment and have prevented the refinancing of the mortgages held by them. This has left some properties in a desperate situation and beyond governmental aid, since the federal loans are based on conservative valuations.

The planter finds his tenants careless, lazy, wasteful, thieving and with increasing insistence demanding more for their services, while they wreck vacant tenant houses for fuel and to repair their outbuildings. His manager is incompetent and probably dishonest—and the holder of the mortgage is officious and critical of his management. It is getting harder and harder to borrow enough money to carry on. The federal government has helped during the past few years, but that gain

has gone toward reducing the mortgaged indebtedness and has not been adequate to banish the haunting threat of foreclosure.

More must be made out of the undertaking. Every possible lock of cotton is being forced from every available acre, and every known trick in marketing is being tried. The planter's debts are the most real things in his life. They must be taken care of and his creditors must be held off until times get better. He is threatened with the loss of all that he has and his necessity knows no law or moral obligation. To his thinking the situation gives him the rights which his desperate need dictates, and there is no use appealing to his sense of fair play or to his sympathy. If he goes to the wall, his world will end with his catastrophe. During the first years of the depression in cotton growing many desperate planters could find no way out except by suicide.

IV

To these sorely beset owners there remains only the expedient of cutting down labor costs. They must find some system of employment which will reduce the amount now being paid for labor—either a different contract or the use of labor-saving machinery. The planter hopes that the perfection of the mechanical cotton picker will offer a way out if it is not delayed too long. But, on the other hand, a successful tenant farmers' union would precipitate his ruin by increasing labor costs, which are already heavier than the traffic will bear.

With a better price for cotton, things are looking more promising than they have for some time, but the planter knows that he cannot count on the continuance of such prices. He must maintain a wage standard based on average expectations. Whatever increase there is in his earnings this year will have to go toward mortgage reduction and replacement of necessary equipment. This present-day planter is not a character in a romance of the old South but a hard-driven industrialist, fighting for his economic existence and ready in his desperation to fight with every weapon he can command against those who threaten him.

Local bankers and merchants, who until recently have been living in ease and comfort from the system, have not given much thought to where it might be leading or to the unhappy plight of its victims. It is to the interest of these bankers and merchants to keep the system in operation because it supports their chief customers. Lawyers, doctors and newspaper publishers are in this class, too. If the planter should

go to the wall, his creditors would go with him. All of these have encouraged the growing of cotton to the exclusion of anything else because cotton would pay their bills more surely and quickly than any other crop. Town and city are economically and morally involved in this setup, and everyone in the South is deeply concerned with the problem's ultimate solution.

And now the mortgagee! Individuals, banks, loan companies, insurance companies and many others in the pursuit of profitable use of capital have been lending money on supposedly good farm mortgages. The money loaned went for more land, improvements, stock and equipment and generally was used to increase the value of the investment which stood as security for the loan. Such money was considered to be wisely and safely loaned, but the value of the security dwindled with failing production and falling prices. The profits of the cotton growing industry have disappeared and for all the pressure put on the borrower the lender does well to collect the interest. What payments have been made on the principal, through the paternalistic generosity of the AAA, have not served to reduce the debt to an amount corresponding to the value of the security. In order to keep down extravagance in personal expenses the holder of the mortgage has often put the owner on an allowance for his personal and household necessities. In such cases the owner must get permission to purchase a new car or to send his children off to school. In spite of every precaution the total mortgaged indebtedness has increased as the years have passed. Mortgaged places are now more encumbered than ever before, and fewer are free of debt.

While it is true that in the whole cotton structure exploitation is the rule, in these mortgages we have the keystone to the arch. If the holders of mortgages on cotton plantations were willing to share losses with those lower down in the system and would refinance the mortgages at a greatly reduced capital valuation and interest rate, the situation would be improved. In many cases interest rates have been reduced with government aid, but this cannot remove the burden of enslavement from poorly compensated labor. With land valued at fifty dollars an acre and taxes levied at one dollar, and with five and six per cent interest, the fixed cost is almost four dollars an acre; sometimes more. This might conceivably be cut in half by recapitalization and lowered interest rates such as the government is charging in its resettlement loans, but the small saving divided between the owner

and the tenant would yield but about one dollar an acre to each, or twenty or thirty dollars a year to the sharecropper.

V

What can be done, if anything, about this apparently hopeless situation? There are a number of tentative answers.

The answer of the plantation owner is a fascist one. Seeking government help for himself, he wants unrestricted freedom to exploit his labor and land and the right to discard workers when he can do with fewer hands. The immediate result of his remedy would be to reduce vast numbers of people to human refuse. The ultimate result would be to precipitate a bloody revolution.

The labor leader seeks to organize the workers in a strong union which will secure for its members better working conditions and a larger share of the fruit of their toil. The immediate effect of this proposal would be to relieve the stress of the cropper's pitiable condition, but the ultimate effect would be to ruin the present owners and other classes dependent upon the owners.

The federal government is making a sincere effort to help. First, attention is given by the agricultural administration to the matter of building up and maintaining prices through controlled production in the hope that with a few prosperous years the mortgage burden might be removed and the plantations put on an economically sound footing. If this could be done, which does not appear probable, it would be at the cost of prohibitive prices for cotton products to the millions of consumers. The result would be an increase in the prices of the things the planter must buy, which would cancel most, if not all, of the gains from better prices for cotton. The benefits so far brought through the AAA were not enjoyed by the croppers and have not materially helped the owners.

The second effort of the government is in the direction of first-hand aid to the cropper and tenant class through the Resettlement Administration. This project seeks to free the cropper from his economic slavery by putting him on a farm of his own and by giving him a long time at reasonable rates of interest to pay for his land, buildings and equipment. This is a praiseworthy effort and will no doubt greatly better the situation of those selected for the experiment, but it does not promise a solution of the whole problem, for reasons which can be briefly stated.

Where the projects have been set up on cutover land, the labor of clearing is enormous and the stumpy condition of the plowlands and meadows will restrict the use of labor-saving tools for a number of years. Where old land has been secured, it is more or less depleted in fertility and infested with such pests as coco, Johnson and sedge grasses, entailing heavy expense for fertilizers, lime and other restoratives. Besides, dividing the plantations into small farms and putting croppers on them would be taking a step against the current of progress. The lot of the farmer, cut off from technological improvements, is one of heavy toil, and to sacrifice the advantages made possible through large-scale operations is no twentieth century solution of the farm riddle. Even if the erstwhile tenant could make out somehow with cotton at present prices, he could not do so when efficiently industrialized large-scale growing, inevitable when the mechanical picker is perfected, brings lower prices. When cotton can be grown and harvested as wheat is in the West, its value as a money crop for the small farm will disappear. In that case the government would have to continue subsidizing the small farmer indefinitely or else close him out and recast its rural aid on some cooperative basis. This brings us to the heart of the problem.

There are no answers to the questions raised by this decadent plantation system to be found within the present economic setup. If the government bought up all cotton lands and parceled them out without cost among the Southern farming people, making no provision for getting cotton products to those who need them, cotton farming would still fail. King Cotton cannot pay tribute to an economic suzerain and retain his throne. It should also be remembered that the cotton spinning industry cannot, or will not, pay a living wage to its exploited workers—another phase of the same economic tangle.

The weakness of the cotton growing business is fundamental to the whole economic system. The means of distribution are inadequate. Very few people in this, or in any country, have all the cotton goods they need. If the poverty stricken millions throughout the world were able, they would buy enough of these things to wipe out the surpluses of both manufactured and raw cotton and so give the growers a challenging task; and if the cotton farmers received enough for their produce they would be in the market for the things which they cannot grow.

Numerous efforts have been made to find the answer through the

cooperative farm, but so far such attempts have failed. They will in all probability continue to fail, because they must tie into the profit-seeking system and perforce operate on a profit motivated basis. If cotton prices are high enough and the cooperative is not overshadowed by debt, it might survive for a time, but it will eventually fall under the stress of the competitive system.

Unless the national government takes hold of the cooperative as it has the Tennessee valley project, bringing cotton growing on a large scale under scientifically planned and controlled measurement, the nation will soon be faced with the complete collapse of the cotton empire. Such a project, or authority, may be used as a yardstick with which to measure the survival worth of individualized farming.

It seems to this student of the situation that the tottering dynasty of the fleecy ruler offers the strongest available evidence of the inadequacy of the whole economic system, and he believes that remedial measures, however successful, within the present fabric of capitalism will but prolong the death throes.

Dradner James Moore

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE RUSSIAN CHURCH?

By P. E. T. WIDDRINGTON

IF by the Russian church is meant the Orthodox Church in Russia, no complete or satisfactory answer can be given to the question which is the title of this article. There is a conflict of evidence due to the fact that the policy of the Soviet government depends to a considerable extent on the ways it is administered in the various provinces of the country. The communist theory, to which the Soviet government is committed, requires the liquidation of all churches and the destruction of the religious instinct. But the exigencies of statecraft compelled the government to a recognition of the right of the church to exist for the purposes of "religious confession." "Freedom for religious confession and antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens" according to Article V of the constitution.

I

By "religious confession" is to be understood the holding of church services. Religious propaganda is not permitted. This is made clear by the seventeenth article of the law of April 29, by which it is forbidden "to organize either special meetings for children, youth or women for prayer or other purposes, or general meetings, groups, circles or departments, biblical, literary, handworking, labor, religious study, etc." and "only such books as are necessary for the performance of the religious ritual are permitted to be kept in the church building and houses of prayer." The law forbidding instruction in religious faith to those under the age of eighteen is still in force and no religious instruction of children in numbers of more than three or four is permitted. Training centers for candidates for the ministry are illegal and so is the publication of any religious journal, pamphlet or book. Priests must live outside of towns and may only visit them for church services.

It is necessary to give this brief résumé of the penal laws against religion because an idea is abroad that there has been of late some radical change in the Soviet policy. The granting to the priests under the new constitution of the right to vote and the modification of the rigor with

which the penal laws have been administered do not mean that persecution is at an end or that the church has regained its liberty to preach and to teach. All that can be said is that it is allowed to provide devotional facilities for those who continue to have a taste for such practices.

The position of the Metropolitan of Moscow is not an easy one, and Archbishop Sergius is the subject of much criticism not only by the Russians in exile but by many of the Orthodox in Russia. He is not a great man, and the price he paid for the legalization of his status and that of the church is regarded as exorbitant even by many of his supporters. The declaration signed under the coercion of the government in which he denied the existence of persecution in Russia and charged those who suffered death for the faith with the commission of anti-revolutionary crimes and his obsequiousness to the government have gone far to destroy the respect that Orthodox Russians have for a metropolitan. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that his policy is in accord with primitive precedents and that he is facing a situation when the "first duty of a Christian is to live, to hide the Word in a living breast, to keep it and to hand it on; and the second duty is to die, to die for the faith after living in the faith, so as to pass on the faith intact." These duties the church in Russia has discharged and the Metropolitan Sergius, its leader, may argue that no further duties should be expected of it. It has no liberty of action, it can instigate no reforms, it cannot openly proclaim the gospel; it cannot even teach its children: it can only pray, worship, strengthen its members by sacramental grace to suffer the loss of all things for Christ's sake and, if need be, to die.

Is there any prospect of a larger measure of toleration? I believe there is. The grounds for my belief are twofold. First, there are indications that the attempt to root out religion among the Russian people has disappointed the hopes of the leaders of the Militant Atheists and the Godless Union. The report presented by Loukachevsky to the conference of Militant Atheists last year makes some notable admissions. The Godless Union is still baffled by the stubborn resistance their efforts encounter. The antireligious lectures bore the people: "Frequently we cannot muster an audience." "Those who broke with religion long ago and have heard lectures dozens of times are not interested in them . . . and the believers who after eighteen years of the revolution keep steadfastly to their faith avoid these lectures." A secretary of the Godless Union reported in 1933 that 50 to 60 per cent of the churches

had been closed. This would leave 20 to 25 thousand parishes, each with the necessary legal nucleus of twenty to take responsibility for the church.

Again, on June 9, 1935, Yaroslavsky made the following statement in a speech before the All-Union Conference on Antireligious Propaganda: "If I were to estimate how many people at present do not admit the influence of priest, rabbi or mullah; how many, that is, have cut themselves off from religion, I think the figures would not be less than 50 million, perhaps more." But the population is 168 million, which leaves 118 million still under the influence of religion. If the antireligious propaganda among adults has failed to produce the results its instigators anticipated, they also admit that their success with the children of the nation has not been conspicuous. "The non-religious are wrong when they declare that there are very few religiously minded children among the school pupils." Interesting statistics are given by A. L. Perovsky in *Antireligious Education in Primary Schools* (1934) which serve to demonstrate that a marked proportion of the children have acquired the habit of prayer and a large percentage go to church systematically, Sundays and holidays. In a document which has the endorsement of Sir Bernard Pares, recently returned from a visit to Russia which has caused him to take a more favorable opinion of the Soviet achievement than that which he had previously expressed, we are told that "considerable numbers of the younger generation who have been taught the official atheist dogma at school, openly show their undiminished reverence for the Christian faith."

In the second place, the attempt of the fascist powers to isolate Russia, and the alliance between Germany and Japan against her, make her anxious to conciliate opinion in Great Britain and the United States. If there is one opinion which is shared by the great democracies of the New World and the Old it is that which regards liberty of conscience as the inalienable right of every citizen. And it is the flagrant violation of this right by Soviet Russia which estranges the sympathy of those who recognize the right of every country to adopt whatever social system it chooses. The victimization of men and women and the exile of bishops, priests and monks to labor camps in Siberia and elsewhere, because they profess the Christian faith, disgust many. The abandonment of persecution and the concession of the maximum amount of liberty possible in a totalitarian state, would do much to change the attitude of liberal-minded people both in America and Britain.

Stalin is a realist in politics, and therefore capable of jettisoning strict fidelity to the Marxian creed when the interests of Russia are at stake. The antireligious campaign absorbs energy, is still meeting with stubborn resistance, and is a barrier to any understanding between Russia and the countries she wishes to conciliate. In spite of the articles in the constitution and other state documents hostile to the existence of religion, and the campaigns waged by the government against religion, I am convinced that there will be a change in Stalin's antireligious attitude. I affirm this in face of the declaration made in the *Comsomolskaya Pravda* of November 14: "Stalin's project of the constitution, which reads 'Freedom for the conduct of religious cults and freedom for anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens,' does not anticipate any sort of weakening of antireligious work. On the contrary, this work must be developed by all possible means."

Such a measure of toleration as I have indicated would mean only a very partial revivification of the church in Russia. But it would enable it to survive. It would not be in a position to re-evangelize the lapsed, much less to set before the nation the Christian message to society. It lacks leadership. Its bishops for the most part are obscurantist in theology and reactionary in social outlook. Most of its priests are old and many of them broken men. The enthusiasm of the priests and laymen for the reforms contemplated by the synod of 1917-18 has evaporated in the sufferings of the last twenty years. The revivification of the church in Russia must be sought for, not within Russia itself, but within the "church in exile." It is what is happening in the church in exile, more specifically, in the Orthodox Church in France, to which I would now direct attention.

II

There are, on a conservative estimate, between six and eight hundred thousand Russian exiles. Some authorities give the number as more than a million. "The Russian emigration presents a particularly striking spectacle. It is a whole nation in miniature: bishops and humble monks; army commanders of the highest rank and private soldiers; judges and lawyers; professors and students; employers and employees; landowners and peasants; partisans of the old regime and socialists who fought against it; members of the Orthodox Church, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Russians proper, Ukrainians, Tartars: in short, all elements of the old Russian empire numbering some million men, women and children" (Rubenstein: *The Refugee Problem*). Of the

exiles, between 160 and 180 thousand are in France. Half of them are living in or around Paris. It is in Paris that the new movement in Orthodoxy has its center. It is in Paris that the majority of the intellectuals who have returned to the faith since the revolution are living. It is in Paris that the Russian church possesses its one seat of theological learning. It is in Paris that the new leaven is fermenting which is destined to transform Orthodoxy and render it the most vital religious impulse in the Christianity of the future. I have watched the development of the "church of the exile" for the past ten years and am convinced that it is of vital significance for the whole church of Christ. I shall give my reasons in the final part of this article.

The Russian exiles in France are for the most part the remains of the old armies, which fought with the Allies in the World War. They have suffered as no other section of the Allies has suffered. They have endured eighteen years of exile. They are without citizenship and without rights. They exist on sufferance. They are made to feel that they are not wanted. During recent years their condition has grown ever more desperate on account of the economic depression in France and the passing of rigorous laws restricting the employment of foreigners. Vast numbers of the exiles came to France at the invitation of the French government. They were needed to make up for the decline in man power. Since the depression began in the country, the treatment of the exiles has been increasingly harsh, and many of them have been imprisoned for offenses against the labor laws. In one year France spent over twelve million francs on imprisoning refugees, mostly for technical offenses—being without means, having no labor permit, having lost papers of identity, and the like. How appalling is the suffering through which the exiles have been passing is demonstrated by the continual toll of suicides, never so heavy as it was last year.

How is the church of the exile endeavoring to cope with the situation? It is not too much to say that in the midst of the suffering brought about by poverty, underfeeding, overcrowding and unemployment, the church has become a citadel of hope built on the very edge of the abyss of despair.

Times of crisis produce exceptional men, and the Metropolitan Eulogios is a case in point. He is the outstanding figure in the Orthodox Church episcopate: a real "father in God" to his people, humble and saintly, and at the same time a wise and far-seeing statesman, a conciliator able to mediate between the divergent elements of which the

exile is composed. He is deeply venerated and loved by his people. He has under his jurisdiction more than forty parishes in France and almost the same number scattered through eleven European countries. Twenty-five of the forty parishes in France are in or around Paris.

III

The Russian Theological Seminary is under the control of the metropolitan. It has been in existence for twelve years. It offers a thorough training to students prepared to share a life of self-denial and hardship, for the students live on the simplest fare and under rooming conditions which would deter all but men with a stern sense of vocation. It has a staff of professors and tutors which would excite the envy of any American or British theological college. It is presided over by Sergius Bulgakoff, a profound thinker, and has among its lecturers Professor Berdyaev, who is now coming to be recognized on both sides of the Atlantic as one of the major prophets of our time. The seminary has immense possibilities which cannot be actualized on account of its poverty. The money for the seminary has been supplied for the most part by the American Y.M.C.A. and the British Russian Clergy and Church Aid Fund. That the seminary survived the acute period of economic depression is largely due to the gallant championship of Dr. John R. Mott.

The seminary has immense possibilities. What is wanted is an intelligent man of wealth who would give the money to endow an Institute of Orthodox Culture, which would absorb the seminary as it now exists and open its doors to American and British professors and students. I can think of no benefaction pregnant with such possibilities at this moment, when a new apologetic is imperative if Christianity is to be equipped for its task in a new world.

The training which the students receive fits them for the hard life they must face in the parishes. A Russian priest rarely expects a definite stipend. Having food and raiment he must be content. In several of the parishes in the outskirts of Paris there is no stipend for the priest other than the poorest lodging and meals, which he is given at the scanty tables of his people. It is no uncommon thing for a priest to be working as a laborer in a factory and ministering to his flock after working hours and on Sundays.

The churches of the exile remind one of the churches described by Harnack in his *Expansion of Christianity*. They are more than places

of worship: they are centers of the life of the community. At one moment they are clinics to which Russian doctors give their services and where medicines are dispensed. At another they are labor bureaus and clubs for the unemployed. At another they are the consulting rooms of a poor man's lawyer, a godsend in a country where it is not easy for a foreigner to understand the laws. Here in the evenings are discussion circles and lectures. But best of all their secular uses is that they serve as a common home for the children, an escape from the overcrowded tenements and the dangers of the streets. Here are held the Thursday-Sunday schools (Thursday is a school holiday in France). Shortly after 9 o'clock the children assemble for lessons on their homeland and its culture, a Bible lesson and a short service. Many of the children return in the afternoon for games.

The church buildings are often disused factory buildings or motor sheds; a few have been built by the voluntary labor of the people. The church I know most intimately consists of a school lent without charge by the Protestant church, an appreciated act of generosity. It consists of two large school rooms, one used as a club and the other converted into a very beautifully appointed church. Both club room and church bear witness to the artistic gifts of the congregation. Four years ago the Russian colony of about four hundred souls had neither church nor priest. Its members were sinking into despair, and moral degradation was rife among them. Today it is the most remarkable church of the exile in Paris, with a large body of workers and the happiest children I have met among the exiles.

New parishes are continually being planned. Wherever there is a colony of Russians, attempts are being made to get them together and stimulate the desire for a church of their own. The work usually starts in a cafe and is undertaken by laymen. In the course of next year, it is hoped, the needs around Paris will have been provided for and work in the provincial centers may be more seriously undertaken.

The Student Christian Movement has supplemented the work in the parishes. It has provided for the needs not only of students but of all classes of the Russian community. Every year it has organized camps for children and young people in the south of France and in Savoy. These camps have been the means of saving hundreds of children from tuberculosis, the scourge of the exiles. Each camp has its doctor and its priest. Educational work, evening classes covering a wide range of subjects, have done much to equip the exiles for business and industry.

Organizations which correspond to our boy scouts' and girl guides' movements have brought pleasure, health and discipline into the lives of the young people. During the depression and acute unemployment among the exiles, the Student Christian Movement has run a hotel at which free meals are given and where men can find shelter.

The youngest of the agencies created by the church is *Action Orthodoxe* or Russian Christian Action in France. It was founded eighteen months ago at a conference called by the metropolitan. Its origin was the evangelistic efforts which a group within the Student Christian Movement had made from time to time not only in Paris but in the provinces. *Action Orthodoxe* is an evangelistic society. It seeks to strengthen the work of the existing parishes, to prepare the way for the creation of new parishes, to seek out the Russians who have sunk into the dark underworld of Paris and to educate the social conscience of the church.

Its headquarters are in the nunnery in the Rue de Lourmel and its chairman is a talented and remarkable woman, the head of a new religious order. Mother Maria was once a well known social revolutionary, and she has brought into her religious vocation the dauntless courage for which she was famed in her days of political agitation. The nunnery is unlike any religious house known to me. It shelters a hotel for girls engaged in business, is a refuge for old ladies who have no one to care for them—the lot of the old in exile is tragic—houses a clinic and a restaurant where every day sixty or eighty unemployed men, not a few of them intelligentsia, professional men, artists and writers, get a substantial meal for a nominal payment, and serves as a club for unemployed men and their wives. The hall of the nunnery is used for conferences and lectures. The chapel, which was originally a garage, owes its beauty to Mother Maria's gifts as an artist. When Mother Maria took the house in the Rue de Lourmel she possessed ten francs; today the house is self-supporting.

Nearby is a hotel for men to which is attached a restaurant. A new venture is a hotel for young men, mainly taxi-drivers. The hotel is a converted mansion in one of the pleasant parts of the city. A further example of Russian Christian Action is the post-convalescent home for tuberculous men at Noisy le Grand, six miles from Paris. A year ago the Russians, being "stateless," were not admitted to the French sanatoria. I shall never forget a visit I paid to a wooden shack, erected as a temporary hospital by the American army and used by the Paris mu-

nicipality as a dump where they put "creatures that once were men," the flotsam and jetsam picked up under the arches, rotten with disease. In that horrible place I found Russian officers and men suffering from tuberculosis!

Hospital visitation is another branch of *Action Orthodoxe*. This is under the direction of a priest who has devoted himself to the care of the sick. Some day it is hoped a nursing association may be organized to supply nurses who will visit in the homes of the people. Lastly, there is the rescue work in the underworld of Paris and in the districts outside the old city walls where human beings, men, women and children, are living in shacks not fit to house cattle. This branch of the work merits the epithet "heroic." These "lost" folk form only a very small proportion of the emigration. By visitation and sympathy and help it is possible to save many of them.

Such is a brief account of the way in which a church without resources is endeavoring to cope with its task.

IV

I have already referred to the church in exile as the new leaven which is destined to transform Orthodoxy and render it the most vital factor in the Christianity of the future. Never in its history has the church been confronted by a world presenting such a complexity of problems. And the question which many devout and thoughtful Christians are asking is: Can Christianity meet these problems? Is the Christian apologetic adequate? If by Christianity is meant the Christianity of the West, the answer is in the negative. For there are aspects of revealed truth that the Christian West has either forgotten or failed to make explicit in its teaching. Some of these truths are the heritage of the church of the East. They belong to the age of the Greek Fathers. Their explication and development were arrested by the long sleep to which thought in the Orthodox Church succumbed. But the age of sterility and decadence is at an end and a new age has dawned. The Russian church in the exile has awakened and is arousing the other churches of the East. She is no longer the church of the closed mind. The Bolshevik revolution has inflicted grievous wounds on the body of the church, but it has been the instrument by which its mental and spiritual creativeness has been released.

I have heard it affirmed at a conference of Russian Christians that the persecution and the exile should be regarded not as evils but as

blessings. For they have given the church a freedom it never possessed. Under the czars the church was protected; under the Soviet it was persecuted; in the exile it is free. But freedom must be transformed from a negative to a positive good; it must be used as the condition and opportunity of creative thought and life. "Freedom has been given us in order that the church may be liberated from historical evils which have grown up around its life and stifled its liberty." And further, the creative thought germinating in the church of the exile will be conserved for the holy Russia of the future and will also enrich the theology of the West.

Orthodoxy in the exile is possessed by a passionate search for truth. The search is concentrated upon revelation, anthropology and cosmology. Is not the fascination exercised by the theories of Steiner and other schools of cosmologists the result of the ignoring by the church of an essential element of the Christian revelation? The universe has been surrendered by the church as the province of positive science, the natural sciences and technical invention. "When and where do we hear sermons in which sin and redemption are placed in their cosmic setting, in which the Pauline groaning of the entire creation is no mere figure of speech but the consequence of a primordial disaster which befell the world and which is repaired by the resurrection of Christ as a cosmic event involving the transfiguration and cure of the entire body of the universe?"

The ideas adumbrated by Soloviev and Dostievsky are fructifying in the minds of the intellectuals who have returned to Orthodoxy. Their exposition, explication and criticism are being undertaken. By his work on Christian anthropology Berdyaev is doing service for the whole church. I close with some words of his: "The meaning of the cosmic process cannot be exhausted by redemption. Man must share the work of God's continuous creation of the world. Nor is the cosmic process a juridical process between man and God. And man's vocation cannot be fulfilled by the justification before the divine tribunal. Revelation was not completed by the Gospels. There is gnosis: continual revelation." Or, as Bishop Butler wrote in the *Analogy*, "The Bible contains many truths as yet undiscovered."

P. S. T. Whelan

TWO POEMS

BY CARL JOHN BOSTELMANN

THE CALL TO ARMS

DRUMS of doom parade the meek to battle.
Death's bugle calls. The flags of war are flying.
Come, youth, the gods of hate demand their chattel!
Prepare, my brothers, for this time of dying!

The martial madness of the regiments
Infects the populace. From hill to hill
Prolific thunders voice the eloquence
Of maniacs, teaching mankind to kill.

Hate, still your drums! War, make your trumpets mute!
Earth, stay vain sacrifice of singing sons
Conscripted out of life! Love, give salute!
God, keep young laughter from the lust of guns!

MECHANISM

WHAT price
This mechanism, this device
Of man's immaculate inventiveness?
What fee
This splendid rhythmic symmetry,
This sinewed miracle that hands have wrought
Out of imagining, this mighty thought
To which all human actions acquiesce!

Challenge the pistons in their impetus,
Question the turbines in their unison;

Certain, immediate, monotonous,
They chant the same long answer as they run :
“You have endowed us with your gifts of dower ;
Your will is our will, and that will is power !”

This dream
Made actual of steel and steam,
Conceived of human strength and laws of nature—
This wheel
Has yet new wonders to reveal,
New beauty unsuspected and unsought,
New alchemy and magic to be caught
By wiser men with minds of greater stature !

We are the pistons in their impetus,
We are the turbines in their unison ;
Constant, obedient, oblivious,
We function in them and our will is done :
This is our heritage, this is our dower—
We are this mechanism ! We are this power !

JESUS' CONFLICT WITH THE PHARISEES

BY GREGORY VLASTOS

NO PART of Jesus' life more frequently embarrasses modern interpreters than his conflict with the scribes and Pharisees. This phase of his career, if we may accept the Synoptic account of it as being on the whole reliable, seems so flagrantly inconsistent with Jesus' own ethic. "He urged his disciples to love their enemies, but so far as we can judge he showed little love to those who opposed him. He urged that the lost sheep be actively sought for ; but except in the way of sheer abuse and bitter vituperation, he did nothing to win over to his own conception of religion the Pharisees and rabbis who ventured to criticize and dislike him." These are the words of Montefiore, a singularly fair-minded critic. If Jesus' ethic of love be the perfectionist non-resistance of current interpretations, this charge seems unanswerable.

The paradox is sharpened if we remember that modern research has emphasized the similarity between the teaching of Jesus and that of his bitter opponents. Both the general statement of the law of love, and many of the precepts which particularize it in the Gospels, can be matched in rabbinic literature. It was a rabbi who declared "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" to be the most comprehensive rule in the law. A foreigner came to the great Pharisee, Hillel, and asked to hear the whole law while standing on one foot. This was the answer : "Do not do to your fellow what you hate to have done to you. This is the whole law, entire ; the rest is explanation." In the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* we read :

Put away hatred from your heart, and love another in deed and word and thought. . . . Love one another from the heart ; and if a man sin against thee, speak peaceably to him, and do not hold guile in thy soul. . . . But if he is shameless and persists in his badness, even so, forgive him from the heart, and leave the retribution to God.

What was it, then, that Jesus held against the rabbis and Pharisees? To answer this may bring us closer to the mind of Jesus than all the traditional platitudes about the "positiveness" of the Golden Rule, the

"inwardness" of his ethic or his alleged stress upon the "supreme worth of human personality."

I

The scribes traced their origin to a commanding figure of post-exilic times, "Ezra, the scribe." It was he, according to tradition, who came up from Babylon to re-establish in Israel the forgotten law. He brought together the priests, the Levites, the nobility and those who "had separated themselves from the people of the lands." They pledged themselves under his leadership not to intermarry with "the people of the land"; to observe the Sabbath and the seventh year; and to pay the various taxes, dues, first-offerings and tithes for the support of the temple and its ministers. About a fifth of the covenant, as described in Neh. 10:28-39, concerns marriage and the Sabbath. About four-fifths of it are devoted to economic provisions. These were doubtless very important in the eyes of the new class of scribes, who followed in the steps of Ezra as students and expounders of the law. Their powers were not merely religious. They included important legislative, judicial and administrative functions in the civil community. They constituted a privileged social class who were exempt from manual labor. Sirach, the scribe, thus draws the contrast:

Learning is the privilege of leisure. Husbandmen and artisans are the support of the social structure, but, wholly occupied as they must be with their several callings and often highly expert in them, they have no time for the wide ranging studies that make the scholar. They are therefore not qualified to be called to the council or to take the lead in the assembly; they cannot sit on the judge's bench, for they do not understand the principles of the law, and cannot bring out the rights of the case and a just judgment.

It was a similar movement for the stricter observance of the law that led some three centuries later to the rise of the Pharisees. "The garments of Amhaarez [the people of the land] are *midras* [that is, defiled by pressure] for *Perushim*," says an ancient text. The *Perushim* of this text are none others than the Pharisees. The word means "separated"; separated, presumably, from the Amhaarez, the people of the land. How important is the religious significance of this separation we can judge from Hillel's categorical statement, "No Amhaarez is religious." Its political implications are no less important. The Pharisees' party, formed under John Hyrkanus (135-105 B.C.), became engaged in a desperate struggle for power against the Sadducees,

the hereditary priestly nobility. Under Hyrkanus and his son, Jan-naeus, the Pharisees seemed to get the worst of it. But they came to power under Queen Alexandra (78-69 B.C.). Her brother and chief minister was Simeon ben Shetah, a Pharisee. The Pharisees gained control of the Sanhedrin and even of the temple. The growth of the synagogue extended their influence through the land. Josephus tells us that "they have so much power with the multitude that even when they speak against the king and the high priest, they are instantly believed"; and that the Sadducees in office "give way to the demands of the Pharisee, because otherwise they would not be tolerated by the multitude."

II

In all of Jesus' polemic against the scribes and Pharisees recorded in the Synoptic Gospels there is not a hint of disagreement on the doctrine of God. Never does Jesus accuse his opponents of having a false, or inferior, notion of God. Nor could he. They too believed that God is a Father; that his providence extends to all, man and beast; that he hears prayer; that he stores up reward for the righteous and wrath for the evildoer; that he sees all; that his love never fails, but is ever open to those who repent and return. The last two points deserve special emphasis. Christians have argued all too hastily from a legalistic morality to a legalistic theology, and have claimed superiority for the God of Jesus, who looks not upon the outward deed, but on the inner disposition, and is ever ready to forgive. In both cases they have misjudged the God of the Pharisee and scribe. In his *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, Abrahams cites the following prayer of confession attributed to Abba Arika, a famous ritualist: "Thou knowest the secrets of eternity and the most hidden mysteries of all living. Thou searchest the innermost recesses, and triest the reins and the heart. Nought is concealed from thee, or hidden from thine eyes." Abrahams also quotes this rabbinic parallel of the parable of the Prodigal Son:

A king's son went out into evil courses, and the king sent his guardian after him. "Return, my son," said he. But the son sent him back, saying to his father: "How can I return, I am ashamed." His father sent again saying: "My son, art thou indeed ashamed to return? Is it not to thy father that thou returnest?"

When we come to ethics, however, the matter is clearly different. The Pharisaic ethic is conservative. The Torah accepts the fundamental social divisions between rich and poor, rulers and ruled, wise

and ignorant. It applies within those divisions and lends a spirit of humanity and kindness to their operation. Consider, for example, the teaching on wealth and poverty: The scribes take a very realistic view of the poor man's hardships—

All the days of the poor are evil [Prov. 15:5]: Ben Sira said, the nights also. The lowest roof is his roof, and on the highest hill is his vineyard. The rain off [other] roofs [falls] on his roof, and the soil from his vineyard on [other] vineyards.

But the true good, fidelity to the Torah, is open to poor and rich alike. In this respect there is no inequality. "The rich God tries whether his hand be open to the poor, the poor he tries whether he can calmly endure affliction." And the final justification of economic inequality was always ready to hand: "If all men were equal, all rich or all poor, who would perform the loving-kindness of truth of Psalm 61? . . . This theory, that the poor are necessary to the rich, runs through the Jewish theory of almsgiving and charity in all subsequent ages" (Abrahams). Thus the Torah sanctifies social distinctions in a double sense: It urges a spiritual use of material misery or good fortune; it accepts both as the necessary tests of true godliness.

Recent writers have stressed Jesus' affinities to the scribes and Pharisees. Guignebert: "His roots were in the soil of Pharisaic piety." Case: "In his sympathies and aims Jesus had more in common with them [the Pharisees] than with any other Jewish party of his day." Bultman draws attention, among other things, to the title, "Rabbi," which "marks Jesus as belonging to the class of scribes." He goes so far as to conjecture "that Jesus, being a scribe, had received the necessary scribal training and had passed the requisite scribal tests." If this should prove to be true, it would only make the clash more intelligible. The many things they had in common would explain the violence of the few things that divided them. Jesus was almost a Pharisee, yet he was willing to step over the line of separation of Pharisee and Amhaarez.

And as he passed by, he saw Levi the son of Alphaeus sitting at the receipt of custom, and said unto him, Follow me. . . . And it came to pass, that, as he sat at meat in his [Levi's] house, many publicans and sinners sat also together with Jesus and his disciples: for they were many, and they followed him. And when the scribes and Pharisees saw him eat with publicans and sinners, they said unto his disciples, How is it that he eateth and drinketh with publicans and sinners? [Mark 2:14 ff]

Abrahams tells us that the Gospel's phrase, "publicans and sinners,"

parallels the expression, "publicans and robbers," in the rabbinic literature. For a Pharisee to admit such persons to his company was a hostile act against the Pharisaic system. It amounted to pulling down in a single gesture all the careful scaffolding which upheld the social system and its Pharisaic champions. A distinction had been drawn between those who pay the tithes and those who do not. If it goes, what assurance is left that the religious taxes will be paid? A wall had been raised between ignorant and learned. If this is torn down, what becomes of the authority of the experts on the law? Jesus' willingness to condone laxness in the observance of Sabbath and of dietary and ceremonial regulations was a direct challenge to the authority of scribes and Pharisees, a menace to their power.

Hence the terrible disagreement in their agreement. When the Pharisee pronounced Lev. 19:18 the great commandment of the law, he meant: To love your neighbor as yourself you must respect his rights as defined by existing regulations; you must promote his well-being in the Jewish community by attending to all your duties of Sabbath, ceremonial and tithe, which sustain that community; in short, to love your neighbor as yourself you must submit in every respect to the wisdom and authority of those who understand the Torah, and are the only ones fit to instruct you in the meaning of love. When Jesus pronounced that great commandment his meaning was very different: When you have truly loved your neighbor, you have no further need of the Torah, because you have already fulfilled it; you can dispense with social distinctions, for these are excluded by love. What does it mean to love my neighbor? Answer: The parable of the Good Samaritan. The Samaritan succeeds where the priest and the Levite fail because of his very willingness to override barriers of caste in obedience to love.

The sayings about receiving the kingdom of God as a little child; about the things hid from the wise and learned, but revealed to babes; about the first who shall be last, and the last first—all these things take on sudden meaning in the light of this conflict. They mean: Sirach, the scribe, is wrong. Husbandmen and artisans admittedly have not the privilege of leisure, and not the knowledge of the law that comes with that leisure. That is all to the good. A new order is at hand, where none of these things matter anyway. The scribes and Pharisees, who are first in all these things, are no nearer this order for all their learning. But those who are last, whom oppression and suffering have

kept mere children in the ways of this world, they are wiser for love, readier for the kingdom of God.

It is thus in Jesus' feelings toward rich and poor. He distrusts the rich. Like the Pharisees, they are first. They fare well in this order; their values are tied up with it. All they know of love is the humanitarianism they can practice consistently with the maintenance of their privileges. Whatever their loyalty to the great commandment, it cannot lead them beyond the tried comforts and flatteries and securities of their status. Will they ever be able to venture into that unknown region where only love is certain and everything else is uncertain? Hardly. It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. It is different with the poor. Blessed be ye. Yours is the kingdom of God. Not that you have done anything to deserve it. But only that poverty will not keep you from it, as riches would. You have nothing to lose—no possessions, certainties, treasure on earth. You have received no consolation and will cling to none.

III

Consider now the epitome of Jesus' judgment of Pharisaic morality: hypocrisy. The stinging words of Mark 12:38-40 and Matt. 23 have often been taken as an attack upon conscious insincerity. Such an interpretation betrays, to put it mildly, a lack of subtlety. Conscious insincerity is a negligible factor in human conduct. It was no more prevalent among the Pharisees than among any other class of religious professionals before or since. To attack a whole class for a sin which could be charged justly only against a small minority within it would be the height of spiritual insensitiveness. The scene would then become: A consciously good man attacking consciously bad men. In this case, it would be more appropriate for the accusation to be reversed. Socrates could tell us as much; and so could Jesus. When the Pharisee stood up in the temple to pray, "God, I thank thee, that I am not as other men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican," there was no conscious insincerity in his prayer. But he was a hypocrite, none the less. He did pretend to be better than he was; not because he was trying to hide something from God, but because he did not realize how much there was to hide.

There is a simple-minded kind of hypocrisy which sets out to deceive others by pretending unreal virtues. Most men graduate from this

tenderfoot stage before they reach the age of twelve. They learn to deceive themselves before deceiving anybody else; to get disproportionate returns from their moral achievements by the simple expedient of exaggerating their real virtues. This achieves the same results at much less cost of inner conflict; one can practice it with a clear conscience. It serves the good man as well as the bad man—and hypocrisy is the besetting sin of the good. Its most fertile soil is a ruling class; its most flourishing specimens are among the spiritual aristocracy in that class. A truly sensitive conscience would have to meet problems that spring from one's very membership in a privileged group. Quite apart from any questions of personal virtue, such a one must reckon with the larger issue: Have I the right to the kind of goodness which is based on exclusive privilege? Unresolved, this doubt is devastating. And, once raised, it is not easy to resolve it. It is best—best psychologically—not to raise it at all, to accept unquestioningly the rightness of my class morality; strive for moral perfection within its standards; and then argue from the moral success thus achieved to the absolute rightness of the standard. Thus I find a moral sanction for class division and class exploitation. I can resist with righteous wrath any change in the social system which would prevent me from practicing my indisputable virtues. If you deprive me of my riches, you rob me of the chance to be generous to the poor. I can argue in all sincerity: "If all men were equal, all rich or all poor, who would perform the loving-kindness of truth of Psalm 61?" This is hypocrisy worthy of the mettle of moral athletes.

The *locus classicus* of Jesus' attack on his spiritual opponents is Mark 12:38-40. (Matt. 23 gives the substance of this passage on a grander scale.) They "love to go in long clothing, and love salutations in the market places, and the chief seats in the synagogues, and the uppermost rooms at feasts: which devour widows' houses, and for a pretense make long prayers." The major charge is social ostentation; the other is greed facilitated by repute of piety. The scribe would deny both passionately. He would feel innocent on both counts. He does enjoy his conspicuous dress and the social deference it commands. But why shouldn't he? It is not for himself that he makes broad his phylacteries, and enlarges the borders of his garments. He walks into the market place not as a mere individual, but as the costumed conscience of the social system. A slight to him would be a slight to the Torah. And as for coming into property through his religious offices,

why not? Who would make better use of it than one so fully instructed in the law, so anxious for its protection and propagation? There is only one kind of hypocrisy the scribe would recognize: feigned love for the Torah. But his devotion is genuine. He is first to denounce spurious piety. And the vehemence of his attacks on the conscious hypocrisy of individuals leaves him more secure in the unconscious hypocrisy of a class.

IV

Many a modern reader will object, "Is it not an anachronism to foist the class struggle on Jesus and the Pharisees?" It is quite true that Jesus did not possess our modern concept of social classes. Yet he knew the difference between rich and poor. He could deliver himself upon occasion of a parable like that of Dives and Lazarus, where the characters are described in bare class terms, without the trace of a reference to personal ethics. Dives "was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day." Lazarus was a beggar at his gate, "full of sores, and desiring to be fed with the crumbs which fell from the rich man's table." That is all we hear about them. The next thing we see is Lazarus in Abraham's bosom, while the rich man suffers the torments of hell. No reason is given for this turning of the tables, save Abraham's heartless reminder: "Thou in thy lifetime receivedst good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things: but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented." A more complete affront to individualistic morality can hardly be imagined.

But let us come to that part of Jesus' ethic that is not so shocking as to be almost incredible. Whatever he may have thought about social classes, there is no doubt about what he did. In every major social division he identified himself with the underdog and asked his disciples to do the same. As between rich and poor, he sided with the poor. As between Pharisees and Amhaarez, he sided with the Amhaarez. From many angles he returns to the paradoxical superiority of social inferiors: "This poor widow hath cast more in than all they [the rich] which have cast into the treasury." "I tell you, this man [the publican] went down to his house justified rather than the other [the Pharisee]." He seldom misses the chance to generalize: "For everyone that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted." His active ministry begins in the Gospel of Luke with the offering of himself to the poor, the broken-hearted, the captives, the

blind, the bruised ; it ends in the Gospel of Matthew with an expression of complete identification with the hungry, the thirsty, the stranger, the naked, the sick, the prisoner, "one of the least of these, my brethren."

From everything he did and said one conclusion is borne upon us—his ethic of love meant the tearing down of social barriers. The Pharisee who clings to social superiority and still claims loyalty to love can only land in hypocrisy. The rich young man of spotless private morals still lacks the one thing needful to enter eternal life—renunciation of his great possessions. Love entails for Jesus a classless society, where there is no exclusiveness of wealth, religious office or political authority, where your servant is your great one and the slave is first.

V

We are ready at last to consider the meaning of the kingdom of God for the ethic of love: the kingdom is to the Torah what revolutionary love is to humanitarian love. For the pious Pharisees eschatology answers the need of individual reward or retribution. The Torah can and must be practiced wholly within the present order of society ; in fact, it is the pillar of that society. The righteous deserve reward. They may not get it now. The righteous poor will not become less poor through more scrupulous payment of tithes, *terumah*, first-offerings, sin-offerings, thank-offerings, shew-bread, *quallah*, temple-tax and free-will offerings, in addition to the grinding taxes required by the Roman government. The unrighteous rich, on the other hand, may be the richer for his carelessness in religious dues. He must be assured of a punishment which all too plainly does not come to him in the present state of things. The balancing of accounts in a future life was an absolute necessity for the social conservatism of the Pharisaic ethic. This enables us to understand why it was that "the Pharisees, and they alone, developed the belief in the resurrection" (Herford). The hope of a national golden age did not meet the needs of individualistic morality. The good man must be assured of a personal place in it, even if it were to come along after his own death. The sinner, on the other hand, must be excluded.

Jesus shared the Pharisaic belief in the resurrection of the dead and the doctrine of reward. And he did not hesitate to combine the two: "Thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just." Yet the contrast of the messianic kingdom in his ethic and the ethic of the

Pharisees is none the less absolute. For the Pharisee the expectation of the kingdom confirms social inequalities in the present. For Jesus it abolishes them. The thought of the future serves the Pharisee as consolation for present frustrations and discipline for present irregularities. This is, for Jesus, a very secondary motif in the announcement of the kingdom. The first and dominating thought is, "Repent." This does not mean for him, as it would have meant for the Pharisee, "Repent, and become more law-abiding members of this society, that you may be rewarded for your pains in the world to come." It means rather, "Prepare yourselves for a new order which now threatens and condemns the existing one, and renders its virtues and exactions null and void." Thus Jesus' kingdom is not meant to police this society, but to upset it. It does not ask of the rich to be more generous in their charity; it asks them to become poor. It does not counsel the poor to show long-suffering respect for their superiors. It teaches them the falsehood of existing valuations in the face of the imminent reversal, where the first shall be last, and the last first.

Anyone who took seriously a revolutionary interpretation of the ethic of love would have to ask himself: What order of society will take the place of the existing one? What definite steps must be taken to realize it? He would be asking, in other words, for a social philosophy and a political program. Jesus answered both through the expectation of the kingdom. Or, rather, that expectation relieved him of the necessity of finding an answer. A miraculous intervention of a supernatural God would bring in the new society at an hour which no man knoweth. God and his angels would reckon at that hour with the kingdoms of this world. It was utterly unnecessary for Jesus and his faithful to organize a political and economic revolution. God would look after that.

To the modern reader this must sound like a splendid evasion of the whole problem. We ask for a social strategy, and get stones for bread. The scene shifts to the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power and coming on the clouds of glory. But this only means that Jesus did not share our naturalistic approach. In this respect he was utterly different from us. To rob him of his apocalyptic hope and turn him into a modern reformer is to do him violence. It is to make a simpleton out of him, who preached revolution in his ethics, to assume that he expected it to come about through a summation of changed hearts, while the power of Caesar and the Sanhedrin continued undisturbed.

When a few score years later his church began to relax the expectation of the speedy coming of the kingdom, it began also to water down the revolutionary ethic of love. Clement of Alexandria had to do a lot of allegorical sweating to prove that, after all, a rich man *could* be saved. The apocalyptic hope served as a revolutionary weapon to a period whose moral insight far outran the practical possibilities of the political world. Without it the ethic of love could never have been more than a precept of accommodation.

VI

Revolution means conflict. Spiritualize its meaning as much as you will, you can never get away from that. New wine means the discarding of old bottles. No man can stand as the herald of a new order without challenging the beneficiaries of the old and incurring their hostility. Jesus is no exception to the rule. And he was quite aware of the fact:

Think not that I am come to send peace on earth : I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance with his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law : . . . He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me. And he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me. And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me. [Matt. 10:34 ff]

These words are consistent with the whole direction of Jesus' teaching. There is the old order, here is the new. You cannot have both. You cannot serve two masters. Where do you stand? Choose. Conflict is written inescapably in the fact of incompatible alternatives, in the necessity of the choice, either . . . or. You choose to go with the new. Your father and mother choose to remain with the old. You are at variance with them not because you love them less, but because you love the kingdom more.

Conflict thus appears in Jesus' ethic not as a compromise of the absolute imperative of love, but as the inevitable result of its incidence on a hostile world. The words of Matt. 5:38-48 lose none of their force. The obligation to love the enemy continues undiminished. But there is a choice which every man must make for himself. If I decide one way, and someone else decides the other way, we are divided. The will to love cannot ignore this on pain of degenerating into smirking amiability. To retain its seriousness it must acknowledge the fact of present division and work all the more resolutely for the new world where con-

ditions which breed conflict will no longer obtain. In the meanwhile, all I can do is to remember that vindictiveness, bitterness, violence of word or deed, are never goods in themselves. "Blessed are the peacemakers; for they shall be called the children of God" (Matt. 5:9). Yet Jesus was no peacemaker. No honest reading of his relations to the scribes and the Pharisees can avoid this disagreeable conclusion. Had his prime object in life been peacemaking, he would have avoided that conflict. But the price he would have paid for peace would have been compliance with the Pharisaic view of love. He counted the cost, and chose war.

Did he do so with any sense of rankling personal bitterness? We have his response to the scribe who answered intelligently, "Thou art not far from the kingdom of God." We have the words from the cross, "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do." Peace is a great good. But it is not the greatest. It is not greater than love. "He who would love all men must oppose some" (Wieman). One does not deny the value of a lesser good when one must sacrifice it to a higher one. "It is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire."

VII

Every generation rewrites its history. It is not that the past alters, but that we change, and that our changed present opens new perspectives and raises new questions. This is pre-eminently true in the case of Jesus. The quest of the historical Jesus never ends. As our experience grows we discover new truths about his life and teaching undiscerned by our fathers, not because their eyes were less keen than ours, but because they were turned in different directions and looked for other things.

The liberalism of the nineteenth century read the ethic of Jesus in line with its own genial individualism. It honored Jesus for discovering the "inwardness of ethics" and the "supreme worth of human personality." It pointed to his emphasis on the inner disposition, the hidden thought, the heart whence good and evil acts proceed. It lingered on the parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin, the Prodigal Son; on the various sayings which express utmost concern lest "one of these little ones" be offended; on his final question, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" It interpreted the ethic of love as a command to individuals to cultivate personal feelings

of tenderness, kindness and benevolence for their neighbor. Nor would it be fair to forget its social concern. It recognized that loving feelings must be nourished by deeds of mercy, and sustained by social harmony. Hence its active program of humanitarianism. It explained the kingdom of God as the reign of the spirit of God in each loving heart, and expected its speedy arrival with the abolition of illiteracy, intemperance and slums.

The underlying assumption of this approach is clear enough: Morality is essentially a personal matter; it is concerned with the relations of one individual to one or more individuals. It does not ignore, of course, the existence of group relations. But it reasons quite plausibly that each group is nothing more than a collection of individuals; if you wish to change the conduct of the group, change the heart of the individuals who compose it. It has never come to grips with the question: Can an individual acting with the best of intentions, with the highest conscious regard for personality, and with a steady sense of good will to those around him, still remain consistently immoral? The question, in other words, is that of the moral man in the immoral society—or rather of the man who strives to be moral and feels moral, but is actually deeply immoral because of group relations whose basic injustice is never questioned or else is excused as a “practical” necessity. This can be pressed a bit further. In the struggle of groups personal virtues are often weapons by which an exploiting group secures its hold over an exploited group. How virtuous are these virtues? How loving is the ethic of love when it becomes a tool in the struggle for power?

This question is obviously not a speculative matter. The master's kindness has often served as a moral lubricant to smooth the workings of exploitation. The slave's fidelity and forbearance, his religious scruples against nursing an injury or studying revenge, have served as antidotes to cruder impulses whose accumulation might have impelled him to revolt. There is a terrible irony in the fact that the liberal gospel of personal love can be used to facilitate benevolent parasitism. It can counsel the Negro to long-suffering, the subject races to gratitude, the worker against the strike, the recipient of relief against making militant demands. Thus the word “love” can stink in the nostrils of those who ask for plain justice. It can remain the watchword of the sentimentalist and the charlatan, the bulwark of class hypocrisy and class plunder.

Such unintended but undeniable results of the liberal approach lead many who have been nourished in that tradition to reconsider its basic

premises. Is personal morality enough? Is conscious intent of any value unless it be checked at once against the social situation which is its unconscious but all-important condition? Is not the ultimate question for morality that of articulating the principles of group relationships? Can love serve as a guide to a social ethic? These are the questions with which I have approached Jesus in this essay. I have not been concerned to "refute" the liberal interpretation of his ethic. I have been intent on finding new light, not on dimming the old.

The problem that looms largest when this approach is made to the ethic of Jesus is the conflict with the scribes and Pharisees. This conflict is not to be explained as an attack on their personal morality. So much the work of modern scholars like George Foot Moore, Montefiore, Herford and Abrahams should make clear. What is it then that provoked and sustained a conflict between Jesus and this class of scrupulous moralists who shared fully his conviction of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man? It was the fact that Jesus' ethic of love was not exclusively, or even primarily, an individual affair, but that it assailed the whole system of class relations upon which the scribes and Pharisees relied for their authority and power.

But if you destroy the present system of class relations, what would you put in its place? Jesus' answer is plain: The kingdom of God. Here the first shall be last and the last first. Here there is no superiority of hereditary rank, priestly status, religious privilege or economic possession. Here there is none greater than the servant. Thus the ethic of love stands at the meeting point of two irreconcilable orders. It means world destruction and world creation; condemnation of the old, condition of membership in the new. The negative side of love covers the conflict with the Pharisees. It explains precisely and completely how it was that he who preached love as the supreme commandment, did not shrink from sensational public attacks upon the religious leaders of the day. The positive side of love was the expectation of the kingdom. And the judgment on the Pharisees—as well as on the rich—was in terms of that kingdom: the Pharisees would not enter, the rich could not.

The inwardness of ethics and the supreme worth of human personality are conserved—with a difference. Jesus was indeed solicitous that none be lost. But lost from what? From the kingdom. Personality is valued for its actual or potential part in the coming kingdom of love. When Jesus asks, "What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole

world, and lose his own soul?" he is asking, What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his place in the kingdom? as the context plainly shows. The stress on inwardness is no concession to introspective morality. The state of one's heart is itself conditioned by one's place in society, one's stake in it, one's "treasure." And in the final summing of accounts the test is not the heart, but the act: "In as much as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren. . . ." The test of the deed is absolute; and the deed required is that which cuts across the lines of class and caste.

The final note in the ethic of love is conflict. There is nothing surprising in this. On the contrary, it would be surprising if that note were lacking. In a world organized on a basis of exploitation those who preach love can purchase immunity from conflict only at the price of hypocrisy. So did the Pharisees. So do their modern successors of many faiths. The supreme traitors to the ethic of love are not those who doubt or renounce it. They are those who believe in it sincerely, and make it an apology for class division and class privilege. To avoid that betrayal one must distinguish: This is the way (not the feeling) of exploitation; that is the way (not the feeling) of love. There can be no truce between the two.

Gregory Vlastos

SHALL IT BE CHRISTIANITY?

By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

WHILE religion has for some time been outwardly losing ground, inwardly it has been recovering balance and certitude. The old supports in self-regarding motives and authoritative restraints have been giving way; but meanwhile the conscious resources within itself have been silently accumulating.

This renewal of self-confidence is due (1) to the study of the philosophy and psychology of religion, revealing the strength and firmness of its substructure in human nature and relationships; (2) to a growing conviction of the limitations of science which, contrary to its earlier promise, is proving wholly inadequate to reach ultimate truths and values; (3) to a deepening sense that something is needed, and desperately needed, to sustain and implement the higher life of man, to buttress morality and reawaken reverence in a generation that is in danger of becoming wholly secularized and disillusioned.

I

As the conviction of the indispensable place of religion in human life thus deepens, the question becomes more and more urgent: What religion? Shall it be religion in general, or the religion of the cults, now so numerous and clamant, or a new eclectic, or synthetic, religion? Or shall it be Christianity? And if Christianity—is this *one* faith, however highly estimated, sufficient in itself to fulfill all other faiths and become the universal religion? The increasing urgency of this issue is compelling a fresh re-examination and revaluation of Christianity.

If, in the light of the history and philosophy of religion, one were to look for the essentials of a universal religion, so far as these are discernible, they might be tentatively formulated somewhat in the following way:

Such a religion should be catholic, comprehensive, all-embracing, large enough to include all the fundamental meanings and values of religion as they have revealed themselves in human experience. It should have positive historic content and a clearly marked autonomy.

It should be purifying and refining, correcting the excesses and rejecting the abuses which have corrupted the nature and obstructed the pathway of religion throughout its history. It should be inclusively but distinctively and definitely revelatory, fulfilling the largest meaning and possibility of revelation. It should be expansive, progressive, developmental, not only providing scope for unlimited progress but actually anticipating it. It should make due place for all the human interests that constitute the spiritual life of man, so as not to usurp the place of any, while it infuses all with its spirit. It should be radically and completely redemptive—saving humanity from itself to its highest possibilities.

To examine with thoroughness any one of these qualifications, to say nothing of adequately considering them all, would manifestly be impossible within the limits of a single article. All one can hope to do is to indicate a little more fully the character of each of these requirements and to point out provisionally how largely Christianity is able to fulfill them. In fact, it is Christianity itself that suggests them; for it is only through Christianity that the knowledge of such qualifications could have arisen.

II

For any single religion to be comprehensive enough to fulfill all the deepest needs, impulses and aspirations of the religious life of the race seems at first thought well-nigh impossible. Such a religion would need to have the substance of all that primitive man felt the need of to enable him to meet the adverse forces of nature—the sense of the numinous, “the awesome, the fascinating,” the mysterious, which belongs to religion even in its earliest and crudest beginnings, and all the dumb outreach toward something divine in nature which characterizes the nature religions. It should contain the reverential awe and hope of sun worship and star worship, the sense of kinship with lower forms of life embodied in tree worship and totemism and animal worship, lifted into a nature-mysticism that finds the divine in all things—such a feeling for nature as one discovers, for example, in the attitude of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount and his resort to nature for spiritual refreshment, and in the nature-love of St. Francis and Wordsworth, Tennyson and Emerson, Whittier and Francis Thompson. This religion should contain the answer to the longing for regeneration and resurrection which gave to the mystery religions so strong a

hold upon the decadent cultures of Greece and Rome. It should possess the deep mystical spirit which has made the soul of India the witness to the depths of religious intuition and feeling in the human soul; it should have the serene sense of transcendence, of trust in "Heaven," of confidence in the eternal nature of moral rectitude, which belong to Confucianism; above all it should contain the fulfillment of the germinal monotheism which sprang up in African, Australian and American native tribes, dawned with radiance upon the soul of Ahknaton in Egypt, inspired the prophets of Israel, and swept through Mohammedanism cleansing the apostasy and superstition of a wilfully idolatrous age. Not only so, but it should fulfill all the reflective religious intimations of philosophic thought from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle to Berkeley, Royce and Bergson.

To hold that Christianity can embrace and bring to fruition all these manifold and puissant virtues and meanings is a daring confidence. Yet in the creative spirit and teaching of Jesus, in Pauline breadth and depth of thought and feeling, in Johannine mysticism, in the fellowship and ministry of the pristine church (pristine rather than "primitive"), and in the successive unfoldings of its inner spirit through the centuries, Christianity has given ground for the belief that within its range there lie all the essential meanings, virtues and ministries of true religion.

It is equally essential that a universal religion have an autonomous, self-evidencing and self-directive originality and uniqueness. That Christianity has this in an exceptional degree can hardly be questioned. The secret of its originality is embedded in the name it bears. A founded religion, it owes far more to its founder and has continued in much closer relation to him than any other faith to its founder. The personality of Jesus Christ indeed constitutes its very core and more than anything else accounts for its vigor and fruitfulness.

Buddhism has receded farther and farther from its founder, until he has been well-nigh lost sight of, or transformed into a symbol as in the Amidism of Japan, where Buddhism has its greatest present strength. Islam has kept an almost fanatical adherence to its historic and all too well known founder, but is finding him less and less adequate for its enlarging need, and his exposure to the searchlight of ethical criticism is making an ever increasing problem for the adherents of this virile faith.

It is true that Christianity sprang from the soil of Judaism and is in the Semitic-Hebraic lineage, but it soon won an independent life of its own. Here is the paradox of Christianity as expressed in the words of its founder: "Not one jot or tittle . . . but I say unto you"—indebtedness, independence; continuity, originality. As Bergson says, "A religion which was essentially national was replaced by a religion that could be made universal."

From its inception Christianity has been at once autonomous and assimilative. At the very start it appropriated its ideology, though not its nutriment, from Hellenism and Stoicism. In the mystery religions it discovered a secret longing for God which it embraced and replaced with its own contrasted "open mystery" of Christ. But always its appropriation has been distinctively assimilation rather than borrowing; and such assimilation is a mark of inner vitality and strength rather than of deficiency.

For a religion to be comprehensive and assimilative—"all things to all men"—would, however, be a disqualification were it not accompanied by the purity and restraint essential to true universality. In this regard nothing is more manifest than the deep-seated moral rectitude and spiritual self-reliance which characterize pure Christianity.

This does not mean that the tendencies to corruption and superstition so prolific in human nature have not found frequent and disastrous release within the confines of nominal Christianity; but the presence of self-correction and self-purification and the repeated recovery of its own inherent norm have been markedly characteristic of Christianity and may be trusted to reject whatever is contrary to its true nature. The necessary accompaniment of assimilation and growth, on the part of an organism, is rejection of whatever is alien and deleterious. As a spiritual organism, Christianity has had to be, and must continue to be, rejective as well as assimilative, self-loyal as well as catholic.

III

Thus we come to the supreme test of religion—revelation. No religion can be rationally persuasive and convincing that does not rely upon and embody an authentic and adequate principle of revelation. Religion as a purely human product, valuable as it might be to human life and progress, has not the inner vigor to maintain a place of commanding power. Religion requires revelation—both general and spe-

cific. Humanism is religious; it is not religion. Christianity is convincingly and persistently revelatory. Its inherent philosophy of revelation has been painfully misconstrued, it is true, narrowly restricted to a book or to a system of revealed truths. This partial and wholly inadequate conception of revelation it has taken upwards of nineteen centuries to develop and dissipate. The true nature of the Christian revelation could not be fully disclosed until it came to be recognized that revelation is universal. All truth is revealed, not less so because it is also discovered. The two processes—search and disclosure—are reciprocal. To him that hath shall be given. But while all truth is revealed, there are levels of truth and thus of revelation. Moral and religious truth, by virtue of its self-attesting quality, is highest and possessed of largest intrinsic value. The literature that contains most of such truth is *ipso facto* most revelatory and most inspired. This is the real basis for an ardent and intelligent Christian evaluation of the Bible.

Revelation is not only human, cosmic and universal, but also historical and ethnic. Every people is a chosen people, and has its own peculiar apprehension and expression of divine truth—not for itself alone but for mankind. Yet truth that is for all may—not to say must—be exceptionally transmitted through a particular channel. To term Israel *the* chosen people is therefore simply to recognize its peculiar mission to all peoples; for to all “the wondrous gift is given.”

Neither racial, national nor distributive revelation, however, can convey its full wealth of meaning and value. The completest carrier of revelation can be no other, or less, than a chosen personality. This is the Christian experience, and therefore the Christian conception. Moreover it lies in the nature of revelation itself. All good men reveal God. The nobler the person the truer the revelation. The light that lighteth every man reveals in each its Source, but it shines more brightly through the best, and brightest through the One Best. *Ecce homo!* In him is beheld supreme sonship, “the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father full of grace and truth.” In other words, unitary human incarnation alone can afford a completing revelation. Avatarism is not incarnation; for incarnation, in its supreme instance, can occur but once. A circle can have but one center, however widely its circumference may be enlarged.

Yet here we meet with another of those profound paradoxes that witness to the superlogical character of experienced truth. Essential

completeness means temporal incompleteness. Revelation requires development. It is both inceptionally whole and also developmental, expansive, advancing. It fuses purpose and process. It may concentrate only in a developing incarnation. The fullgrown oak is in the acorn, yet not in a rigidly deterministic form. There is a certain freedom in response to environment as the tree grows. So with religion. A truly competent religion will not only affirm the principle of development but itself realize and embody it. It will have within it the perpetual impetus and outreach of developmental increment. No static form can satisfy the demands of genuine religious experience.

IV

Yet how can Christianity be progressive, if Jesus Christ is its final revelation—"the same yesterday, today and forever"? The answer, again paradoxical, once more arises out of Christian experience. There is in Christ both present sufficiency and the promise and potency of unrestricted personal adequacy for the future. The unfolding results of his impact upon developing humanity are limitless. He is inexhaustible in the implications and applications of his personality. Well is it said of him that he "was and is and is to come." One may instance the rise of the social gospel. He who in the days of his flesh did not seek to change the social institutions of the time, in the days of his spirit is leading his followers toward intensive social reconstruction. The moral and spiritual dynamic effects of his presence, operative in history and actually taking place in the thought and life of today, point toward still greater things to come. What if the future shall see, even more than we have seen, the heavens opened and the angels of God ascending and descending on the Son of Man?

Christ was to Paul more (in certain respects) than to Peter, more to John than to Paul, more to Athanasius than to Origen, more to St. Francis than to Aquinas, more to Luther than to Zwingli, more to Wesley than to Whitefield, more to Jonathan Edwards than to Calvin, more to Schleiermacher than to Bunyan, more to Kagawa than to Moody—and so on indefinitely. More, that is, in differentiation and enlargement of meaning and motive. Each had the Christ of his fore-runners and his own Christ. Such a living, ideal personality continues to develop in reality and meaning. To coming ages and individuals he will be more than to us. The orient seems certain to find in him that which the occident has not been able to discover. The fiftieth century

will find more in him than the twentieth. Who will venture to place a limit upon this enlarging conception of Christ? Nor is this increasing revelation apart from the entire range of human activity and advancement. New discoveries of science, fresh insights of philosophy, new achievements of art, fresh enterprises in social advancement, will amplify the circumference of the circle whose center is Christ and extend the range of his vitalizing potency.

This leads to the too little recognized requisite of a consummative faith already alluded to—that it should give religion, as such, its true place in the spiritual life of man, yet without making it an exclusive interest. The life of the spirit, in the larger sense, includes all the higher pursuits of humanity—morality, art, philosophy, science, education—all that lifts man to a higher level of thought and activity. Religion is but one, yet an indispensably vital one, among these cultural agencies.

In the early stages of civilization the various forms of human culture were either absorbed in religion or inhibited by it. As civilization has developed, its cultural pursuits have become differentiated and gradually, to too great a degree, independent, not only of one another but of religion also. This has proved, to an increasing extent, stultifying and obstructive, not only to religion but to the forms of culture themselves.

Unless the spirit of reverence which religion fosters is present and pervasive in any field of culture, it loses its idealism and becomes increasingly sodden and sterile. It is this isolating, dehumanizing, despiritualizing blight from which art in all its forms is suffering today. Art for art's sake? Science for science's sake? Philosophy for philosophy's sake? No; all for man's sake, and man as related to "the Beyond that is within."

Christianity, as a religion, is peculiarly potent to stimulate and suffuse all the higher activities of the human spirit, imparting to them its own reverence and aspiration, its own vision of perfection and devotion to humanity. It has already proved this capacity beyond question, in every field of human endeavor. The mustard seed has become a great tree and the birds of the air—art, music, literature—have lodged in its branches. It is no accident that modern science sprang up under the aegis of Christendom, although some of the exponents of science have so far forgotten this as to represent religion as the foe of science, and its own triumphs as victories over theology. It is true that leading

ecclesiastics and theologians have tried to thwart scientific advance, but the pioneers of scientific discovery—Roger Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton and the rest—have themselves been devout Christians. If Christianity has been failing of late in its stimulating and fructifying influence upon culture, the fact is due to a secret unfaith in it on the part of its own representatives as well as to alienation from it on the part of those who falsely imagine that art, science or any other pursuit can be separated from human well-being at its highest and attain its true end.

V

Finally, there is within the very life-blood of Christianity the principle and potency of redemption. This is not peculiar to the Christian faith. All great religions aim at redemption. Christianity from the beginning has been arduously, passionately, persistently redemptive. The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost. Granted that the goal has been often lowered, demeaned, well-nigh lost to sight, the uplifted Christ has not, and will not, let it disappear.

Christianity is the religion of redeemed personality—far more fully than has as yet been realized. Yet to stop with individual salvation would be to limit and desiccate Christianity. The ideal of *social* redemption is also structural within the Christian faith and has been from the beginning. It is only in the present century, however (especially in the light of the Great Defection, the Great War and the Great Depression), that it has come home fully to the Christian consciousness that redemption means “corporate” redemption as well as individual, with all that this implies.

Is Christianity adequate to this overwhelming task? If not, then no religion is—surely no eclectic or synthetic pan-religion and still less any purely social or political movement which has not the religious impetus.

If Christianity is indeed the consummation and fulfillment of religion such conclusions as these follow:

Christianity cannot be true to itself and decline its world-wide mission. It must needs go forth as a sower to sow, not with a “claim” but with a consciousness, not with dogmas but with an experience, not with pride but with humility. Like Paul the church cannot do other than exclaim: “Woe is me if I preach not the gospel!” “I am debtor both to Greeks and to barbarians, both to the wise and to the foolish.” Chris-


tianity, like its great ambassador, is debtor "to all"—concerned, not to gain adherents, but freely to give that which it has freely received.

Largesse oblige.

None of the higher religions can lose its real autonomy, or fail in its mission, by freely merging itself in Christianity; for it will thus gain its own larger life. Indeed, it is not too much to affirm, extravagant though it sounds, that none of the great religions can come to full self-realization (any more than religion itself) until it finds itself in the larger fellowship of a universal religion. Into the city of God is already being brought the glory and honor of the *religions*.

Even more urgent than the extensive mission of Christianity is its intensive obligation. It cannot be true to itself and fail to develop its own inherent resources, intellectual, moral and spiritual. To remain provincial in an age like this is to invite obsolescence and decay.

Finally, there confronts the Christian mind and spirit the task of exercising to the full its twofold redemptive mission, to the individual and to society. To assign the whole of the latter task to the Christian church alone would clearly be unreasonable. It is the corporate task of all formative and reformatory agencies—educational, political and social. The mission of Christianity is to supply motive power, idealism and faith (not without works), adequate to so difficult and so inspiring an enterprise as that of the personal-social redemption of humanity.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "John W. Buchanan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "J".

THOMISM AND THE RE-BIRTH OF PROTESTANT PHILOSOPHY

By THE EDITOR

BY the term "protestant philosophy" it is not implied that protestantism has ever had an official philosophy; it is intended to designate the philosophy which arose with protestantism and has been the dominant philosophy of the Western world where protestantism has been the dominant religion. The term also implies that there exists an inner kinship between this philosophy and protestantism itself. In an article in the previous number of *CHRISTENDOM* I raised the question whether there are in our day any signs of rapprochement between catholic and protestant Christianity. In the main, that article was given over to a report of the contemporary intellectual revival in catholicism.* It concluded with a promise to consider at a later date whether there existed on the protestant side any discernible movement toward the catholic conception. The present paper is written in partial fulfillment of that promise.

I intend at another time to consider the question of the church—that is, whether protestant thought is moving toward the catholic idea of the church. In the present article we shall consider the question whether protestant philosophy is moving toward catholic philosophy. Catholic intellectuals of all communions repudiate the philosophy of the West, root and branch, and Roman Catholics propose that we return to the Roman obedience by way of accepting, in substance, the system of Thomas Aquinas which, since the sixteenth century, has been the official philosophy of the Roman church. What has protestant philosophy to say to this proposal?

An invitation to return to the Middle Ages has a certain attraction for a baffled and tired protestantism. There are those who in their disillusionment turn wearily back to an authoritative institution and a

*It is necessary in order to avoid gross misunderstanding to repeat here a footnote in the earlier article: "It is my belief that much confusion of thought is caused by the failure of most writers to make any distinction between the word 'Catholic' as used to refer to the Roman Catholic Church, and the word 'catholic' as used to refer to the generic principle of catholicism in Christianity. This distinction is indicated in this article by the use of the capital 'C' in one case and a small 'c' in the other. Because of the frequent occurrence of 'catholic' and 'protestant' together in this article, the latter word is written with a small 'p,' contrary to the normal style of this publication."

finished philosophy as a haven of rest for soul and mind. Their religious loyalties are chilled by the wanton dismemberment of the Body of Christ which they see in historical and contemporary protestantism. Moreover, they begin to realize how shallow is the philosophical stream which has flowed down the Western slope of civilization during the protestant centuries. It is easy for them, therefore, especially in the present hour of spiritual distress, to believe that the way out is to repudiate the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the scientific positivism in which these movements have issued, and to start all over again under the authority of the medieval church and in the intellectual peace of the Thomistic system.

I

I cannot agree that this is the way out. Sympathetic as I am with the catholic diagnosis of our cultural ailment, and grateful as I believe all of us should be for the penetrating light with which the catholic intellectuals are disclosing the spiritual and intellectual follies of the modern era, there are four reasons why I cannot accept their prescription. One is that I do not believe it is psychologically or culturally possible ever to "go back," to anything, anywhere. There may be a rediscovery of living roots, but there cannot be a return. A second is that catholics themselves, while they are fairly agreed on the diagnosis, are by no means agreed on the prescription. Neither the Greek nor the Anglican communion is willing to accept the Roman obedience. As for the Thomistic philosophy, though it is, perhaps, broadly acceptable to Greek catholicism, it would be unacceptable to the Anglican church, with the possible exception of the Anglo-catholic minority. A third reason concerns the Roman Catholic Church itself. That church has not kept pace with the evolution of human values during the past four centuries. Great gains have been made, despite the progressive exhaustion of our spiritual and intellectual resources. The Roman church, as it seems to me, has suffered the fate of an arrested development, and can hardly be recommended as a satisfactory spiritual home for those who have shared in the dynamic processes of Western culture.

The fourth reason is the fact that protestant philosophy itself is turning, by its own inherent motivation, toward a world view which makes a place for whatever permanent values inhere in the Thomistic system. The importance of this fact cannot be overemphasized; yet in all the literature dealing with the catholic analysis of the plight of Western

civilization, I do not remember to have run upon a fair statement of it. About a generation ago, Western philosophy began sharply to turn in a new direction, in many respects an opposite direction from that in which it had been moving since the Renaissance.

The full significance of this *volte face* was not recognized at the time because the disintegrative effects of Western philosophy and protestant pietism were not discerned until the post-war period. Now, however, when these effects are writ so large that no one can mistake them, it is strange that critics can describe the contemporary scene without mention of the change which has come about in protestant philosophy itself. Instead, they berate protestant philosophy as if it were continuing to flow in the direction which can be roughly marked by connecting the names of Descartes-Locke-Hume-Kant-Comte-Spencer-Dewey. I hope to make it clear that this stream ran into the sands of self-exhaustion more than a generation ago, and that the present living stream of effective philosophy arose from springs of fresh insight which emerged at the spot where the old stream disappeared. The new stream is flowing in a new direction. And I affirm that this contemporary philosophy has more in common with St. Thomas than with—shall I say?—John Locke.

It is necessary, in order to clarify the present situation in protestant philosophy, to exhibit the relevant features which belong, respectively, to the medieval, the modern, and the very modern world view. (The word "modern" is used in contrast to "medieval"; such terms as "very modern" and "new modernism" will be used to refer to the contemporary movement in Western thought.) From the standpoint of our religious or cultural interest in a given philosophy it is the outcome of that philosophy, its world view, which engages us. We are interested in the relation of a philosophy to its civilization, that is, to human behavior. And human behavior is not determined by the technical method or the details of a particular philosophy but by the general pattern of the world which it displays to those who accept it. Our task, therefore, is sufficiently general so that even a layman in these matters, like myself, who may wish to undertake it, may do so without undue presumption.

Medieval philosophy came to its flowering in the system of Thomas Aquinas. Modern philosophy arrived at its logical goal in the system of Auguste Comte. The very modern philosophy began in the writings of John Dewey, with the prompting of Charles Peirce and William

James, and has reached its most consistent and definitive statement up to date in the writings of Henry Nelson Wieman. To understand the contemporary cultural and religious scene, and to share intelligently in the conflict of catholic and protestant ideologies which has arisen in the present cultural confusion it is necessary, as I see it, to have at least a general understanding of the world views of these three philosophies.

II

St. Thomas looked out upon a world of nature which existed in an ascending scale or hierarchy of orders of being—physical objects, living creatures, man, the church and God. These all were bound together as an organic whole under the concepts of “matter” and “form.” Each order of being is “matter” for the order above it, and “form” for the order below, except God who is pure form or the “Form of Forms,” immanent in all orders, creating and sustaining all that is, and giving unity to the whole. Moving upward in the scale, inanimate nature is “matter” for living nature, which in turn becomes “matter” for human nature, which, in its turn, becomes “matter” for spiritual nature or the realm of grace. Moving downward in the scale, spiritual nature is the “form” of human nature, which is the “form” of animate nature which, in its turn, is the “form” of inanimate nature. In this hierarchy of nature man completes the order of “bodies” and becomes the “matter” or foundation for the order of the spirit which is nourished by the church and its sacraments as the body of man is nourished by the plant and animal life below him. Man’s reason allies him with the spiritual order or the realm of grace. The highest task to which reason may apply itself is to demonstrate the existence of God. But this man would be powerless to do unless God first made himself known by an act of revelation. Thus reason is a servant of faith and its most meritorious exercise is in elucidating and proving the truth already known by revelation.

For our present purpose the features of this system which it is important to emphasize are three. First, the organic unity of nature, all of whose orders are held together in the bonds of form and matter. Each object or “body” derives its being from its “form” and thus participates in the Form of Forms, which is God. It therefore shares in the being of all that is. Secondly, there is a limitation on human reason—revelation being a prerequisite of any rational demonstration of God’s

existence. But even so, reason is in direct contact with objective reality. There is no suggestion that reason deals with the merely phenomenal, while ultimate reality—"things in themselves"—elude it. Man's thought is of the same kind as God's thought, immanent both in the rational thinker and in the object of thought. Natural theology is thus of a piece with revelation. The supernatural is, in the words of our contemporary Santayana, simply "the rest of the natural." There is one universe of reality which is created and governed by God; and human reason, by virtue of man's actual participation in the supernatural, has a real, not merely an apparent validity.

Thirdly, man and his reason are not independent and supreme, but dependent upon and subordinate to the being of God. Man does not impose his thought or his will upon nature; his thought and his will are fulfilled only if they conform to the truth of nature. Man's freedom, therefore, consists in his capacity as a "spiritual" being to transcend the causal sequences of nature and to share in the uncaused freedom of the divine mind and will. His human nature is both natural and supernatural—he is a citizen of both worlds, enjoying the freedom of the supernatural which pervades the whole of reality, but limited by his participation in the processes of finite nature.

Thus, in summary, the universe as viewed by St. Thomas is characterized by the organic interrelationship of all its parts, by a limitation upon man in this organic whole through the dependence of human reason upon God, and by human freedom in virtue of man's participation in the spiritual or supernatural order.

III

With the breakup of medieval society, the rise of protestantism, and the emergence of a new scientific interest in natural processes, the new world began to turn its back upon the highly symmetrical and formidable system which the "angelic doctor" had built up largely in the terms of formal logic. Philosophy began to find a wholly new channel for itself. It abandoned the idea that reason was the servant of revelation, and though for a long time it kept the idea of revelation more or less on the periphery of its thinking, it undertook to validate revelation by reason, thus reversing the medieval procedure. Man's reason became the guarantee of the revelation. And revelation receded steadily into an ineffective and irrelevant position while reason tended to dominate the whole scene of reality.

This modern movement had begun, vaguely, before protestantism appeared, but it found its first systematic expression in Descartes, in the first half of the seventeenth century, and came to its logical goal two centuries later in the positivistic philosophy of Comte. In order to understand Comte's world view it will be well to refresh our minds as to the course of thought in these two centuries.

Descartes could not contemplate the world view of St. Thomas with intellectual satisfaction. Doubt having arisen in his mind, he proceeded bravely to doubt everything which could be doubted, and was stopped only when he came to *himself*—"I think," he said, "therefore I am." Upon the indubitable existence of the self as a "thinking substance" he proceeded to rebuild his world. Looking upon the Thomistic picture of reality, Descartes saw that it was shot through with unproved assumptions—not alone the ultimate assumption of a divine revelation, but innumerable *a priori* conceptions which, by the deductive processes of formal logic, determined the lights and shadows of the picture. He observed especially the place which man held in the picture, and saw the difference between the man *in the picture* and the man *who made the picture*. What rational right, he asked, had Aquinas to put man in just that place in the universe? Descartes, therefore, transferred his attention from man as a part of the Thomistic system, to man as the maker of any system, Thomist or any other. He detached man from the grand picture of a complete universe, and made his existence as a "thinking substance" the starting point of true knowledge. Over against thinking substance he found justification for believing in the existence of another substance—"extended substance," or matter. Thus a dualism entered philosophical thinking, wholly unlike the dualism of "form" and "substance" which had haunted philosophic thought from Plato downward. Both the external world of matter and the internal world of thought are now seen as existing each in its own right.

From that day onward the great problem in philosophy was the problem of crossing the gulf which separated the thinker from the object of his thought. Having divorced man from nature, every kind of effort was made to bring them together again. Locke sought to break down the unity and reality of the thinking substance by denying the existence of innate ideas and affirming the merely adventitious association of ideas in the "mind." Berkeley approached from the other side and denied the objectivity of any material world at all—what seems a material world is in reality a system of ideas. And Hume bravely ac-

cepted the skeptical consequences of putting the arguments of Locke and Berkeley together.

How Kant and the German idealists, in one line, and the British utilitarians and pragmatists in another, undertook in different ways to gather up the fragments of the universe which Hume had left in complete disorder, need not be described. In the light of subsequent history, it can hardly be claimed that either movement was effectual. Man was left on one side of a great gulf, and the world of matter on the other. Both movements left the door open for scientific positivism, Kant with reservations, the British with none.

IV

It was Auguste Comte who boldly formulated the world view toward which Western philosophy had been moving since the Renaissance. His view reflects the logical outcome of a wrenching of reality into two substances which could not be put together again. In broad terms, Western culture has been dominated by the implications of this divorcement ever since the Protestant reformation, and since Comte's day it has been avowedly entrenched in the habit patterns of the special sciences as well as in popular thought.

It was not until Comte put into form his positivistic philosophy that all attempts to keep connection with religion and metaphysics were deliberately discarded. Except Hume, whose skepticism was thoroughgoing, all the great contributors to modern philosophy had found some device to keep God in their systems. Rejecting the church as an organ of revelation, they fell back upon the Bible, or innate ideas, or a *deus absconditus*, or the moral imperative. Philosophers were thus able to keep up the appearance of a world which had some kind of place in it for religion. These, however, were survival devices. All the while the disintegrative process, begun by the disjunction of man and nature, was going on. The Comtian period is not only the period of vast scientific activity but also the era of metaphysical despair and religious disillusionment. Comte boldly discarded both theology and metaphysics. He saw the history of human thought as moving upward in three successive stages—the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive.

The theological stage is the primitive, or childhood, stage of intelligence. It is subdivided into three phases. First, comes the period of animism or fetishism, in which activities in nature and events in experience are explained by regarding natural objects as animated by

spirits or demons. This is followed by a polytheistic period in which invisible beings are imagined as governing certain objects and events. The final development of the theological stage is that of monotheism in which all these particular divinities are merged into a single God who governs all things either by occasional or by constant intervention in the activities of the world.

The metaphysical stage is reached when the conception of a supernatural will is displaced by abstract conceptions of forces, laws or principles. These become the governors of all events in nature and history. Abstractions thus slide into the place of anthropomorphic supernatural beings, taking on the qualities of intelligence and purpose or other human characteristics. Thus we say nature "abhors" a vacuum, or we speak of something having a "curative virtue." The fallacy of all metaphysics is that it mistakes abstractions for entities.

The positivist stage is reached when both the theological and metaphysical methods of explanation are rejected and thought restricts itself to facts in time and space and their objective relations. This is the period of true science, as contrasted with vain speculations. Comte is inspired directly by Hume, who wrote a century before him. Yet he sees clearly that the positive period did not begin with Hume but at the end of the Middle Ages, when Descartes potentially freed the external world from bondage to theological speculation, and gave title to both mind and matter to set up housekeeping for themselves. Locke brought the positivist goal definitely nearer when he freed the physical world from metaphysical speculation by showing that, after all, man knows nothing outside his own experience. The external world presents itself only in ideas, all of which come through sense perception and assume on the *tabula rasa* of man's understanding the shapes and groupings and interconnections which experience itself determines. Upon the premises of Locke's empiricism, Hume perceived that nothing is left but experience. Man and his sensations are all the universe there is.

The significance of Comte's contribution lay in the fact that he took the results of this skeptical negativism and turned them to positive account. Instead of the dismay with which the dissolution of all bonds in the objective world of matter and the subjective world of thought had been generally received, Comte greeted it with acclaim, declaring in effect that we now have a fair and open field for unconstrained scientific exploration—of both the material world and man. Positivism

thus became the charter of scientific liberty. Under it the monumental achievements of the past century have been made. It has gone its way without let or hindrance from either theology or metaphysics, in practice, and for the most part in theory, on the basic assumption either that reality in itself is unknowable, or that any reality beyond direct experience of the senses is an illusion.

But Comte must be credited with the perception that man is a social phenomenon as well as an individual. Social man is therefore an object of scientific or positivistic study. Society or civilization is the incorporation in history of the values which emerge in individual experience. There is thus a place for something which Comte calls religion, but it is a religion whose "deity" is Man himself, in whom and in whose welfare science now finds its ultimate *raison d'être*.

All metaphysical bonds in nature were now unloosed. In contrast to the symmetrical closed system of St. Thomas, thought now contemplated an open process, untrammelled by any standards of truth except utility and the association of ideas. For St. Thomas's majestic frame of reference within which all things found their explanation, a new frame of reference was set up. It was human experience. Any attempt to transcend this empirical framework was like trying to lift oneself with one's bootstraps. And since, following the Lockian tradition, experience is basically constituted of disparate sensations, the world itself partakes of this same atomistic character. Thus the world as St. Thomas saw it, fell apart. It fell at first into two big chunks. Then these chunks—mind and matter—fell apart into their elements. Physical atoms and psychological atoms became the ultimate realities. It is a universe of atoms in which we live, and whatever bond or bonds of unity may seem to be discerned in it are only the reflection of the association of ideas in the mind or the projection of abstractions which are merely convenient devices for making our way practically through the jungle of a world of sensations which are too multitudinous for the understanding to deal with them separately.

V

Against this whole mode of thinking the neo-Thomist attack is directed. It finds no point in the philosophic stream of the past four centuries, not even in the channel of German idealism, at which it can stoop and drink clear and refreshing water. The entire stream was "poisoned" when Descartes detached man from his place in the Tho-

mistic system. From that point on, Western philosophy moved in a channel which led inevitably to humanistic empiricism with the result that Western culture has been progressively falling apart into nationalisms and racialisms and class conflicts and economic, political and artistic individualism—in a word, into secularism, which is the inevitable expression of atomistic irresponsibility.

With this diagnosis and criticism I have already expressed my sympathy. But let us not uncritically heed the call to return to the philosophy of the Middle Ages before inquiring whether there is any new life appearing in modern philosophy itself. As I see it, new life *is* appearing. We do not need to ask St. Thomas to open our eyes. Our own philosophers are doing it for us. Contemporary protestant philosophy is turning away from the sandy atomism which marks the end of the whole post-Renaissance era. A mode of thinking is now under way which, though not Thomistic, is oriented toward the values which the neo-Thomists desiderate. It is more congenial with Thomism than with the humanistic modernism from whose ashes, like the mythical phoenix, it is arising.

In presenting this new modernism, I do not pretend to be proceeding in the manner of a competent historian of philosophy. But perhaps my layman's method may have a certain merit for the general reader which a more scholarly approach would lack. As I see it, the most revolutionary thing that is happening in contemporary philosophy is this: the new modernism is putting man back into nature, putting him there even more integrally than did St. Thomas. And man's presence in nature is causing a revolutionary reinterpretation of nature itself. All of which takes us beyond empiricism, in the Lockian sense, and lands us in metaphysics, from which Comte and his successors thought they had freed us forever.

Contemporary modernism can be identified by reference to any one of several regulative concepts, each of which may be said to imply the others. I will choose the concept of emergent evolution, with which are associated (1) the organic conception of reality, (2) the "holistic" conception of the organism, under which the nature of the parts is determined by the whole, not the whole by its parts (the opposite of the atomistic conception); and (3) the new insight that the actual process of reality is the exact reverse of the process of inquiring thought—that is to say, reality moves creatively from concretion to concretion, while thought moves ever from abstraction to the yet more ab-

stract. These, taken with the conception of man as a part of nature, are the major ideas in the conceptual structure of reality which is rising on the ruins of scientific positivism.

Professor John Dewey may be considered as at once the last representative of the old modernism and its destroyer. By putting man back into nature, where he was in the philosophy of St. Thomas, Dewey was in a position to close the gulf across which philosophy had been seesawing in conflict throughout the entire protestant era. In the light of this insight the philosophy of the protestant era was now seen to have been largely shadow boxing. By treating the individual mind and its ideas as a world of existence by itself, Descartes and Locke and Kant were working in a vacuum. And by treating matter as a world by itself, Comte and his positivistic successors, the scientists, though they have produced marvelous results in mechanical invention and technology, have left man without understanding, a being disoriented in the midst of his world.

VI

I said that Dewey destroyed the Cartesian tradition with his primary insight that man is a part of nature. His thought was largely influenced by the biological conceptions which had come in with Darwin and the theory of evolution. Thus, such dynamic categories as process, organism, environment, stimulus and response, heredity, part and whole, and creativity, shattered the static fixity of traditional systems, both idealistic and materialistic. Dewey saw that man cannot be kept outside this creative order. But if he is included in it, it becomes necessary to reconsider the nature of human intelligence as a phenomenon appearing *within* the order of nature. Mind emerging in nature, and functioning as a part of nature, cannot be conceived in the same way as mind which stands across a gulf over against nature. Dewey was thus led to elaborate his famous doctrine of the instrumental (sometimes called "pragmatic," also sometimes called "functional") nature of intelligence. In this view, the classic problem of protestant philosophy, with its classic solutions—dualism, idealism, materialism and positivism—disappeared for lack of meaning.

But if man is included in nature, it becomes necessary to reconceive and redefine nature so as to include all that is in man. This Dewey has not consistently done. A leading empiricist, E. S. Ames, has insisted upon the importance of doing it, but has not been sufficiently

thoroughgoing in his own practice to avoid the pitfall of idealism. This appears in his tendency to define God in *ideal* terms, as the "idealization" of social values, or the "personification" of human ideals. If man is a part of nature, God cannot be defined in terms of man's ideals but in terms of That in Nature upon which the realization of ideals depends—that is to say, God can be defined only in objective or existential terms.

Dewey's followers have divided into two schools at this point. In one school are those who made the inference that man, being integral with nature, is therefore reduced to the level of nature *as nature had been previously conceived apart from man*, that is, "nature" as studied by the physical and biological sciences. This school of contemporary "naturalism" claims Dewey as its father, a compliment which Dewey never has accepted.

The second school of his followers consists of those who call themselves "humanists," in contrast with the school of "naturalists." They insist that with the emergence of man there appeared a being whose dignity and importance are to be measured not in terms of the natural biological forces which produced him but by the inherent values of his own experience. The only values in nature are human values. Man's intelligence is the instrument for the realization of these values, and he exercises it in the control of his biological impulses and of nature's forces and laws. Thus man's business is to make a kind of clearing in the jungle and chaos of nature, wherein he has emerged, and build there a civilization with his own strength and intelligence, impressing into his service the forces of nature, "harnessing" the lightning and every other power of nature on behalf of the values which he desires to attain. In this enterprise man has no superhuman or extra-human cooperation, neither from any anthropomorphic God nor from nature itself. The cooperation which he may seem to have is only the reflection of an affinity with which, in his imagination, he has clothed nature, or which, by his own strength, he has imposed upon it. This school, too, claims Dewey as its father, in which claim he at least acquiesces.

It is difficult to account for Dewey's willingness to be identified with the humanistic school inasmuch as his writings seem to contain much that is contrary to this position. In attempting to account for it, I cannot help noting that Dewey's chief philosophical preoccupation has been his doctrine of the instrumental nature of thought, rather than

his major presupposition of man's organic participation in nature. This preoccupation has kept his interest rather closely within the confines of experience, as such, where he has developed the logical theory of intelligence as the instrument *for the control and enrichment of experience*. It was thus easy for him to fall back, upon occasion, into the traditional fallacy of subjectivism, that is, of taking "experience" as a world in itself, detached from nature—the very fallacy against which his whole philosophy was in revolt.

In his unwillingness to accept the full consequences of his primary doctrine that man is a part of nature, Dewey has kept a vestigial remnant of the idealistic doctrine that nature is a "construct" arising in human experience. We cannot, however, have it both ways. If man is an emergent in nature, nature was here before him, and however recalcitrant to his will and desires it and its forces may appear to be, nature must be given at least this much credit: it gave him whatever being he has! It gave him not only his body, but his mind, not only the part of him which he was taught to think of as "matter," but that part which he was taught to think of as "spirit." The *whole* man is a part of nature—his volition, his ratiocination, his affection, his imagination, his sense of duty, his powers of abstraction and idealization, his capacity to understand, to appreciate and to adore. These all are human functions, yes; but being human they are also functions of nature (or of something superhuman in nature) upon which they depend for their initial emergence, their growth and their fulfilment. Had Dewey tarried as long and as reflectively with his own great insight into this truth as he did with his insight into the instrumental function of intelligence, I do not think he would have allowed himself to be numbered with those who regard man as inhabiting a walled-in realm within the jungle of nature, building a humanistic civilization with only human resources, in the face of nature's indifference or in the teeth of her hostility. The conception of nature as a mere theater upon whose stage man enacts his humanistic play is incompatible with the conception of man as an organic part of nature.

VII

The significant movements of thought since Dewey's basic insights were first set forth have been in the direction of more serious and critical acceptance of those insights, especially as to the implications of man's participation in nature. I need only refer to such concepts as

"creativity," which Henri Bergson introduced into philosophy a decade after Dewey began his work, and "emergent evolution" and "holism," which Lloyd Morgan and General Smuts, respectively, introduced more than another decade later. These terms alone suggest how completely the organic conception of reality is displacing the atomistic conception into which Western thought had degenerated. And when we examine the philosophical system of Professor Whitehead we find a world view which could almost be said to be St. Thomas's world view come to life—that is to say, it is Thomism with dynamic and vital concepts substituted for the bare formal logic of scholasticism. There is marked affinity also between the "holistic" view and the Thomistic.

Among contemporary thinkers, Prof. H. N. Wieman is in a position of peculiar significance because he stands directly in the Dewey tradition (if so new a movement can be called a tradition), and fulfills it. He takes seriously and critically *both* the organic conception of man's participation in nature and the instrumental conception of thought. His world view is determined by the positive combination of these two principles. Wieman is not clearly understood by the British and French philosophers just mentioned, and I think the basic reason is that they have never accepted (and many have never taken pains to understand) either the doctrine or the implications of the doctrine of the instrumental nature of intelligence. They broadly hold (and notably Whitehead) to a form of idealism or platonism, which Wieman rejects in favor of the functional view of intelligence as contrasted with any ontological view. There is, however, a striking affinity between Wieman's view and that of one of Britain's most stimulating contemporary philosophers, John Macmurray.

Wieman's significance lies in the fact that he is willing to take the full consequences of both instrumentalism and organicism. With the emergence of man, nature's creative work—or at least that frontier of her creative work with which man is concerned—is henceforth carried on in cooperation with human intelligence. But human intelligence—including imagination, reflection, choice and action—is not *merely* human; it is articulate with nature and dependent upon nature, or upon Something in Nature which selects, supports and effectuates those humanistic ideal ends which are possible of realization. The radical difference between Dewey and Wieman is connected with the doctrine of the function of intelligence. Both hold that its function is instrumental. But instrumental for what? For the realization and enrichment of

human values, answers Dewey. But Wieman, while agreeing with this answer, goes beyond it. He holds that intelligence is instrumental to the realization of the creative possibilities which exist in nature. Dewey has refused to accept this answer and has thereby, if I am able to understand the issue, failed to take the full consequences of his own insistence that man is a part of nature.

VIII

It is here that Wieman's philosophy of religion takes shape. Man's dependence is radical and realistic. It is not a sentimental dependence as in Schleiermacher, nor a mere logical dependence as in idealism, but an actual, concrete, organic dependence which throws man back upon nature, or upon Whatever-It-Is-In-Nature which carries the power to realize the possibilities which appear as ideas and ideals in human intelligence. God transcends human thought, not in the sense that he is "wholly other," and not in the sense that we are unable truly to know him, but in the sense that he cannot be delimited by ideal or ideational terms. Wieman's God is "existential." No longer is man the center of the universe, or its source, or its end. God is now in charge of creative reality and man is co-worker with him in the creative process. Human values are not walled off from nature in human imagination, as Santayana and Dewey hold, but are the product of nature's creativity and dependent upon her creativity for their realization.

Yet it is not nature as a whole upon which man depends—Wieman repudiates pantheism—but upon Whatever-It-Is-In-Nature which carries the power to realize the highest possibilities of value implicit in nature. This, in my own language, is Wieman's minimum definition of God. The task of religion, then, is to make connections with and adjustments to this Carrier of Possibilities. The task of philosophy or theology is not to prove the existence of this Carrier of Possibilities, for its existence can no more be doubted than you can doubt the existence of nature itself, but to explore its ways and define its character in the interest of fuller human cooperation with its on-going. It is a phase of this exploratory task upon which Professor Calhoun and Professor Wieman are engaged in their current discussion in this magazine.

The most radical difference between the Thomistic philosophy and the philosophy of the protestant period may be stated thus: the former started with God, the latter started with man. Wieman starts with God. For him, as for St. Thomas, God is the most indubitable fact of

human knowledge. In details and method there is little enough in common between the two. But their radical kinship must not be obscured by the scholastic dress which the Thomistic system wears. Wieman rejects the method which Western philosophy adopted when it started on the road of doubt and stopped only when it reached the empty subjectivity of the self. He does not reject it in the interest of scholasticism, but in the interest of a theocentric world view which is just as God-centered as that of scholasticism itself. Wieman thus finally and absolutely closes the gap which Descartes first opened up, in the presence of which philosophers have stood baffled for centuries, and which Dewey intended, but failed, to close—namely, the gap between the ideal and the real, between mind and matter, between man and nature. This, I repeat, is accomplished by regarding man, with his intelligence and ideals, as integral to, and as the instrument of, the real.

The apologists of Thomism do not seem, as I said above, to know that protestant philosophy is being reborn. They assume that Western culture is still afflicted with Cartesian, Lockian, Comtian atomism, as indeed, in our institutional patterns and in popular thought, it is. They therefore prescribe for us a philosophical and ecclesiastical medicine which we could consent to take only in a mood of despair, believing that no other remedy was available. But if, despite the serious illness of protestant culture, a new protestant philosophy is actually at hand, it is well to consider its possibilities before calling in the "Angelic Doctor," whose medicine, though admittedly virtuous, is mixed with scholastic anachronisms and irrelevancies which make it difficult to take.

Though it is unnecessary to go back to the scholastic scene of medievalism, it is highly important that the two groups of thinkers, protestant and catholic, shall know just where they stand in relation to each other. As I see this new relationship it strikingly suggests the *status quo ante bellum*. At least negotiations can now be carried on. For the first time in four centuries, contemporary thought has opened up a line of critical communication and possible understanding between protestant and catholic philosophy.

Charles Clayton Krumpholtz

CONTEMPORARY BOOKS

SEEKING LOST WORLDS

THREE WORLDS, by CARL VAN DOREN. *Harper & Brothers*, \$3.

ACROSS SPOON RIVER, by EDGAR LEE MASTERS. *Farrar & Rinehart*, \$3.50.

THE Middle West speaks again—and again speaks for much of America—in these two autobiographies, by Carl Van Doren (born, 1885) and Edgar Lee Masters (born, 1869). Both men were brought up in the Illinois countryside (some seventy-five miles apart); both went to the city, Van Doren to New York, Masters to Chicago; both became literary men, Van Doren a critic (and teacher), Masters a poet (and lawyer). Van Doren tells us of three worlds: pre-war, post-war and depression. Masters' full narrative stops with the war, though an epilogue brings us to the present.

The most significant thing about these books is what they say, or imply, about religion. Van Doren says practically nothing; Masters says a great deal, none of it good. But both books imply, and strongly; and what they imply is what most thoughtful people know by now: that generally speaking, religion in America, within the last two generations, has become merely formal or has even ceased to exist. Van Doren would probably greet this statement with unconcern, Masters with satisfaction; in the fact, however, lies the basic cause of the incompleteness of their lives as they have recorded them.

Masters' incompleteness is more evident than Van Doren's. Van Doren lost, or almost lost, his first, and most real, world; Masters has never found one. And the church has meant practically nothing to either. Van Doren's two references to the church are both suggestive of its weakness. His grandmother, he says, organized the first Sunday school at Hope, Illinois, about the time of the Civil War. "I'm tired of having the men waste all their Sundays on horse races. It's a bad example for the children." When religion becomes merely the instrument of morality, it is pretty far gone. He tells us later that he and his brothers were all cheerful unbelievers by sixteen or seventeen, and having moved to another community, Urbana, they soon stopped going to church. So does mere piety die in a new environment.

Yet, in spite of this inner weakness of Van Doren's boyhood world, it was at least a world, and the best he has yet found. I think he admits this himself. There is certainly no doubt of it in my mind. In this world of the Illinois farm—his father was a country doctor, who turned more and more to farming—he really lived; in his later years, in New York, he observed. His early life expressed itself through the dual pattern of an almost ideal home and a well run farm. In this gracious atmosphere he learned the clarity and charm that his book reveals. His best pages tell of this life. The dust cover refers to notable portraits of writers Van Doren came to know in New York; some of the re-

viewers do likewise. Doubtless they are good portraits; they increase our knowledge or arouse in us the pleasant sense of recognition. But where meanwhile is Van Doren, and what is the quality of his life?

That he felt the danger of becoming merely an observer is suggested by his references to the dust gathering atmosphere of Columbia University before the war, where scholarship seduced him—willing, however, to be seduced; by his attempt, as literary editor of the *Nation*, to relate literature to life; by his interest in the vital younger generation of the 1920's; by the fact that he has made *American* literature his main field; and, especially, by the fact that he wrote two of his books in satisfaction partly of a personal need: the biography of Thomas Love Peacock, to learn how a conventional poet became a skillful prose writer, and the biography of Jonathan Swift, to find there, writ large, his own tragic loneliness. But the realization of danger is most plainly indicated by his turning away from the empty headed crowd of the late 1920's; and, finally, by his turning in thought back to his father and his father's life, and his recognition of his own resemblance to his father.

It is at the moment of this recognition that he becomes aware both of his weakness and of his strength, and we become aware in addition of the cause of that weakness and of a depth within it unrealized I think by him. He feels within himself, he says, a blind faith—the same blind faith that his father had felt; and this has come to him, somehow, with insufficient moral or intellectual reason, out of his own depression, which had preceded somewhat the national depression. Possibly he suggests the reason when he tells how he became aware of it on a trip out West: "Was life better? Life was bigger." This may mean that in renewed contact with the land he felt the old vital forces returning and was moved again by the religion of nature which as a boy on the farm he might well have felt, and which a passage of his own writing indicates that he did feel. Now, as important as the farmer's natural religion is, it is a dangerous staff to lean one's whole weight upon, because, however vital, it is unmoral and may sooner or later betray one's dearest dreams; furthermore, it is difficult, as Van Doren's own experiences testify, to transplant it to the city: the ritual of sowing and reaping, of summer and winter, is generally lacking, and without the ritual the spirit itself dies.

As I see it, then, Van Doren has become aware at fifty of the wisdom that has deeply underlain the confused rushing surface of his life; he is therefore nearer this wisdom now than at any other time since he left its source; he is certainly nearer than he was in 1924-25, for I attended his lectures that year; yet the best he can say for it, now that he has found it, is that it is blind.

Edgar Lee Masters cannot say even that. Through the sale of his books, and through legal success, he has at last found freedom from the law; physical freedom, therefore, from the confused legal and business world of Chicago. There is no assurance, however, that the freedom of a spiritual order has replaced in his

own mind the general confusion of his life. The impression that I keep is of confusion. Touches of pathos here, of tragedy there, but by and large confusion, and the sense of futility that accompanies it. Van Doren has spent many years as the observer of a confused world, drawn into it only partially, and remembering, however faintly, an earlier world where order prevailed; Masters, less fortunate, was led, because of confusion without and within, into active participation in a confused world: wanting to be a poet, he spent most of his life being a lawyer; Jeffersonian, friend of the common man and the underdog, he yet was bound by his own and his sister's marriages to the capitalistic social, financial and industrial world of Chicago.

The confusion existed from his childhood. The village and small town life of Illinois gave him the broken pattern of conflict instead of the complete pattern of peace. In his and his father's experience (his father was a lawyer) the bad men were in church, the good outside. This confusion in the community would have been less disastrous if it had been offset by order at home. But order, both physical and spiritual, was lacking even there. "What a happy relief it was to get away from this home life and go out to my grandmother's!" he says. There he found the order he missed at home. Yet even these visits were marred by his mother's inability to get along with his grandmother and her jealousy of his love of his grandmother. Van Doren had an ordered home life and the discipline of a farm; Masters had a disordered home life and only occasional visits to a farm. Van Doren could neglect the church; Masters had to oppose it.

The country—not the farm—brought out in Masters one notable quality, his mystic sense. The light that shines through nature is one of the finest characteristics of the *Spoon River Anthology*. He was aware of it from boyhood, he says: "The still sunsets when the fire of the sun dazzled from distant windows; the call of quail, and the cry of the meadow larks flying amid the light of afternoon which concealed them—and here arose my own longings and griefs for something that seemed far off in life when I should be mature; but that something was more distant than that—it is distant now, and will ever be so."

This is the central tragedy of his life. The light that shone from natural scenes was for him a will-o-the-wisp, not reflected by human beings and institutions—with one exception: his grandfather, "to whom man's pilgrimage on earth and his end in the grave constituted a mysterious tragedy." Beyond this, he sought in vain: in woman after woman, for instance; in our general social life. Like nearly everyone else, his mother, he says, was a divided personality. Later he indicates the division in his own life: "All through my poems there run the two strains of realism and mysticism." The social structure was against him; he was never able to humanize God. "The humanization of God," says Berdyaev, "is the fundamental process of the inner consciousness of humanity." In this fundamental process Masters has failed. He had the light, he had the

will, but the confusion of the world was too great. Temperamentally a more religious man than Van Doren, his religion has been less effective in ordering his own life. Even his style is confused; and this in spite of his lifelong devotion to Homer. Behind the supreme clarity of Homer's style is a religious faith; lacking this, Masters has lacked the one thing necessary for great achievement anywhere.

Van Doren, though sixteen years younger than Masters, draws his strength from that old reservoir, the farm. Masters was less fortunate. As for the church, the ideal reservoir of spiritual strength, it has left Van Doren indifferent and aroused the hostility of Masters.

JAMES McBRIDE DABBS.

ARE LITERARY STANDARDS MERELY LITERARY?

ESSAYS ANCIENT AND MODERN, *by* T. S. ELIOT. *Harcourt, Brace & Company*, \$2.

FOR SEVERAL years the name of T. S. Eliot has been familiar to thoughtful persons, but only now are we beginning to realize the great significance of his career. Mr. Eliot began as a poet and literary critic, but both his poetry and his criticisms have taken him to the Christian faith. It is quite possible that his most enduring influence may be in the field of Christian apologetics.

Those who speak of current tendencies in Christian thinking usually lay great stress on the Barthian movement and the Oxford Group movement, but they cannot reasonably overlook the importance of the movement of which Eliot is one of the most persuasive representatives. This movement may be described as humanistic theism. Most of those who share in it have plumbed humanism, especially that of the late Irving Babbitt, to its depths, and have found in it no ultimate resting place; they have gone on beyond humanism to full belief in the reality of the supernatural and the authority of the Christian revelation.

Eliot's new collection of essays shows where this thinker has arrived and the place of arrival is very far from the place of departure. Born in St. Louis in the New England Unitarian tradition, he has become a British subject and an Anglo-catholic. It has been wittily said that Mr. Eliot has followed the pathway of his fathers in reverse order, both geographically and theologically. He went to Europe by way of Harvard.

Eliot has now been before the reading public for a full quarter century, his earliest poems having been published soon after his graduation from Harvard. Not long afterward there appeared in his work a note similar to that of the metaphysical poets of the seventeenth century, to whom he has given much attention in his more recent lectures. Like them he indulges in obscure and oblique allusions, and also like Andrewes or Donne in their learned sermons, he does not bother to explain. Eliot gives evidence that his reading of the great

theologians has been both wide and deep. He seems to be greatly strengthened in his own mind by the fact that he stands in a tradition which reaches back many centuries and includes so many strong men.

When Eliot was lecturing in this country four years ago he told us of the moving experience in his own life when he first came to the realization that certain earlier poets had been saying the very things which he had come to see as true. Then, he told us, he saw that he had "the backing of dead men," and the result was a significant enrichment of his life. There is not a specific mention of the doctrine of the communion of saints in Eliot's recent work, but it is clear that he knows the meaning of it.

Our time, according to this critic, is especially superficial in its thought and experience, largely because we are unable or unwilling to keep the sense of continuity with a great past. We suffer from the disease of "contemporaneity." Eliot sees this especially in our reading and makes the following observation: "And there never was a time, I believe, when the reading public was so large or so helplessly exposed to the influences of its own time. There never was a time, I believe, when those who read at all, read so many more books by living authors than books by dead authors; there never was a time so completely parochial, so shut off from the past."

As a literary critic Eliot finds it necessary to make judgments and in this he needs standards. What shall the standards be? Shall they be merely his own personal likes and dislikes? Shall the standards be merely literary? In answering these questions Eliot finds no standards convincing short of those supplied by the Christian religion; a man cannot, he suggests, criticize literature without the introduction of ethical and theological conceptions. It is clear that much current writing cannot pass the suggested tests. Eliot asks Christians to stand by their own convictions concerning what they *ought to like*, regardless of what the general public likes or thinks it ought to like: "What I believe to be incumbent upon all Christians is the duty of maintaining consciously certain standards and criteria of criticism over and above those applied by the rest of the world; and by these criteria and standards everything that we read must be tested."

Of the essays in this new book many will enjoy especially "Religion and Literature." The author makes clear what he thinks religious literature should be. It is not literature *about* religion, but the literature which assumes the reality of religious objects. "What I want," Elliot says, "is a literature which should be *unconsciously*, rather than deliberately and defiantly, Christian." This was once true, but later men like Hardy worried about religion, and soon they ceased even to argue about it, because the last phase "is the phase of those who have never heard the Christian faith spoken of as anything but an anachronism." Perhaps the secularism with which modern literature has been so widely corrupted has almost run its course, and men may again take Christian

standards for granted in all parts of experience. In any case, the work of Eliot and his colleagues who write for the *Criterion* is directed toward that end.

The present volume includes much that was in the earlier volume of essays, *For Lancelot Andrewes*. This book is out of print and the new selection is given the public in place of a new edition. Three essays which were in the earlier volume have been omitted, and five new ones have been added. One of these is the brilliant introduction to the Everyman Edition of Pascal's *Pensées*. It is good that the essay on Lancelot Andrewes has been reprinted, even though it no longer gives the title to the book. One reviewer has charged that Eliot has practically *invented* Andrewes, but this is far from true. The great and saintly Bishop of Winchester, who helped to make the Authorized Version of the Bible, has always been known by a minority, but Eliot has made him known to a wide public. The essay, in the earlier volume, was successful in turning this reviewer to a use of the *Private Prayers* of Andrewes, and the experience has been a precious one.

It is certain that religious thinkers cannot afford to neglect the work of Christian men who stand today in the tradition of orthodoxy, rejecting Pelagianism as heretical on the one extreme and Calvinism as heretical on the other. This is the *via media* of the school of Hooker and has ever been the main stream in the Church of England. Because T. S. Eliot writes in conscious conformity to this Christian tradition his work is important for Christian readers.

D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, by SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS. *Henry Holt & Company*, \$5.

FOURTEEN years ago, in introducing the opening number of the now distinguished American journal, *Foreign Affairs*, Mr. Elihu Root made the point that "the control of foreign relations by modern democracies creates a new and pressing demand for popular education in international affairs." "When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. The world will be the gainer by the change, for, while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. That way is to furnish the whole people, as a part of their ordinary education, with correct information about their relations to other peoples." To furnish such information is the purpose of Professor Bemis' excellent book.

Almost twenty years ago, however, no less an authority on diplomatic affairs than the late David Jayne Hill warned us that there is no assurance that democracies will be more successful than other forms of government in keeping out of diplomatic involvement and war. If, for instance, we take the statement

in the Declaration of Independence that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed" to mean that the government is our small boy; or if, in the field of foreign affairs where each state claims to be free from effective legal control, we consider the government our agent, unlimited by law, in prizing open for us the foreign doors to raw materials and markets—if this is the meaning of government in our democracies, there is no assurance whatever that democracies will be better able than other forms of government to promote friendly and mutually profitable international relationships.

Nevertheless, it is true that, whether sufficient or not, education in the field of international relationships is increasingly indispensable in all countries that propose to continue to hold to the democratic ideal. As Herman Finer, in his penetrating study of *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, has said, "This great blundering blind giant, Demos, can be prodded into supporting the most suicidal of policies by those who take advantage of his blindness, and, in the long run, the giant may trample upon his leaders, wise as well as stupid, friends as well as enemies, out of sheer ignorance." As long, for instance, as we leave it to Mr. Hearst and others of like mind to interpret for us the meaning of Washington's "Farewell Address," the giant is likely to continue to grope around for a consistent foreign policy. That address, which Washington penned primarily with a view to persuading his fellow countrymen to bury the political hatchet has been used by these gentlemen to persuade us to dig up the political hatchet. It was originally a warning against our participation with either side in a rivalry of power. It has latterly been used to prevent our participation in a concert of power. It was defended by its author on the ground of our national youth and immaturity. It has latterly been proclaimed in the day of our maturity and our strength. The point is that the people of this country are getting a large part of their "information" concerning our diplomatic history from unreliable sources.

The writer is of the opinion that questions of foreign policy receive wholly inadequate attention from the electorate. Whatever the vagaries contained in the platforms of the two leading parties in the recent presidential campaign, the planks on foreign policy raised a genuine and important issue. Nevertheless, their influence on the outcome of the election was probably negligible. I have been forced, after years of observation and fairly close contact with local political "leadership," to the conclusion that these "leaders" know and care very little about questions of foreign policy. Such questions are therefore seldom matters of serious and general discussion in national elections.

Professor Bemis' *A Diplomatic History of the United States* is a thorough study impartially presented. In the interest of a broader knowledge of our relation to world affairs the volume deserves to be widely read. While it will doubtless be most generally used as a text in courses in diplomatic history, and while it does not meet the need for a briefer, more generalized, and yet scholarly review of our diplomatic history for those who have not disciplined themselves

sufficiently for the task of facing eight hundred pages of our diplomatic past, it will unquestionably at once take its place as one of the very small number of distinguished volumes covering this neglected field.

In his concluding chapter Professor Bemis thus summarizes: "The United States made no serious mistake in its diplomacy, and committed few minor errors, from 1775 to 1898. Its uniform successes were due to taking advantage of the wars, rivalries and distresses of Europe, to its detached and distant position, and to the fact that the objectives of its policy were perfectly compatible with the genius and the interest of its people on this continent." And again: "The continental position has always been the strength of the United States in the world. American successes in diplomacy have been based on a continental policy. The interests of the United States today rest on the same support. It is a safe ground on which to watch and wait for a better world." With high praise for the author's success in factual presentation, the reviewer cannot agree with him that the facts warrant these generalizations. Is the United States to continue merely to take advantage of the rivalries and distresses of Europe, and merely to "watch and wait for a better world?"

EARLY L. FOX.

CONTEMPORARY CONTINENTAL THEOLOGY

GOD TRANSCENDENT: FOUNDATION FOR A CHRISTIAN METAPHYSIC, by KARL HEIM. *Charles Scribner's Sons*. \$3.50.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE WORD OF GOD, by KARL BARTH. *Charles Scribner's Sons*, \$7.50.

TO the enterprise of Charles Scribner's Sons, we owe the publication within a single month of the two most important works in Continental theology (with Emil Brunner's *The Mediator*) to be rendered into English since the World War. For, as Edwyn Bevan reminds us in his introduction to Heim's book, the two German thinkers with largest influence upon the younger generation of Christians are Karl Barth and Karl Heim. Heretofore, the former has been known to English readers only through a host of interpreters and a few volumes of semipopular or fragmentary character; the latter only through two small books and no adequate interpretations. Now we have at our disposal a major volume from the pen of each. In each instance, it is the first section of what is intended to be a comprehensive and systematic exposition of the author's theology—his magnum opus.

The simultaneous appearance of these two important books has a triple interest, growing out of (1) the intrinsic merit of each, (2) the opportunity thus afforded for critical comparison of the two most powerful schools of Christian thought on the continent of Europe and (3) the intimate relation of both books and their authors to the bitter crisis of the German church. For each book has been radically recast from its original form (it is the later and revised editions which are here translated) under the pressure of events in the last five

years; each aims to provide solid standing-ground for Christians in the vortex of the present. In our comments, we may well hold in view this threefold interest.

Professor Heim's problem is set for him by the particular intellectual, spiritual and practical situation in which he, as a professor of theology in Tübingen in January, 1934, finds himself. That problem is no longer, as it was in the first edition of his book three years earlier, to commend the importance of religion to a disintegrating relativism and skepticism, but to vindicate the claims of transcendent Reality over against the powerful positive faiths of blood and race and immanent world-process. The central issue, he believes, is that of transcendence; and so, in the English translation, the German title, *Glaube und Denken* (*Belief and Thought*) has wisely been superseded by *God Transcendent*.

Toward the solution of this problem, recourse is had to a careful analysis of transcendence in intramundane relations to discover how much light it may cast on the nature of divine transcendence and how far such analogies are delusive. For Professor Heim claims affinity with a movement of thought, probably the most powerful in German philosophy before the nazi revolution, of which the leading spokesmen were Grisebach, Heidegger and Martin Buber. "The note of this new philosophy was to emphasize the factors of time and the personal perspective standpoint in all observation of the universe." Conceiving the world in which we actually find ourselves to consist of relationships between three factors—"I," "Thou" and "It"—the interpretation of Reality proceeds by a deeper understanding of this "I-Thou-It" world. To an exhaustive study of these relationships, the bulk of the book is devoted.

The ultimate epistemological question—"How far is the world as we experience it real?"—is deliberately put to one side; investigation is limited to the "distinctions which confront us within the world of space and time." From a fuller comprehension of how two mundane realities—for example, "I" and "Thou"—can intimately affect each other and yet remain transcendent to each other, we may gain some suggestion of the nature of divine transcendence. That is to say, what the character of that transcendence must be *if* God exists. For the investigation of this introductory volume "does not consider the question whether anything definite can be said about the existence and nature of the supramundane Power"; it brings us face to face with the unknown God. This is the conclusion of the matter: "If God is a reality and not to be explained away in the manner of idolatry and pantheism, then it is impossible for us, by any observation or any thinking of our own, to reach what he is and what he wills. We are thrown back on God's own revelation." Thus a pathway is laid to the second volume in the series, *Jesus the Lord*, which has already appeared in the German and may shortly be expected in translation.

This is not the place for an exhaustive examination of Professor Heim's thesis and its development, though only a fairly exhaustive critique can do it justice.

Queries arise all along the way. It is doubtful whether the author maintains firm consistency even in the use of his own presuppositions and terminology. We are told that "God stands over against the whole 'I-Thou-It' world as something Wholly Other"; elsewhere, the definition of God as Wholly Other is derided as a case of "these passionately strained descriptions of otherness." The dialectical theology is taken to task for illustrating the divine transcendence by the "special metaphor of a plane, which is intersected by a ray from another direction"; yet the author makes "space" the central category for his own position, and though he intends to free it from material associations he never quite succeeds in doing so, frequently slipping into inapt spatial analogies.

This suggests a more fundamental criticism: whether the deliberate construction of Heim's vocabulary, which must adequately interpret *all* types of relationship from exclusively spatial terms ("space," "dimension," "boundary," etc.), is not, to say the least, unhappy. It tempts him to illegitimate parallels between events in nature and events in personal experience. It is a sound principle of interpretation, too little observed in theology and philosophy today, that distinctively personal realities cannot adequately be described in categories drawn from sub-personal levels.

But perhaps the most fatal weakness of the whole position is the excessive subjectivism which has characterized all thinkers of Heim's school. By begging the fundamental epistemological issue—whether our "knowledge" be of genuine reality or only of the world as we experience it—the discussion is set in a phenomenalist, and so partial, perspective. It may be said never fully to escape the "ego-centric predicament." This appears most clearly in a startling omission. In a volume devoted to the analysis of relationships, there nowhere appears any recognition, let alone investigation, of the unique character of the "I-They," "We-They," "We-It" relations. The world is made to consist of my solitary ego, your solitary ego, the relation of each to its world of things, and the relation of these solitary egos to one another. But what is really to be interpreted is not an "I-Thou-It" world, but an "I-Thou-We-They-It" world. It is difficult to see how a theology neglecting this fact can bring true or persuasive help to peoples enthralled in mass loyalties and in the problems of their corporate existence. Professor Heim's study embodies many helpful insights into the logic of personal relationships. It can hardly be regarded as a promising starting point for a new Christian theology.

To open the covers of Barth's *Dogmatic* is to be carried into a different world. There are no premises not made familiar through the spirited controversies over the dialectical theology in recent years—the primacy of revelation, the centrality of the Word of God, man's fallen and helpless condition, the importance of preaching, the definition of theology's task as "that of investigating church proclamation as to its agreement with the Word of God, as to its suitability to what it proclaims."

What will surprise and reward the critical reader is the extraordinary rich-

ness of the material, the fertility of the treatment, and, especially, the mastery of the whole range of historical theology as well as contemporary philosophy, the summoning in support of the argument of the best thought of the Christian centuries. Augustine and Aquinas are cited hardly less frequently than Luther; the development of church doctrine from Ignatius of Antioch to Wobbermin and Tillich is held clearly in view throughout. One may question some of the author's interpretations; one may dissent from his conclusions; one can only acknowledge with admiration a breadth and comprehensiveness of scholarship which has few, if any, equals among living theologians. Through more than five hundred and fifty closely packed pages, nearly half of them excursuses in fine type narrowly spaced, the discussion is carried forward with no flagging of vigor or command. Indeed some of the most challenging and stimulating discussions are hidden in these digressions.

Since this is only the first half of the first volume of a projected five-volume *Church Dogmatic*, and since the whole of the first volume is designated "Prolegomena," we hardly expect to be conducted beyond the threshold of the argument. Yet the main outlines of a full theology are fairly well revealed. Whatever the measure of our agreement or dissent, this "preface to the introduction" is sufficient to vindicate the claim that here is the most notable attempt at a Christian theology since Ritschl, and probably since Calvin.

Heim and Barth have influenced each other by attraction and repulsion. To the Anglo-Saxon mind, their thought appears to share many fundamental presuppositions, though, after the wonted habit of theological controversialists, they bludgeon each other merrily and mercilessly. Indeed, the contrasts are deep-going—less in theological presupposition than in standpoint, objective and method. Heim is alarmed and bullied by this and that current aberration; he is anxious to maintain relevance to the present situation; he longs to give us a work which shall be at once a Christian metaphysic and a tract for the times. Like many another with similar purpose, he never shakes himself loose from the position he wishes to correct sufficiently to bring it under incisive and convincing judgment. It cannot be said that he ever gets beyond "apologetic," in the unhappy as well as the legitimate meaning of that term. Barth, also, hopes that theology may have "a word to say to politics, as indeed it ought to have a word to say to them!" But he believes it can say that word truly and effectively only when and as it discovers its own truth. And so he moves forward about his own enterprise without concession or apprehension. One writer seeks to minister to contemporary thought currents by deliberate immersion in them with scant recognition of any thinker before and with nervous sidelong glances for immediate effectiveness, and achieves an insecure foothold which is hardly likely to command favor after the present swift-flowing currents have passed. The other ranges through the treasury of Christian reflection with bold indifference to current presumptions, and establishes a position which, how-

ever partial and perverse it may appear in certain respects, is firmly grounded *within* theology and seems destined to wield influence far into an uncertain future.

We suggested that these two foremost Continental theologians furnish an especially interesting contrast because of the intimate relation of each to the present crisis in the German church. Perhaps it is enough to note this paradoxical fact: Heim, intensely preoccupied with the pagan *Weltanschauung* of blood and race and intending his theology to be a refutation of it, continues to teach at Tübingen under sufferance if not approval of the nazi government; Barth, doggedly pursuing theological truth without regard to immediate political relevance, was driven from Bonn as an insufferable stumbling-block to the nazi government. Here is food for reflection.

A final query. What is the importance of present-day Continental theology for American thought? Walter Horton, introducing his study of *Contemporary English Theology*, suggests that "there are some indications that the intellectual leadership of Western Christendom is about to pass from Germany to England; and American Protestant thought is beginning to look to English rather than to German theology for help in the solving of its problems." In Barthianism he finds stimulus and challenge, but little positive guidance. For many readers, the works under review will confirm that thesis. Amid the welter of current views, three clearly stand preeminent. One is the familiar American liberalism of the recent past, whether of left-wing or more moderate persuasion; it requires no great prophetic gift to forecast an early revival of militant liberalism. The second is that to which Horton himself is drawn and which he well names "evangelical catholicism." There is a third; no one who comes open-minded to *The Doctrine of the Word of God* will doubt it. We have not yet done with Karl Barth.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN.

JEFFERSON AND THE JEFFERSONIAN TRADITION

THE JEFFERSONIAN TRADITION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, by CHARLES MAURICE WILTSE. *University of North Carolina Press*, \$3.

THE LIVING JEFFERSON, by JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS. *Charles Scribner's Sons*, \$3.

JEFFERSON IN POWER, by CLAUDE G. BOWERS. *Houghton Mifflin Company*, \$3.75.

THOMAS JEFFERSON was something more than a man of his own times, who wrought for his single generation and departed with it. There is an universality in his thinking and emotion which has made him contemporary to each new generation. One believes that were he alive today, he would not long be lost in an alien land but soon would be lighting our way through the dark. Therefore it is not surprising that to this day he remains one of the great quarries from which the political philosophers—and the polemicists

—secure stones for their structures or their strictures. This is not surprising, for Jefferson is the American Leonardo da Vinci, as many-sided a genius as this continent has ever had, cultivating diverse fields deeply and raising good fruit on most of them.

This combination of universality and depth has made Jefferson the delight as well as the despair of the historian: there are as many facets to him as there are writers to gaze upon his career and mind. Thus each new decade we have many new books about the Sage of Monticello because each generation needs to interpret the great men of the past through its own eyes and with its own vocabulary and to adjust them to its own social and psychological patterns. At the moment there is a new upsurge of books about this mild mannered man who composed the Declaration of Independence, guided our first bloodless revolution and set the tone for our political philosophy. Three such books are before us.

Professor Wiltse has done a workmanlike job in his critical appraisal of the mind of Jefferson and its influence on our political thought. He seems to me to have succeeded in penetrating to the inner essence of Jeffersonian philosophy. Looking beyond flashing phrases to essential meaning, he has realized that Jefferson's end purpose was the attainment of a free and happy society. This had the obvious correlary of implementation through certain specific immediate formulas and arrangements; these were the means by which the particular society of the day might be carried toward the Jeffersonian goal. There were three elements to the equation: the existing situation of society, which is a variable; the end result desired—a free and happy society—which is a constant; and the political, social and economic formulae by which to secure it. Inasmuch as social conditions are never static, for the securing of the same result formulas likewise must change. This is something Jefferson knew well and frequently proclaimed. Moderns praising him have the tendency to fall into two groups: those who admire his end purpose and seek to adjust political mechanisms so that it can be achieved; and those so obsessed by his precise formulas for application at a particular time—say, 1798—that they ignore a century and a half of change. The perception of this essential fact illuminates Dr. Wiltse's volume. Its style is generally good and occasionally there is a flight of fine and moving prose.

The author is particularly effective in his discussion of the fashion in which "Jeffersonian democracy" has been adapted by those who followed Jefferson. But for him this is merely another proof of the tremendous vitality of our American democracy. It has endured, he feels, chiefly because it is not "beyond the reach of change," and therefore permits alteration and adjustment within the old familiar frame. Thus preserving "the ideal of a free people cooperating under free institutions," American democracy has survived and prospered, justifying again and again "the faith of Jefferson that an informed and intelligent people can and will work out their own salvation."

With this statement Mr. James Truslow Adams would seem in some measure to disagree, for while *The Living Jefferson* presents a striking picture of the career of our third president, one suspects that the career is chiefly valued as a vehicle for the moral which the author attempts to draw: that the sort of political, social and economic arrangements we have in America today are abhorrent to the spirit of Thomas Jefferson.

Those who have followed the bent of Mr. Adams' thinking over the past few years have realized that increasingly he has viewed the world—and America—through a dark glass and has seen ruin lurking around the corner. But the real gravamen of his complaint seems to be not so much that we have failed to seek the end purposes which to Jefferson were all important, but rather that the formulas of 1798 have been partially discarded because they no longer are thought to fit the needs of an industrialized society. And this is why Mr. Adams' lamentations fill the House of Gideon.

Jefferson was not the man to insist upon a socially frozen world. He would have been the first to agree with the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that "change is the law of life." In his career he demonstrated many times that he would not let the paternity of a pleasing formula of words stand in the way of his prompt and realistic treatment of an actual living problem requiring action and solution—witness the Louisiana purchase. Although a philosopher, he was likewise a pragmatist; when a fact came into collision with a theory, he would adjust the theory to meet the fact.

This ability of Jefferson to be a practical idealist accounts for much of his greatness, and it is this which a reader of Mr. Adams' concluding chapters feels he has failed to sense. One is convinced that the real "living Jefferson" would not block but would aid the efforts of our nation to adjust itself to a new economic situation through the democratic process of participation and consent.

With *Jefferson in Power*, Mr. Bowers has returned to the epoch of the fathers of the Constitution, resuming the narrative where his *Jefferson and Hamilton* left off. The passage of time and his entry into diplomacy have not cooled the ardor of this brilliant orator-editor for Thomas Jefferson. Nor has his formula for writing history undergone any substantial change.

This is true of his style as well as of his attitude toward Jefferson. The volume opens with a thumb-nail portrait of the sprawling town of Washington when Jefferson entered the White House; then here is a limning of its society, diplomatic as well as pettycoat; the chief actors in the coming drama are brought upon the stage, and then the narrative begins in the author's vivid style and staccato tempo.

Mr. Bowers is at his best as the advocate. In *Jefferson and Hamilton* he showed art in making the great Federalist an attractive figure, so that Jefferson could shine by comparison as a much greater one. In the present volume, which is concerned with the presidency of the Sage of Monticello, there is no single anti-Christ posited against the great democrat, but a veritable battalion

of them. One sees Fisher Ames in his dotage ; one has a growing sympathy for a Hamilton who has lost the reality of power and must satisfy himself with the empty husks of success at the bar, securing what pleasure he can by immoderate slurs upon his enemies, until one of them calls him to a bloody dueling field. It is a strange story how the faction mad Federalists employed this deliberate betrayal of his country by Aaron Burr as a weapon in a partisan political assault upon the Jefferson administration—an assault joined in by John Marshall !

In such respects the book is vivid. Mr. Bowers is a master of semi-restrained invective. Furthermore, he has some satisfactory descriptions of Jefferson's policies and problems. In particular, he paints the broad canvas of the negotiations leading to the Louisiana purchase. Here Jefferson showed himself a consummate statesman. The author likewise does well in his treatment of the embargo. Far from having been an inept, feckless policy, it was carefully thought out and afforded a meritorious substitute for war. Its merit has never received proper recognition.

One wishes, however, that the volume gave one a better grasp of the inner essence of its central character. Jefferson is mentioned on nearly every page ; he gives dinners, writes letters, sends messages, nurses wounds. Even so, one does not come to know the man. He remains elusive, insubstantial, more the focus for a book than a real being of flesh and blood. Perhaps the author expected his readers to carry forward the admirable sketch in *Jefferson and Hamilton*. But he should have realized that during the eleven years between the publication of the two books their memories may have grown dim.

GEORGE FORT MILTON.

ISRAEL'S WISE MEN

ISRAEL'S WISDOM LITERATURE, by O. S. RANKIN. *Charles Scribner's Sons*, \$4.50.

DR. RANKIN has given us here a solid volume of theological thinking and historical interpretation. It is of great value in stressing for this ultra-modern minded age the wealth of the ancient influences which have gone into the shaping of Christian thinking. Its subject matter, the wrestle of the sages of ancient Israel with the problems of human destiny, has been too largely ignored, at least in popular religious thinking, a circumstance doubtless due to the inherent difficulty of the book of Job and the atomistic character of much of Proverbs ; but in this volume, the activity through centuries of Israel's wise men, crystallizing at length in these and other books, is so presented that none may escape a realization of their significance for later theological thought.

Yet with full recognition of the high value of Dr. Rankin's work, one must point out that he has too narrowly conceived his theme. Apart from the final chapter, the volume is concerned almost entirely with the problem of reward and retribution as it was worked through to varying solutions in Jewish and

Christian thought. In this exhaustive discussion there are some valuable contributions to our understanding. A section of more than a hundred pages is occupied with the rise and significance of Israel's belief in a future life, a subject ripe for reconsideration. Another important chapter is that in which Dr. Rankin examines and effectively refutes the narrowly rigid conception of Hebrew group solidarity which has been the orthodoxy of criticism for many years.

Yet it must be fully realized that the wisdom speculation of Israel was something more than all this. Indeed, as a treatment of the Wisdom literature the book is quite inadequate. It is unfortunate that Dr. Rankin did not choose another title for his volume. It is not a discussion of the Wisdom literature at all, but an able historical investigation of certain ideas which were touched on by the wise men though they take a secondary, if not a minor, place in their speculation. Chapters 1-9 of the book of Proverbs, to take a casual illustration, are rich in religious ideas of the highest importance: the immanence of God, the divine purpose in human life, the ultimate sanction of ethics, the nature of divine inspiration and revelation, the quality of the good life and the like, all of which are ignored by this work, which purports to be a comprehensive treatment of the Wisdom literature.

Notwithstanding a voluminous literature of exegesis of the book of Job, we have not yet reached agreement, much less finality, on its import and meaning. It is too much to expect, then, that Dr. Rankin's use of it will meet with uniform endorsement. He leaves himself open to serious question in some interpretations and to definite objection in others. He endorses the common view that the hope of future life has no part in the solution of the book of Job. The easy generalization that Job and the friends alike hold what Dr. Rankin calls the Deuteronomic view of suffering flies right in the face of unmistakable evidence of quite a different sort. And, to select a detailed point, the long wrestle with Job 19:26f is a thankless task and the deductions drawn are highly unstable, for in the end no more is possible than a guess at the original meaning of the passage. On the other hand, the clue to Job 19:25 is in the now famous passage of the north Syrian epic, "I know that Aleyn Baal liveth; that Zebul, lord of the earth, exists," with which it is surprising to note, Dr. Rankin is only slightly acquainted. By some strange oversight too, he fails to take cognizance of Mowinkel's important discussion of Job's *Go'el* and Witness in Heaven. As a result of both omissions, he misses the clue to this most mysterious figure, upon which the original author's reasoning turns.

There is occasion also to take exception to certain points in the discussion of the belief in a future life. The major justification for reopening this issue now is that we know much more of the ancient cult of the god who died and rose again, and its bearing on the hope of immortality than when the problem was rife some years ago. Yet here again we encounter a strange but basic deficiency in Dr. Rankin's grasp of his theme, which otherwise is impressive. He

seems but imperfectly to have realized the significance of this range of ideas for Hebrew thinking. He gives somewhat grudging recognition to Hooke's volumes though their position represents but the commonly accepted outlook of progressive scholarship. We may then register serious doubts when Dr. Rankin undertakes to explain the lateness of the development in Israel of a doctrine of future life by an antagonism between the celestial and chthonic deities; to speak categorically, the orient is oblivious of any such antagonism. The problem calls for another solution.

An excellent feature of the work is its consciousness of the influences that beat upon Israel and made their contribution to that Hebrew synthesis which in the course of the ages has become a supreme treasure of our heritage. Particularly striking are the parallels assembled between the figure of Wisdom and certain concepts in the Avesta. The story of Israel's debt to Persia has not been fully told. But we have suffered too often in Old Testament study from theories of *pan-this* or *pan-that* to be cordial to even a suggestion of pan-Iranism, however strictly limited chronologically it may be. Rather we must be conscious of the richness and variety of influences beating on Hebrew and Jewish thought.

In particular, it may be said, the wisdom speculation can be understood only by those who realize the antiquity and scope of this genuinely philosophic investigation in the orient. It had already come to notable expression in both Egypt and Babylonia long before Israel came upon the stage of civilized life. And the Hebrew sages, when at length they became active, were fully conscious of this long anterior speculation and availed themselves of the work of their predecessors to an extent that may well surprise the uninitiated. Furthermore, the concept of Wisdom as a quasi-personified figure (so significant for the later Logos doctrine) is a very old notion of the philosophers of the land of the two rivers. It had thousands of years' vogue before Israel adapted it to her special needs or even Zoroaster or his followers borrowed from it for the Avestan poems.

W. A. IRWIN.

GUIDANCE FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS

SOCIAL JUDGMENT, by GRAHAM WALLAS. *Harcourt, Brace & Company*, \$2.75.
THE DISCUSSION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS, by CHARLES A. BEARD. *The Macmillan Company*, \$1.75.

BACK of both these books lie a common concern and a common question. The concern is to improve the process by which groups and individuals make decisions and judgments in the realm of political and social action. The question is: Will the social sciences be more useful in guiding this process than they have so far succeeded in being?

Graham Wallas' *Social Judgment* is an unfinished study, brought to an end

by his death in 1932. He completed the first part, which deals with "the nature, history and possible improvement of the judgment process," and which is now posthumously published. The second part was to have evaluated "the institutions through which judgment influences social action." While in a sense incomplete and primarily analytical and historical in its emphasis, the present volume is highly suggestive.

The failure of statesmen, administrators and thinkers to protect modern civilization from political confusion, economic distress and the growing threat of war is everywhere apparent. Despite the enormous increase of scientifically authenticated facts and the dissemination of specialized knowledge, modern man's social judgment is, in Wallas' opinion, crude, inept, ineffective. He does not know how to make use of what he knows. The gap between knowledge and judgment is steadily widening. Why?

Among the obstacles to the improvement of social judgment which the author analyzes are, first, psychological factors. There is the old problem of securing a proper coordination between rational calculation and emotional impulse. Men whose heads are stocked with information and nations whose libraries and universities are filled with "social science" act without reference to such knowledge and on the basis of uncriticized and highly emotionalized impulses, hunches and loyalties. To psychologists and educators Wallas presents the problem of finding a way of relating intellectual activities to the feelings, purposes and interests of folk.

A second obstacle is specialism. Scholars have erected artificial barriers around various provinces of knowledge. This may be a highly necessary subdivision of intellectual labor, but the problem remains as to how facts thus brought to light are to be related to the task of guiding human action in situations which have a way of cutting across the artificial "fields" of scholarship. Who is to perform this task of relating? Wallas feels that specialized scientists themselves are to a constantly increasing degree refusing to accept responsibility for the social results of their work or to give advice on social policy.

Two other obstacles to the improvement of social judgment Wallas discusses under the captions, "The Idol of the Laboratory" and "The Idol of the Pulpit." The former term is applied to the tendency among social scientists to take over the methods of natural science and apply them in human relations. This has resulted in the resolute exclusion from their interest and responsibility of certain important data and of all consideration of value and significance in the realm of feeling; a badly distorted picture of the human personality is the inevitable outcome.

The "Idol of the Pulpit" involves influences and attitudes emanating from the Christian religion which have tended sharply to separate reason from emotion. The domain of experience is divided into two distinct and uncoordinated realms. Eddington calls them the "metrical" and "unmetrical." "When,"

says Wallas, "we ask Eddington by what means we are to find guidance in the all-important non-metrical world, he refers us to the 'mystical outlook,' 'mystic thought' and the experience which comes to himself and other members of the Society of Friends 'in our silent meetings.'" The result is that "if, indeed, one learns that a statesman or writer is a sincere Christian, one finds it nearly as difficult to prophesy how he will act as it would be if he were a consistent behaviorist."

For the future, Wallas is optimistic. For one thing, he believes that organized Christianity of the traditional dogmatic and stultifying type will continue to lose ground. Likewise the metaphysical assumptions of scientists who have tended to treat the world of value as unreal are being undermined, and the new outlook is bound to create a more favorable atmosphere for the growth of effective and humane social thinking. Science as at present studied is not co-extensive with wisdom. "The 'merits' of social facts include their value and significance in the realm of feeling." While we have much to learn from the patient observation of scientists and the obstinate questioning of metaphysicians, it is still necessary for us to resume once again the old search for wisdom if our civilization is to be rescued from the perils which surround it. To this cooperative and inclusive task of relating "fact" and knowledge to values and purposes, Wallas summons scholars, statesmen, politicians, and all of us.

In *The Discussion of Human Affairs* Dr. Beard is dealing with the problem that concerned Graham Wallas. He pursues the inquiry into a penetrating analysis and appraisal of contemporary historiography. What contribution has the historian to make to the decision-making processes of modern society? Can he furnish us with the bridges that will span the present gap between knowledge and action?

The early chapters of Dr. Beard's book are devoted to a consideration of what is involved whenever people discuss human affairs. Most such discussions are merely the expression of opinion, even though frequently clothed in the garb of profundity and decorated by numerous citations of fact, true or alleged. What the speaker most frequently "shares" are his wishes and his hopes. "Where many complicated elements are drawn into any discussion of human affairs, both the general principles applied and the subsidiary assertions 'founded on fact' will be found on closer examination to be citations of opinion." Instead of taking them *as* opinions, we usually assume, especially when they are uttered by prestige-possessing "leaders" ("great" editors, "great" businessmen, "great" scientists), that their opinions are facts and foreshadow or even causally influence the shape of things to come. This assumption is rarely warranted. More often than not their opinions are wrong, as Dr. Beard has little difficulty in showing.

In the "more learned" circles, one encounters the hard headed man who insists that he is giving "facts, just facts," no opinions! "Let us make no as-

sumptions; let us discard opinions; let us start with the facts and follow the facts wherever they lead us." Possible and useful within certain limited areas, this attitude is totally deceptive and false in the broad and general field of history, sociology and interpretation. "Even the person who claims to make no assumptions is in reality employing some hypothesis in the selection of facts real and alleged from areas of apparent order and chaos. If no hypothesis is consciously adopted, then subconscious interests and predilections will affect selection, for such interests and predilections exist for every human mind. . . . With reference to all large issues of policy . . . even the most rigorous man of science is more or less a guesser in discussing human affairs."

Two questions inevitably arise: (1) What then does this make of history writing, that discipline which includes as its province "the absolute totality of all personalities and occurrences, past, present and becoming to the end of time"; and (2) what is the possible contribution of the historian to the discussion of human affairs?

In answering these questions Dr. Beard reviews critically recent historiography. Just what does the writer of history do? Does he merely aim to report things as they actually occurred? Dr. Beard disposes of this theory, attractive to many historians and exceedingly fruitful in many of its results, in the chapter entitled "The Default of Written History as a 'Science' of Human Affairs." Likewise in the chapter on "The Collapse of Historical Theories Based on Analogies" he disposes respectively of the "cause and effect," the "cyclical" and the "organismic" theories. He reminds us that the historian is always (1) selecting and organizing facts, or rather records purporting to describe facts, events, personalities; and (2) in selecting facts, is giving effect to some conception of the nature of the particular problem, of its relations to its total setting and, indeed, of the nature of all things. Thus it becomes of the utmost importance to know in the case of any historian just what his "frames of reference" or controlling assumptions are.

There are many important things which the historian cannot do. He cannot bring all the tendencies and developments together in a developing totality or even imagine the terms in which such a description is possible; and even though he could, it would explain nothing, and give no answer to the question "Why?" The historian, as historian, must also be silent on the subject of "ought"; what *ought* to be done in human affairs, what ideas, interests and activities *should* be cherished involve value judgments which cannot be "proved" by reference to historical occurrences or anything else. There is nothing in any facts or sets of fact that commands anybody to cherish them or do anything about them. Still, the historian can distinguish between fact and opinion, and can know something of the various positions from which any position proceeds or takes direction. Inevitably such knowledge reveals overlappings among the various positions with the result that sharpness of division is softened and the way pre-

pared for resolving conflict by the magic of thought projected into the forum of practice.

Important as is this contribution, it clearly is not what Wallas was seeking in *Social Judgment*. Dr. Beard seems to tell Wallas not to expect too much from the historians in his effort to improve social judgment. Within certain limited areas and restricted time spans, the historian may have at his command knowledge of the past which is pertinent in the determination of policies for the future. But in reference to the larger and complicated issues on which statesmen and administrators are called to make decisions, the historian, if consulted, must in the end and like anyone else, guess; and his guess is likely to be no better than the "layman's."

To achieve what Wallas proposes, it would seem that a new profession or focus of energy is demanded for the "coordination of knowledge and the development of wisdom," in which the results of the specialized sciences may be related to the determination of social policy. As Dr. Beard points out, such an agency would have to have as a basis for work "frames of references" or views of the totality which would embody not alone what is *known* but what is preferred, desired, hoped for—in other words, a philosophy. Who shall furnish this philosophy? Is the academic philosopher any more promising a source than the historian? Like the social scientist, the philosopher is often inclined to disclaim any such responsibility. A larger orientation, a more vital grasp of social realities, and more courage in experimentation would seem to be demanded. Is it barely possible that this is the true function of religion in our times? As the situation now stands, those who have the sensitivity for and devotion to values do not know enough, and those who know, distrust their feelings. To find ways of uniting these two motives and resolving the conflict is still one of our major tasks.

THORNTON W. MERRIAM.

FIGHTERS FOR TRUTH AND UNITY

NEW FAITH FOR OLD: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, by SHAILER MATHEWS. *The Macmillan Company*, \$3.

ACROSS THE YEARS, by CHARLES STEDMAN MACFARLAND. *The Macmillan Company*, \$2.75.

THESE two books, each covering the span of half a century, give the story of two active lives during a period of transition. Together they tell the story of the great change which has passed over the thought and life of the church during the brief period of fifty years.

The two lives supplement each other. Dean Mathews' book, while giving the record of a life of extraordinary activity along practical as well as along academic lines, is chiefly concerned with the changes which have taken place in the thought of the church. It might be described, according to the point of

view of the critic, either as the story of the acute secularization of religion in America or as the story of the awakening of the conscience of the American church to its social significance and responsibility.

Dr. Mathews has exceptional qualifications for telling this story. Trained as a sociologist, though coming to his study of social problems from a religious background, the author did not at first intend to make theology his life work. So much was this the case that, though having chosen history for his field, he did not think it worth while to hear Harnack during his year of graduate study in Berlin, an omission which, somewhat to the surprise of those whose privilege it was to feel the inspiration of that incomparable teacher and student, Dr. Mathews contemplates with complacency.

The call to his lifelong association with the divinity school of the University of Chicago came to him while teaching history and political economy in college. His first reaction was one of hesitation. Theological teaching, of which he had some experience in Newton Theological Seminary, did not attract him, and it was only the insistence of Professor Ernest D. Burton and the opportunity which the newly founded university offered to be a pioneer in new fields of educational adventure which led Dean Mathews to return to the field to which he supposed himself to have said a definite farewell.

To cover, even in outline, the area which Dr. Mathews covers in the eighteen chapters of his book would carry us beyond the limits of this review. It is sufficient to say that he traverses with illuminating comment most of the significant changes which have taken place in the thought and life of the American church during his period of active service. Some idea of the range of the topics included may be gained from the titles of the chapters: "Academic Freedom in Religion," "Democratizing Religious Scholarship," "The Reconstruction of a Denomination," "The Social Gospel," "Church Unity Through Federation," "The Churches and Inter-Racial Relations," "International Good Will and War," "Religion and Science," "Religious Education in the Churches," "Modernizing Theological Education." In all these fields the author was active and to all he brought the same fundamental interest, that of breaking down the hard and fast line of distinction between religion and the rest of life and interpreting the church, and indeed Christianity itself, in terms of a succession of sociological patterns.

From the many different interests of which this many sided life was full three stand out as of special significance for the historian: (1) the story of the reconstruction of theological thinking through the widespread acceptance of the critical spirit, first in the study of the Scriptures and then over the whole range of theological thinking; (2) the educational experiment carried on by President Harper in the new university, with its keen sense of responsibility for utilizing its resources to the full and bringing education by every possible means to persons of all classes who wished its advantages; (3) the liberalizing of a great

denomination by the use of the same educational methods which had been found effective in the college and in the theological school. In all these fields of endeavor Dr. Mathews was active. The number of things he found it possible to do, and to do well, might have staggered a man of less vigorous personality and less rugged health. Reviewing this record of a half century of uninterrupted activity one feels like asking: Dear friend, did you never find time to rest?

The answer, no doubt, must be sought, as always, in the realm of the spirit. When one realizes what the changes through which the world has passed in the last generation have meant in tragedy and heartbreak, one marvels at the note of objectivity, not to say of optimism, with which the author surveys the scenes in which he has been an actor and the changes which he has helped to bring to pass. Of the sense of disillusionment and futility that meets us in such books as Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* or Pauck's essay in *The Church Against the World*, one will look in vain in Dr. Mathews' book. The spirit which he has carried through life appears most clearly in the closing paragraph of the last chapter:

I envy a generation that will be called upon to defend the individual from absorption into social process and to direct that process toward personal rather than economic efficiency. For I cannot doubt that in the future as in the past there will emerge that vicarious tenth which, according to its best intelligence, seeks at its own expense to democratize privilege and justify reliance upon love as an expression of that cosmic activity we know as God.

Very different is the impression produced by the second of the books under review, Dr. Macfarland's *Across the Years*. Where Mathews writes as teacher and scholar, Macfarland tells us the story of change from the point of view of the administrator. Beginning life in a modest home with few advantages, having to struggle for education and self-support from earliest years, Dr. Macfarland had no doubt as to the direction to which his steps were to be directed. From first to last the church claimed his allegiance; and by the church I mean organized Christianity, the familiar institution which we know so well with all its faults, yet with all its opportunities. From early pastorates in Malden and South Norwalk, in which the interest in social problems which was to characterize his administration of the Federal Council was already apparent, he was called in 1911 to be Dr. Sanford's assistant and later his successor as secretary of the Federal Council.

The story of the succeeding years of fruitful service has been treated by the author in other books and is touched on here more lightly than perhaps would have been desirable for those not as familiar with the author's work as the reviewer. For there is no doubt that it was as secretary of the Federal Council during its early days of storm and stress that Dr. Macfarland rendered his greatest service to the cause of Christian unity at home and abroad. Coming to the council at a time when it had few friends, he pledged all that he had both of personal and financial strength to its service, even incurring debt which it

took him long to repay. While others doubted he saw the possibilities which lay before the council and gave his best to translate them into reality.

Of special interest in view of the forthcoming conferences at Oxford and at Edinburgh are the pages that deal with the contribution of the Federal Council to the ecumenical movement through its founding of the Bureau of Central Relief, which did so much to rebuild the devastated Protestant churches of France and cooperated so effectively with Archbishop Söderblom in preparing the way for the Stockholm Conference on Life and Work, of which the conference in Oxford next summer will be the successor.

In comparison with Dr. Mathews' book, Dr. Macfarland's autobiography suffers from its fragmentary character. In the one case we have a comprehensive story, in the other fragments of a life work of which the most important and significant parts must be sought in other volumes. This is to be explained no doubt by Dr. Macfarland's purpose, which is not to write a critical history but to preserve such personal reminiscences of sides of his life and of contacts which he has made with interesting personalities as may be of interest to his children and friends. Especially informing to all lovers of free speech and fair play is the chapter which deals with the efforts of Mrs. Macfarland to liberalize the policy of one of the best known of our women's patriotic organizations.

Taking the two books together one has the impression that the world in which each of these valiant fighters for truth and unity lived and worked is passing and that the methods which sufficed for the world of even a decade ago are no longer sufficient for today. If Christianity is to maintain its place in our modern world some larger synthesis is needed—such a marriage of the religious and the ethical in radical thinking with heroic action as is held up to us as the ideal by such disciplined spirits as Berdyaev and Tillich. To perceive the outlines of this new world and to lay its firm foundations must be the task of the men and women of the oncoming generation.

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN.

THE JEW AS PHILOSOPHER

THE JEW AND THE UNIVERSE, *by* SOLOMON GOLDMAN. *Harper and Brothers*, \$2.50.

HERE is an indispensable book to any student of the historic philosophical and religious attitudes of the Jew. It is an expansion of a lecture given last year at the University of Illinois by the brilliant rabbi of Anshe Emet congregation of Chicago in connection with Moses Maimonides' octocentenary.

Rabbi Goldman begins by indicating the separate paths by which Greek and Jew approached the "riddle of the Universe." In the case of the former the approach was logical and philosophical; of the latter, intuitive and organic. Jewish thought was distinguished by its emphasis upon personality, while the eyes of the Greeks "were riveted on natural phenomena," with the result that

"all knowledge was advertised as the product of logical demonstration." The author hastens to assure his reader that this does not mean that the Jews rejected reason entirely, while the Greek was devoid of intuition. The difference was not a matter of "kind or essence but of presentation and emphasis."

Since man was the chief problem with which prophet and rabbi dealt, Judaism's principal concern has been with conduct rather than with philosophy or theology. Unlike the spiritual leaders of many other groups, Jewish teachers were not ascetics but "social beings, a part of the scramble of daily affairs." While faith and reason had their place, conduct was the chief consideration. The existence of God was not argued about; it was assumed.

The chapters dealing with Maimonides are particularly valuable. Living in an age when his people were not only attacked physically but threatened spiritually, Maimonides, "equally at home both with Shem and Japheth" and without leaving the fold of his people, used the powerful weapon of reason to defend the spiritual integrity of Judaism. In Maimonides the author discovers Judaism's attempt to blend reason with intuition. Reason alone tends to tie one into an intellectual knot, while intuition alone may lead toward superstition, obscurantism and magic. The contradictions of reason tend to disappear in the play of intuition, while the latter's "idle vagaries" may in turn be checked by the application of logic.

Rabbi Goldman writes lucidly and with conviction. His style is fresh, vigorous and incisive. The notes at the end of the book will be found of particular value by the reader who intends to continue his studies in this very important field.

JULIUS MARK.

MEN OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

JOHN WESLEY AND MODERN RELIGION, by UMPHREY LEE. *Cokesbury Press*, \$2.50.

PRIOR to Sunday, November the twenty-ninth nineteen hundred and thirty-six, at a quarter before one standard time I did not understand John Wesley. When I put out the second edition of my journal I may wish to qualify this statement, but at present it seems to me that I saw the light in reading Umphrey Lee. The disjointed episodes of a biography took on sequence. John appeared to grow out of John, and Wesley out of the eighteenth century rather than out of Methodism. Incidents which before appeared to me merely amusing took on the quality of tragedy and many a neat generalization dropped out of my lecture notes.

Methodism has been commonly portrayed as an almost complete reaction against the sterility of the religious life of the eighteenth century. On the contrary Lee points out that even deism, with its ethical emphasis, could contribute to the Wesleyan zeal for perfection. The piety of the Anglican church was by

no means moribund. Witness the fervor of Isaac Watts and William Law as well as the moral and spiritual earnestness of the religious societies. Not even fanaticism was dead. The polemic against it is evidence of its continued existence. The dictum that Methodism was an emotional escape for the poor and that the religious revival saved England from a revolution breaks down in collision with the calendar. The familiar association of Wesley with romanticism calls for a more careful definition of that elusive term.

Wesley grew up in a high church, tory environment. His great zeal in the Oxford period was for Christian perfection. The chief motive for coming to the New World was to save his own soul. "The fact that Wesley was willing to go to America with this in view is, indeed, startling; but this is perhaps no compliment to the startled." The American experience was disillusioning in many ways. The idyllic picture of the Indians drawn from the Romantic movement was shattered by first-hand contact. The conviction that he had acquired emotional control by the discipline at Oxford collapsed in the storms of sea and sex. He came home humbled, in search of some deeper religious assurance. He found it in that famous experience on Wednesday, May 24, 1738, at a quarter before nine. At the moment he attached great significance to this sudden change. After years taught him to regard it as a stage. Before he had had the faith of a servant, now of a son.

The consideration of Wesley's religious thought brings every element into relation to the circumstances of the day and reveals a man growing and avoiding extremes. The chapter on his view of the church especially attracted me. We see him seeking to "combine the qualities of an individualistic, intense religious piety, best attainable at its highest in a voluntary society, with those qualities characteristic of the church." In the famous case of Coke the conclusion is that Wesley "conferred no new spiritual character, but an administrative authority."

The practical point of the book in relation to modern religion is to show that Wesley's religion was much richer than that of nineteenth century Methodism, with regard to which there is so much disillusionment at the moment. Wesley can help us to weather the storm, for his vessel was more sea-worthy than that of his spiritual descendants.

ROLAND H. BANTON.

VOLTAIRE, by ALFRED NOYES. *Sheed & Ward*, \$3.50.

THE BASIS for Alfred Noyes' recent study of Voltaire is to be found in *The Unknown God*, which appeared two years ago. There he definitely enunciated his adherence to a general religious rationalism but without subscribing to the limitations inherent in much of positivistic thought. The first half of the volume contained a constructive criticism of such agnostic and scientific thinkers as Huxley, Spencer and Darwin, as well as Voltaire. He sought among them for that attitude of mind before "the central mysteries of Time

and Eternity" and toward the deity, which seemed to him the true basis upon which one might expect to build up a religious philosophy. It is remembered that it was contact with this rationalism which weaned Noyes from the Protestantism in which he was reared and it therefore forms an important epoch in his development, for this earlier work was in a very real sense autobiographical. In this connection he states that "the Supreme Being of Voltaire must be capable of pity and I was content to accept the more emphatic verdict of Voltaire, just as I was content to accept the even more solemn verdict of Huxley that the Eternal required mercy and justice."

In going beyond this position in order to establish what he conceives to be the higher "spiritual values" of religion, he sees no reason for abandoning the intellectual approach. "Rationalism," he states in the volume on *Voltaire*, "at its highest and best comes closer to true religion than the vague emotion of romanticism." He praises Locke therefore for striking "just that note of religious rationalism which was the center of the thought of Voltaire. It was the inauguration of a new religious era; it opened a new approach; it began the new apologetics, which may one day transfigure the results of modern science as Aquinas attempted to transfigure the results of Greek philosophy." Noyes accordingly continues in the present volume to establish along this line what he believes to be the divine element in the sacramental forms of religion, since in the meantime he has become a Roman Catholic, and attempts to show that a similar attitude toward sacramental religion was to be found in Voltaire. He quotes Hegel to the effect that "beauty is the Spirit of God revealing itself sensuously" and that "the divine is the center of all representations of art." Thus through religious rationalism he seeks to mediate between science and religion.

The most striking feature in Noyes' study of Voltaire is not so much his purpose to demonstrate the essential soundness of Voltaire's religion, as his desire to establish the conscious assent which he believes Voltaire gave in his better moments to the fundamental attitudes of Christianity. He holds that Voltaire never actually withdrew from the church in which he was born and in which he hoped to receive his final burial. The essential conformity of Voltaire to Christianity seems, in fact, to be Noyes' main thesis. His originality consists in reaching this conclusion mainly by a study of the living personality of the man himself. It is his belief that "when personality is seen to its depths, the good will remain and the 'insult to heaven' vanishes." He finds it possible, therefore, to sidestep the great body of formal statement scattered widely throughout Voltaire's writings and examine only such published statements as fit his purpose and seem vital. He prefers to confine his attention to those views which he believes to be an expression of the man himself, instead of attempting to inject life into abstract opinions detached from any context and treated dialectically.

One may sympathize with Mr. Noyes in largely ignoring Voltaire's insistent

defense of what he and the deists before him have called "natural religion" and which he apparently hoped would be realized with the dawning of "enlightenment." A reader of Mr. Noyes would scarcely be aware of Voltaire's insistence at this point. It was in the main not a profound theory of religion. It included an unswerving belief in a Supreme Being, who having established a universal principle of gravitation in the physical world might well be conceived as establishing a similar "natural law" in the moral world. When his views on this subject appear in the midst of a spirited attack on the fanaticism, religious intolerance, superstitions and inconsistencies of established churches, couched in the very language of the religion he has under fire, one senses a certain truth and vitality. But stated abstractly as a positive religious philosophy they seem lifeless and inadequate. Mr. Noyes may therefore be justified in making a different approach since he wishes to arrive at positive results.

The picture which the author continually spreads before us of the personality of the man himself is the most fascinating feature of the work. It may in the end prove to be its chief contribution. The epithets leveled at Voltaire have tended almost completely to obliterate the man himself. He has become an abstraction, an embodiment of evil and negation, a wit, to be sure, but only as a cynic and a scoffer. We have neglected to visualize the attraction which the man himself had for the men of his day. Mr. Noyes' account has succeeded in revealing a figure far more personable and real than the Voltaire many have thus far known.

MALCOLM H. DEWEY.

BISHOP BUTLER AND THE AGE OF REASON, by ERNEST C. MOSSNER. *The Macmillan Company*, \$2.50.

THE eighteenth century witnessed the optimistic erection of a religion of reason whose foundation was to be free from all traces of revelation. Hardly had the structure been built, however, when it began to collapse. The deists had forged effective weapons with which to undermine revealed religion, but history was not long in producing a Hume in whose hands these same weapons were equally effective in destroying the foundations of the religion of reason. The famous *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed*, by Bishop Butler, is one of the more interesting documents in the deistic controversy of the age of reason. Butler, like Hume, sought to show that natural religion was on no surer rational ground than was revealed religion. Butler's purpose, obviously, was to use this argument for establishing once again the specific Christian revelation, but from the point of view of logic what he actually accomplished was to show that since neither natural nor revealed religion rested on a firm rational foundation, there is no coercive argument why men should not reject both.

Dr. Mossner's book is, as the title suggests, concerned with both the Age of Reason (particularly as it manifests itself in deism) and Bishop Butler. He

desires to correct what he conceives to be the usual and mistaken view concerning Butler, a view which is gained largely from Leslie Stephen's evaluation of him as a "lonely thinker who stood apart from the world," a "noble failure." Dr. Mossner, on the other hand, looks upon Butler as definitely a man of his time, so much so that in spite of some of his arguments he is still "too much of a rationalist to admit of even a tinge of enthusiasm." Far from presenting Butler as a "noble failure" this book argues that "in the history of eighteenth century English culture, what Locke is to philosophy, what Newton is to science, what Burke is to politics, Butler is to theology. For all alike seek to derive their basic principles from the observed facts of nature and society." The bicentenary of Butler's *Analogy* was celebrated in 1936, but Dr. Mossner devotes no more space to this work than to Butler's moral principles.

The plan of the book is well conceived. There is presented first a description of the thought currents of the early eighteenth century and the relation of deism to these. Then follow critical accounts of Butler's *Analogy* and his ethical theory. After a discussion of the decline and fall of "reason," the book is devoted to an evaluation of Butler's influence.

The plan, I feel, is better than its execution. No one idea is followed out thoroughly, criticisms often appear superficial, references are made to multitudes of thinkers and the author is not always successful in getting to the heart of a philosophical position and stating it clearly. The book is, however, extremely well documented and contains a twenty-one page bibliography. On the whole it should prove a valuable contribution to studies in the history of thought.

HOWARD B. JEFFERSON.

AN ARTIST IN STATECRAFT

METTERNICH, *by* H. DU COUDRAY. *Yale University Press*, \$4.

FOR NEARLY half a century Metternich was a participant in every considerable event in the political history of Europe, and the student of his life swims in a vast sea of data. A study limited to four hundred and fifteen pages may be expected to show both compression and omissions. Mr. Du Coudray has made a commendable selection of the vital material and has set these forth in a style as entertaining as is compatible with a close texture of facts. He shows indeed a true sense of the dramatic in the treatment of incident, but his historical conscience is always in command of his scenes. The book is, however, not remarkable for lucidity and rather exacting of the reader, who is largely left to build up his own interpretation of the leading character. The twelve chapters have no titles; each must be read through before we know what it is about, although titles on the right-hand pages offer some guidance.

The early years of Metternich are treated with suitable brevity. His first antagonist, Napoleon, was master of Europe in 1805. By 1843 Metternich

closed a nine-hour interview with him at Dresden with the words, "You are lost, Sire." "I saw myself," wrote the Austrian statesman of that interview, "the representative of the whole society of Europe. . . . Napoleon seemed small to me." In this phrase, "the whole society of Europe," as well perhaps as in any of his utterances, we catch the mind and purpose of Metternich. Mr. Du Coudray is happy in his intimate sketch of the Congress of Vienna, where Metternich's diplomatic skill and political wisdom appear at their best. We are told how he deservedly won the cooperation of the shrewd Castlereagh in a policy of recognition of the defeated nation, France, and left it to Talleyrand to admire his own dexterity for the outcome. In preventing the imposition of a peace "in the spirit of plunder" (as Castlereagh described the Prussian policy) the congress set an example which later statesmen might profitably have followed with more fidelity.

Metternich saw the same distinction between politics and diplomacy as between science and art. It is his art rather than his science that dominates the story, yet the writer would have us understand that the prince's policies were based on a worthy political philosophy. His efforts to break Napoleon, to check Alexander I, to repress revolution after the great peace, were incidental to a positive purpose for Europe. We may express that purpose in the word "stability"; but the fact is pretty well established in this book that stability for Metternich did not mean (as in our youth many of us were led to believe) a frozen immobility of government and society. The man who condemned the policy of a ruler who "lived on the capital of his power" instead of taking from his opponents the initiative in reform, who held that governments should govern and not merely call out the gendarmes in time of crisis, who favored Greek independence while other powers played for their own advantage in the Greek rebellion, was not the ogre of reaction which liberal historians of a generation ago represented him to be. Indeed, by comparison with the dictators who determine Europe's choices today, the ogre becomes almost a good angel.

Du Coudray is to be commended for the consideration and insight with which he treats Metternich's associates and rivals in the great game of diplomacy. His happiest relations were with Castlereagh and Wellington. The brilliant but avaricious Gentz figures largely in the narrative. Too sophisticated to expect fidelity, Metternich did not resent Gentz's final defection from him. We have the outline of the colorful career of the Princess de Lieven, who broke from Metternich's spell and became his enemy. His third wife, the young Melanie Zichy-Ferraris, plays a rather charming role. With more pomp than importance, most of the contemporary monarchs of Europe pass again and again upon the stage. When his own prince sacrificed him to the revolution of 1848, Metternich bore his fall with equanimity, content to leave his deeds and aims to the assize of history.

The book will enhance respect for its distinguished subject. But Metternich's greatness is not that of the highest order of genius. The reflection remains to

the reader of this admirable work, that the man who perhaps never encountered his equal in statecraft possessed only a distant awareness of the really significant cultural forces of his age—of the new life in religion and philosophy and of the experiences and aspirations of the common man.

JOHN T. MCNEILL.

THE ROLE OF LIBERALISM

THE RISE OF LIBERALISM, by HAROLD J. LASKI. *Harper & Brothers*, \$3.

LIBERALISM means to many of us a liberal attitude toward things in general. A socially-minded person, a progressive, is a liberal in that sense of the word. But liberalism is also a special term referring to a particular theory of political economy. Liberalism in this precise sense is the theory that economic affairs should be free from control by church or state, that commerce and trade should have no external restraints, that there should be no control of profits except the good old jungle law of supply and demand—the philosophy, in short, of modern laissez faire capitalism. It is the history of this liberalism which Harold Laski traces in the present essay.

It is useful for us today to keep in mind this distinction in terms. For the advocates of commercial liberalism have for four hundred years posed as real liberals. Many of them have fooled themselves, as well as the general public, into thinking that their special doctrine is the foundation not only of prosperity but of social progress.

Liberalism was a great step forward from the Middle Ages. Throughout the medieval period a powerful church controlled the lives of men all over Europe in their economic and political affairs as well as in their religious beliefs. These medieval bonds were burst almost simultaneously by three separate but related movements: Protestantism, nationalism and liberalism. The first was a protest against the control of religious life, the second a rebellion against control in political affairs, the third a demand for freedom in economic matters. Volumes have been written about the connection of these three protests. Max Weber, in his famous book, *Protestant Ethic and the Rise of Capitalism*, tries to trace modern business to the new theology introduced by Luther and crystallized by Calvin. Histories are full of the supposed connection between nationalistic states and the rise of capitalism and the relation of both to Protestant theology. More than half of Laski's present essay is devoted to tracing many of these tedious and futile theories. The plain fact is that no one of these movements caused the other but that all three were expressions of a common urge to new enterprise and fresh initiative, which burst through the old authoritarian restraints in many directions at once.

Probably the most far-reaching of the new movements was economic liberalism. Many things served to magnify its triumph. New continents were discovered and new means were found for trade. The inventions of steam and

the development of machinery gave a means at once of manufacturing articles in almost limitless quantities and of transporting them to the ends of the earth. The tremendous new riches, which really came from the industrial revolution and from rapid communications, have been claimed as the results of *laissez faire*. Most business men believe sincerely that commercial liberalism is the cause of the widespread abundance which marks modern life. "Beware!" the business man shouts, "if you hamper us, you will destroy prosperity."

In spite of a good deal of pedantic discussion during two-thirds of the book and all the usual academic paraphernalia of references, citations and documentation, Mr. Laski traces clearly the helpful role which liberalism played in freeing commerce from arbitrary restraints as Europe was moving over from medievalism to modern times. He shows with equal clarity how liberalism itself has now become a restraint upon the free use by society of the new riches ushered in by science and mechanics. In Hitlerism and fascism and particularly in the decisions of the reactionaries on the United States Supreme Court he sees the last desperate efforts of an outworn *laissez faire* to clamp down its restraints against a new protesting liberalism, against society's determination to control individual greed in the interests of a new release from poverty, a fresh freedom from the domination of a moneyed oligarchy.

EDWIN R. EMBREE.

EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE AND LIFE

EARLY CHRISTIAN LIFE AS REFLECTED IN ITS LITERATURE, *by* DONALD WAYNE RIDDLE. *Willetts, Clark & Company*, \$2.50.

THE New Testament teaching at the University of Chicago has been insisting for some time that the social situation of the early church provides the key to our understanding of its literature. This book in a comprehensive way follows out that thesis. Its title might have been "The Literature as Explained by the Life of Early Christianity." For with all the penchant for social origins the author is really more concerned with the literary than with the social problems. In other words, the volume is not unlike what is technically called a New Testament introduction. One interesting difference must at once be noted. This "introduction" includes the Apostolic Fathers as well. The general reader who is less familiar with them will be instructed to see how they fit into the more familiar picture of the historical background of the New Testament. Their inclusion is of great use to the author, since in the later period which they represent his point of view is more readily illustrated. For us all, as a mere reminder of the arbitrariness of the line of canonicity, their inclusion contributes to a more intelligent method of historical study.

In this period several social situations are reflected. Persecution is one of these, as Dr. Riddle has well shown us in an earlier work. Social control of

minority groups is another and the author is probably right in emphasizing the administrative rather than the theological aspect of this problem. Sense of corporate unity and of separateness from the world is another trait of Christian self-consciousness. In time there grew up a feeling for tradition, a realization of continuity with the past, and a respect for the standard bearers of the past, along with organization, intercommunication and confidence in Christianity and the church. All these later conditions are clearly indicated in the subapostolic literature, whether canonical or extracanonical.

The earlier part of Professor Riddle's book is neither so novel nor so successful. To be sure, Paul's letters reveal often quite clearly the church situations out of which they arise. But the Gospels do so only indirectly and the few distinctions which Dr. Riddle generally follows between sources and Gospels, between spiritistic and legalistic, between Jewish and Hellenistic, do not satisfactorily indicate the many divisions in historical development of the Gospel material. It is at this point that the Chicago school has more in common than it realizes with form criticism. Both methods are handicapped by the difficulty of classification under adequate rubrics or tendencies, but both correctly call attention to the presence of significant formative factors in the Gospel material. Dr. Riddle rightly criticizes the German school as giving too little scope for individuality in the Gospel editors. But at least for the later Christian writings his own treatment could be similarly criticized. The problems of the groups addressed are not nearly as determinant of the contents of the pastoral epistles or of the Epistle of James as is the author's own literary tradition and interests. To give each its proper balance is, of course, a very difficult task.

In matters of introduction Professor Riddle's views are eclectic. Local influence is strong as one recognizes in his adherence to "the Chicago theory" of Gospel sources or of the origin of Ephesians. He evidently regards the book of Acts as of very much less historical trustworthiness than archeological testing would suggest for many features of it, and he does not question apparently the usual early dating of either I Clement or the Didache, or the historical actuality of a Domitianic persecution.

The synthesis of the study was very much worth attempting. It is not a passing "bright idea" but an approach which the author with his associates has for some time been conscientiously thinking through. As the footnotes remind us, it is based, as such works should be, on detailed *Vorstudien*. The old habits of literary introduction are so strong on all of us that we cannot avoid a lot of repetition of this stock in trade whenever we try an original approach. But the fresh idea is there, emphasized even when not illustrated. If this volume will help other readers and finally other authors to discover how from their writings the vigorous, developing life of the first Christians may be seen, as it were, between the lines of their writings, an excellent service will have been rendered. One recalls how admirably the elder McGiffert did a similar

service in his *Apostolic Age* forty years ago. Some day it will be possible with less concern for technical matters of other kinds to write a book that more exactly fits the title of this one.

HENRY J. CADBURY.

THE ART OF THE PREACHER

THE MIRACLE OF PREACHING, by J. EDGAR PARK. *The Macmillan Company*, \$1.75.

IT IS unquestionably true that there is no other work in the world in which the quality of a man's life so determines the effectiveness of his effort as in preaching. The making of sermons is not like the building of rabbit hutches, as Henry Drummond once observed. Tools and materials are of course essential, but they do not of themselves work the "miracle." "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life," said Jesus. But the thing that gives words their dynamic and transforming power, and justifies us in speaking of the "miracle of preaching," is something which comes out of the inner texture of life itself.

This is the theme that keeps recurring through this richly rewarding volume of Yale lectures. "The fact is that there are preachers who make sermons, and there are preachers in whom sermons are born." "Preaching must be a by-product of life." "The spark of which we speak when we talk of preachers is a spark from a fire which smolders deep in his life. . . . A personal religion which has no thought of the pulpit and never can be expressed fully therein is the making of a minister"—and hence of a sermon also. For after all, is it not a fact that one can make only those truths of religion real to others which have first of all become real to one's self? This is why Emerson could speak of the little souls who paid the world in sermons, and of the great souls who paid the world with what they were. It is this connection between preaching and life that makes a sermon at its best something more than a work of art. "Other art is done up in a napkin that it may be preserved; . . . this art cannot live except it die and come to life in other lives." Dr. Park does well to remind us that our job as preachers is to live a "human," not merely a "homiletical life."

The book covers in masterly fashion the wide range of homiletics. It begins with the minister looking for "something to preach about" and ends with the minister in his pulpit. This path, although a familiar one, is traveled with a freshness—I almost wrote, originality—that is arresting.

Not the least valuable part of the lectures are the pages which deal with public prayer and with worship. It was, I believe, a European visitor to American churches who commented on "the awfulness of your prayers"! "Many pulpit prayer phrases mean nothing any more; they have about them a faint odor of disinfectant." "The real leader in prayer is one who can shatter the self-satisfaction and comfortableness of a congregation and express for them

the sleeping yearnings and hunger of their deeper selves." Those who resent all ritual and formality of worship will profit by being reminded that "Well, fellows! Here we are again! What do you say to hymn 198?" is just as much a "ritual" as is a more dignified procedure. The only difference is that in this instance people "think they are not ritualistic because what they say every Sunday is not beautiful."

Readers of this book—and every minister should read it—will be impressed by the author's style. His sentences, as a friend of mine would say, "taste good." His language is vivid, often picturesque: "It is clear that mere scolding is out of place in the pulpit. Under a rain of denunciation most modern hearers put up their umbrellas and let the drips run on to their neighbors' shoulders." "But the modern reaction to poor preaching is not patience but absence." "The mind of the congregation is the preacher's palette."

Dr. Park brings to his task a wide experience, a truly rich culture and a timely awareness of things eternal. He tells us that the book is not meant for the saint or for the genius, but for ordinary people, for sinners only. This I certainly question. However, as one sinner, I testify, if not to complete regeneration, at least to having experienced a considerable uplift. Incidentally, everyone with a sense of humor—and pity the minister who has lost it!—will find here much to relieve the shades of blue Monday.

HAROLD C. PHILLIPS.

THE MARCH OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

HIGHWAYS OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE, *by* SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE. *Willett, Clark & Company, \$2.*

THIS latest book by the dean of the divinity school of the University of Chicago does not attempt to duplicate either Harnack's seven volume *History of Dogma* or Schaff's three volume *Creeeds of Christendom*. It is not a compendium of Christian thinking or a theological "Who's Who." The names of many of your theological pets are missing. On second thought you would not expect to find them in five lectures, delivery time five hours. Only the four-track arterial highways are marked, not your favorite dirt roads. Indeed, the tyro in dogmatics and symbolics will not appreciate the acute discriminations appearing throughout the discussion. But as an airplane view of the total Christian theological landscape, these one hundred ninety-two pages will richly reward careful perusal.

The Lowell Lectures for 1936 are a concise, compact, comprehensive and necessarily selective treatment of the turning points in the march of Christian thought from the simple faith of Jerusalem Christians to the "Marcionite sheet-lightning" of Karl Barth. They are far more than this. The author is very definitely of the opinion that the meaning of a doctrine cannot be deduced

from the findings of a Council of Nicaea or the armchair guesses of John Calvin. Religion is inseparably bound up with culture. Until one observes the impact of his environment upon Augustine or Ritschl, discovers the *Sitz in Leben* that conditions their thinking, understanding is impossible. The notes of Madison enable one to discover that a bill of rights was unanimously voted down by the constitutional convention that framed the Constitution of the United States, but to appreciate this fact, the fears of the thirty-nine signers of that document must be uncovered. Just so, Dean Case insists, Christian doctrine is continuous variation because it is part of an expanding culture. When the geographical, political, sociological and economic elements in a situation are known, then and only then can its theology be correctly appraised.

As illustrations of the significance of this approach to Christian doctrine, consider the following interpretations selected at random:

Theologians are a persistent species perhaps not even subject to the law of the survival of the fittest.

A doctrine proves acceptable because it yields satisfaction.

Formulation of Christian doctrine ever remains in a fluid condition.

Infallible dogmas and conclusions arrived at by empirical reasoning are, strictly speaking, incommensurables.

The theologian today finds difficulty in maintaining the profession's reputation for omniscience.

Except for its views on ecclesiology and sacerdotalism, Protestantism was essentially medieval in both spirit and substance.

A doctrine of immanence may make God a deified cipher.

Even to posit a simian ancestry for man did not seem to cut him off so sharply from deity as was done by the older doctrine of a total depravity imposed by Adam upon his descendants.

In his Lowell Lectures on *The Ascent of Man* given forty odd years ago, Henry Drummond clearly set forth this type of evolutionary supernaturalism.

The modernist is always tempted to oversimplify his problem by eliminating from consideration things that to him are uncongenial and unimportant and positing finality for his conclusions.

Modernism loses its soul when it ceases to be a method of dealing with religious issues and becomes a dogmatic creed.

The only sure cure for the defects of modernism is more modernism.

Barthianism is a form of wishful believing.

The first lecture entitled, "The Ascent to Philosophy," traces the evolution of Christian thinking from Pentecost to Origen, indicating how Jesus, a crucified man, became successively a Messiah and a present Savior through the emotional emphasis in the cult, was protected by the expanding institution and glorified in the Johannine philosophy. Thereupon, second century Christian philosophers concentrated upon God-ology, transformed Christ into a second God without dethroning Yahweh, gave intellectual respectability to the Old

Testament and the New Testament and entered Knowledge upon the Christian ledger. With Origen's publication of *De Principiis* early in the third century, Christianity became definitely a philosophy.

The second lecture, "The March to Imperialism," deals with the vicissitudes of Christian thinking from Irenaeus to Augustine. The emphasis is now upon the church, and the kingdom of God is identified with the "church in its ideal solidarity." Irenaeus contended for the authority of the Christian tradition, the efficiency of Christian rites, the dependability of the books of the canon and the validity of the catholic church. Tertullian viewed the "fall of man" as disobedience, regarded the church as the only instrument for mediating salvation, and caused class distinctions among Christians by setting the clergy over against the laity. Cyprian added to all this the idea that the unity of the church was in the decisions of the bishops convened in synod, failing to observe that divided councils made a pope inevitable. Ambrose held that in matters of faith bishops must judge emperors, thus subordinating the state to the church, while Augustine exalted the divine sovereignty exercised upon earth by the yet imperfect, but nevertheless apostolic, holy, universal and authoritative church.

The third lecture, "Tramping Old Trails," is concerned with the ten centuries between Augustine and the Council of Trent, bestowing particular attention upon hierarchical imperialism, sacramental rites and ascetic discipline and dogma. In dealing with matrimony the author should have pointed out that "the parties who marry are themselves the ministers of the sacrament." The theoretical limitation of an indulgence to the temporal penalty for sin might also have been mentioned. Father Conway's *Question Box* would make a valuable addition to the general works in the selected bibliography. The Council of Trent canonized the doctrinal system of Thomas Aquinas.

The fourth lecture, "Blazing Pathways to Freedom," considers the Renaissance, Reformation and the confessional age. The Reformation is interpreted as the religious element in the transition to the modern period. Heinrich Frick's *Deutschland innerhalb der religiösen Weltlage* appeared too late to be used by the author, but its analysis of Luther's view of the church sheds much light upon that complicated problem. The author's tribute to Holland as the asylum for Anabaptists, Arminians, Descartes, Spinoza, Pierre Bayle and John Locke is well deserved. And 1689 is rightly regarded as a turn in this highway of Christian doctrine.

The fifth lecture, "Crossroads in the Modern Scene," depicts the development of modern liberalism, Methodism, the social gospel, the historical study of the Bible, the newer Christology, the emergence of, opposition to and absorption of the evolutionary hypothesis and the Barthian reaction. Especially worthy of mention are the agreements noticed between Hume and Wesley as to the bases of knowledge, the test of convictions in emotional satisfaction, the

deliverance of the individual from the law of reason and the stress upon activism. All in all, *Highways of Christian Doctrine* is an original and fresh analysis of the history of Christian dogma.

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN.

SCIENCE AND COMMON SENSE IN PSYCHIATRY

PHYSICIAN, PASTOR AND PATIENT, *by* GEORGE W. JACOBY. *Paul B. Hoeber*, \$3.50.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY, *by* WILLIAM S. SADLER. *C. V. Mosby Company*, \$10.

TO AFFORD a better understanding between medicine and religion and to realize greater possibilities for cooperation between these two, this book has been written." This is the statement of purpose which Dr. Jacoby makes in his introduction, and his book as a whole may be taken as a contribution to the fulfillment of this aim.

The book is divided into four general sections. Part I represents a summary of the general development of the applied science of medicine. The material is factual rather than penetrative or analytic. The author then proceeds in this same essentially factual manner to outline in Part II some of the features of historic religions, both Eastern and Western. The relation to superstition is strongly stressed, and the joint origin of medicine and religion in superstitious practices is rather labored. Part III, the backbone of the book, consists of a series of discussions of "vital problems confronting the physician and the clergyman." These are contraception and abortion, birth control, suicide, divorce, crime, sterilization, sex education, treatment of mental subnormality, the problem of voluntary death in case of incurable disease, vivisection and professional secrecy.

The treatment of these various topics is rather perfunctory and superficial, but one has the feeling throughout the book that here are the words of a wise doctor, full of tolerance and full of good sense. The author has written, out of a long and useful medical career, a book of very elementary common sense concerning what are really sociological, not religious, problems.

There is little evidence here of any searching inquiry into the basic psychological meaning of religion. The book is not a contribution to the psychology of religion. But it is a useful running commentary upon some of the more poignant socio-medical perplexities of the past and present. It has the further advantage of being well written in a consistently plain, modest style, from cover to cover.

Dr. Sadler's enormous book attempts the impossible. He has attempted to write an exhaustive treatise covering practically every aspect of psychiatry and psychology. Not only has he tried to cover the whole horizon of the human mind in one volume, but he has added still further to the difficulty of his under-

taking by addressing himself not to one professional group or even to one sector of the reading public, but to all groups and to everybody.

The book is remarkable in the great range of general information which it reveals. To read a single chapter of it is to be impressed by the vast amount of ground which the author has covered. Here certainly is a man who has remained intellectually active and has read widely throughout his long medical career.

This is not a cultish book. It is not written to persuade a public to a point of view. It lives up in general to the sentiment expressed in one of its more poignant paragraphs:

In the study and interpretation of dreams, as in all other phases of psychiatric practice, common sense should be brought into play. The modern cults of psychiatry have been altogether shot through with so much that is bizarre, baffling, befuddling and misleading that the entire domain of mental hygiene stands in urgent need of a thoroughgoing housecleaning—a complete reorganization whereby the dogmatic claims of each special school of teaching shall be brought to the bar of common sense and tried before tribunals of scientific scrutiny.

Throughout the almost insufferably long treatise there is a scattered wisdom, a patchy mellowness, a recurrent trace of kindly and genial human understanding; yet these seeds of wisdom and mellowness are imbedded in such a mass of ponderous wordiness and pompous style that one fears for their viability. Surely such pieces of insight and rich human experience as this book unquestionably carries have scant chance of being found, buried as they are in twelve hundred and fifty pages of tolerably fine print.

WILLIAM SHELDON.

INTELLECTUALS DISCOVER THE COOPERATIVES

THE DECLINE AND RISE OF THE CONSUMER, *by* HORACE M. KALLEN, *D. Appleton-Century Company*, \$2.75.

AMERICAN intellectuals, especially those who live in or near that turbulent vortex known as New York City, have recently manifested no small amount of indecision. They have always operated somewhere near the center of what was once honorably known as liberalism, but during the earlier days of the depression they found themselves drifting farther to the left. Indeed many of them actually made the acquaintance of Karl Marx, and some essayed the gratuitous task of interpreting Marxism for their fellows. But these converts were decidedly uncomfortable in Marxist circles; the change came too late in the lives of most of them and soon one noticed a drift toward safer harbors. President Roosevelt's campaign offered an opportunity of this sort. Now one heard them say that neither Marxism nor fascism can make a significant appeal to pragmatic Americans. Then something which may prove to be of primary

importance to the future of this country occurred: the intellectuals discovered the cooperative movement. It had been there for a long time, of course, but the intellectuals had developed a blind-spot; they couldn't see it; if one of them did happen to notice it, he quickly discarded it on the ground that nothing so simple as the Rochdale cooperative principle could really be important.

Happily, the "toughness, flexibility and intelligence of the cooperative movement" (Dr. Kallen's words) were sufficient to allow the movement to survive and grow in spite of lack of nourishment from intellectuals. All simple and "tough" ideas retain vitality, not because they are either simple or "tough" but because their simplicity and toughness are signs that they are grounded in reality. Dr. Kallen has explored the reality, both psychological and sociological, upon which the cooperative movement rests. The first book of this volume, consisting of five chapters subsumed under the general title, "The Producer's World," will stand, I believe, as one of the finest critiques of capitalist economics in existence.

What makes this essay so fresh and so important is the fact that Dr. Kallen utilizes in his criticism the tools of a social philosopher. Capitalism is placed in its proper context and is asked to find for itself an organic rationale in terms of anthropology, sociology, history, social psychology, politics and religion. But, the author does not stop even there: he continues to test producer-capitalism by placing it alongside the high tradition in American culture, namely the democratic process. Still further, he places the consumer cooperative movement alongside the antithetical European conceptions and practices of communism, fascism and nazism. The comparison seems to make cooperation the only possible American choice. Book II, "The Economics of Freedom," is a necessary and logical conclusion of Book I. The modern rise of the consumer is charted; the acute problem-areas which concern the farmer, the industrial worker, money, credit, the organized consumer as employer of labor, education, depressions and war are designated and explored.

In short, Dr. Kallen has done a thoroughgoing, workmanlike and scholarly job which those of us who have for years believed in the consumer movement must now applaud with gratitude and enthusiasm. Although the strand of religion as a cultural influence as well as an established institution of society runs throughout Dr. Kallen's text, readers of *CHRISTENDOM* will wish to ponder particularly the chapter on "The Churches Take to Consumer Cooperation." The closing sentences of one of the paragraphs seem to me so important that I feel justified in quoting in full. Having noted the contemporary and somewhat exciting support which the churches in America are now extending to the consumer cooperative movement, Dr. Kallen proceeds to say:

"Whether, with the upswing of the business cycle this exaltation will pass and these energies die down, it is too soon to say. In the modern world the condition of the churches is such that they must perforce attach themselves to another vision or

perish. In their present crisis they have come to a realization of the primacy of the consumer, and of the significance for spiritual values of the consumer economy. They are better aware than they were of the continuity between this economy and the religious conceptions of their inheritance. But as for building it into the infinite details which make a way of life—before such tasks their history shows churches and churchmen more successful at profession than at practice. To the churches the cooperative movement is the ultimate challenge and test."

EDUARD C. LINDEMAN.

NEW STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

A FRESH APPROACH TO THE NEW TESTAMENT AND EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE, by MARTIN DIBELIUS. *Charles Scribner's Sons*, \$2.

JEW AND GREEK: TUTORS UNTO CHRIST, by G. H. C. MACGREGOR and A. C. PURDY. *Charles Scribner's Sons*, \$2.50.

STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, *Collected Papers of Clayton R. Bowen*, edited by ROBERT J. HUTCHEON. *University of Chicago Press*, \$2.

THE first two of these volumes introduce a series, "The International Library of Christian Knowledge." The editors propose to publish "the best available material in the field of religious scholarship in a convenient and low-priced form." All will agree that Dibelius' *Geschichte der Urchristlichen Literatur*, translated for this series, establishes a high standard of excellence.

Perhaps the most significant feature of this survey by Dibelius is his abandonment of the traditional distinction between canonical and uncanonical. He asserts that "it is not possible to have a historical understanding of primitive Christianity without using all the surviving witnesses." Accordingly, he devotes as much attention to books contemporaneous with the New Testament which were not included in the canon as he does to the New Testament itself.

To the uninitiated his brief summary of *Formgeschichte* will be a convenient and authoritative introduction to this new and important development in the study of Gospel origins. Moreover, it also justifies the arrangement of his book, for he has classified the early Christian documents according to their "form" or type: gospels; apocalypses; letters, treatises, sermons and tractates in letter form; exhortations, dealing with ethics and church government; liturgy (including prayers and hymns); and acts of the apostles. Using this classification, Dibelius describes the nature and explains the function of each document with characteristic insight and clarity. This has been done so well that the reader will frequently regret that it has been done so briefly.

On the whole the classification of the various writings according to their "form" serves to emphasize their purpose or function. On the other hand, this arrangement has some inherent disadvantages. Some documents do not lend themselves to ready classification. The Shepherd of Hermas, for example, is not a true apocalypse. Revelation, a curious combination of letter and apocalypse

in "form," is a martyrology in function, as Riddle has pointed out. To separate Luke-Acts, as Dibelius is forced to do, is to do violence to its original unity and purpose. If, as Goodspeed suggests, Ephesians is to be considered as a covering letter for the Pauline corpus, it is related functionally to the letter of Polycarp, although in type it corresponds to I Peter and I Clement. Furthermore, in general this arrangement according to "form," suggestive though it may be, seriously disrupts chronological sequence, thereby obscuring the growth and development of the social and religious processes in early Christian life which produced its literature.

The bibliography contains but one or two books by American authors. This, however, is characteristic of the work as a whole, for Dibelius has seldom considered the contributions, some of them significant, which recent American scholarship has made toward the understanding of the New Testament and related literature.

The catchy title of the volume by Macgregor and Purdy is somewhat misleading, for nowhere is it intimated that Jesus was a debtor to the Greeks. The subtitle, "The Jewish and Hellenistic Background of the New Testament," is far more descriptive of the contents of the book. The Jewish background is presented by Purdy, largely on the basis of the work of Moore, Herford, Abrahams and other recent students of Judaism. His attitude toward the Jewish religion of Jesus' day is thoroughly sympathetic and appreciative. He emphasizes that it was not stagnant, decadent, dogmatic and formalistic; quite on the contrary, it was vital, vigorous and highly ethical, with considerable variety in belief and practice. He correctly asserts that apocalypticism, despite its importance for the first Christians, was not in the main stream of Judaism. His concluding chapter, however, "Judaism and the New Testament," not only is too brief and superficial to be of value but also ignores recent advances in the study of the New Testament.

Macgregor's appreciative study of the various and widespread aspects of Hellenistic religion, thought and life is a marvel of compressed information. He finds that on the whole the influence of the mystery cults was on the side of higher ethical standards. He concludes that the New Testament has been greatly influenced by Hellenistic forces, but suggests that this should not be deplored as a paganizing of the primitive gospel of Jesus, for "Greek ways of thought provided for the interpretation of the message of Jesus in its wider import new categories, which were much more adequate than purely Jewish conceptions."

On the whole, the book will find acceptance as a more or less popular introduction to the Jewish and Hellenistic background of the New Testament. The authors have supplied a fairly adequate bibliography to encourage further study. Curiously enough, Danby's translation of the Mishnah is omitted from the Jewish sources. Almost as inexplicable is the failure to list any of Dean

Case's books, particularly his invaluable study of the Jewish and Hellenistic environment, *The Evolution of Early Christianity*.

The publication of nine selected papers representative of his biblical scholarship, his charming literary style, his genial personality and his interest in liberal religion is a fitting tribute to the memory of the late Professor Clayton R. Bowen of the Meadville School of Theology.

In the first paper, which outlines the task of New Testament interpretation, Dr. Bowen makes the emphasis that the books of the New Testament are primarily records of religious experience. True liberal that he is, he warns against a dogmatic liberalism that undervalues the heroes of the New Testament because they lie so far behind us chronologically, whereas they may be far ahead of us spiritually; which finds the New Testament unnatural because it can no longer be regarded as supernatural.

In keeping with this view, in his essay, "Why Eschatology?" he evaluates primitive Christian eschatology, despite its obvious shortcomings, as the dynamic for religious experience, past and present. Two original and stimulating studies of John the Baptist will repay careful reading. The paper on Ephesians, significant as an independent study, is also valuable as confirmatory of Goodspeed's theory. The final essay, "Love in the Fourth Gospel," will probably startle some by its demonstration that the love of the Fourth Gospel is confined within the Christian group and does not extend to Jews and others outside the fold. Those who knew Professor Bowen will value the prefatory tribute by his friend, Professor Goodspeed; and all will be grateful for the inspiration which has resulted in the publication of these studies in a permanent form.

MARTIN RIST.

CATHOLIC PORTRAITS OF PROTESTANT REFORMERS

CHARACTERS OF THE REFORMATION, by HILAIRE BELLOC. *Sheed & Ward*, \$3.50.

MR. BELLOC'S latest book is not a mere literary portrait gallery as its title might imply. Essentially it is an impassioned attack on the interpretation of the Protestant Reformation to be found in the average history textbook in England today. It is not the attack of a scholar; it is that of a brilliant amateur who is a Catholic in religion and a romantic Tory in politics. The author annihilates a great many straw dummies, "debunks" a goodly number of Protestant saints, grapples vigorously with several Protestant myths, and comes out of it all with a program for younger Catholic historians which any thoughtful Protestant will find stimulating, even if not convincing.

His thesis is as follows: The "breakup of united Christendom" was by far the most important event in history since the foundation of the Christian church. The peril in which European culture finds itself today is the result of nationalism, rationalism and emotionalism, all of which are traceable, directly

or indirectly, to the Protestant Reformation. England's breach with Rome was the "pivotal matter" of the Reformation; if England had remained in the fold, the movement on the Continent would have burned itself out or would have been crushed by the "superior powers," all of them Catholic. Therefore it was the "accident" of the English Reformation that prevented the papacy from triumphing over its new enemies as it had over the Albigenses. But revolutions ordinarily end in one of two ways: in complete triumph for one side, or in stalemate. The real tragedy of the Reformation was that it ended not in victory for one side or the other but as a "drawn battle." The moral and cultural unity of Christendom was shattered, and though Catholic culture survived it was infected by the poison of the new heresy. The responsibility for this final stage rests with those seventeenth century statesmen like Richelieu who put nationalism above religion.

The twenty-three "characters" chosen to illustrate this thesis range in time from Henry VIII to Louis XIV. Together they form a curious company, but Mr. Belloc is not painting a group picture. Like Plato's prisoner released from his shadow cave, he turns his back on the phantoms and myths of Protestant history and views the Reformation leaders as he thinks they really existed. This means that he elevates the fame or notoriety of some, deflates the reputation of others and dismisses still others as mere "symbols." Thomas Cromwell was the "true creator of the English Reformation," Cranmer "no more than a willing agent." Cecil was the "author of Protestant England," Elizabeth simply the subject of a "creative and vital falsehood," "the Elizabethan myth." As pure character portraits the essays are not always as successful as the striking pencil sketches of Jean Charlot which grace each chapter. As stalking horses for the author's ideas, they are always interesting. The general reader will be both entertained and startled by some of his daring speculations on the "if's" and "might-have-been's" of history; the student of the period will more likely be only startled. Probably neither need be reminded that it is often difficult to separate the gold of Mr. Belloc's opinions from the dross.

Fundamentally, he is wrestling with what to a Catholic is one historical aspect of the problem of evil: How, if God is good, can the Reformation be accounted for? For an answer he is driven to what might be called the "plot theory": The English Reformation was primarily "a rising of the rich against the poor," conceived and instigated by Thomas Cromwell, and carried to success by Cecil, "one of the vilest of men that ever lived." The whole thing was partly plot, partly chance. The intellectual poverty of this explanation is evident. It is too simple. It smacks more of the stage than of the realities of human evolution. In a sense, Mr. Belloc is a minor Gibbon, seated among the ruins of an English monastery and musing on the fall of the Christian empire. But unlike his predecessor, he is a man without hope. Gibbon at least believed in his generation and its "enlightenment." Hilaire Belloc believes that his gen-

eration is doomed because of the sins of a handful of sixteenth century statesmen. One wishes that this book might be read by liberal Protestants and neglected by devout Catholics. One fears that the reverse will be true.

E. HARRIS HARBISON.

JOHN—APOLOGIST OR THEOLOGIAN?

JOHN DEFENDS THE GOSPEL, *by* ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL. *Willett, Clark & Company, \$1.50.*

THOSE interested in New Testament subjects will like this book. I found it hard to put down once I had begun reading it. There is a freshness and a directness about it that makes it good reading, and profitable, too. The subject is the apologetic interest of the Fourth Evangelist, and the effort is to show that the manifold differences between John and the Synoptists, and between John and Paul, reflect the former's attempt to recast the gospel narrative in terms not objectionable to intelligent gentiles of the second century. Thus by omitting exorcisms and transforming miracles into signs and symbols, John guards against the charge that Jesus was a magician. By subordinating the forerunner, by setting Jesus at odds with the Jews as a whole, and by depicting him as the God manifest, he proved that Jesus was neither a Baptist nor a (hateful) Jew, nor even a mere man. By removing the element of self-humiliation and of ministration to the social debtor classes, he indicated that Jesus was not a friend of sinners or a member of the proletariat. By charging the Jews with the blame for Jesus' death and stating that it was both willed by Jesus and in reality a glorification, he showed that Jesus was not a criminal. By transforming the traditional eschatology and describing Jesus as the Logos, he pointed out that Christianity was not a superstition. By reducing the traditional emphasis upon the kingdom of God and interpreting Jesus' kingship as a kingship of truth, he counteracted the impression that Christianity was a revolutionary movement.

Since Baldensperger (1898) the apologetic interests of the Fourth Evangelist have been receiving wider and wider recognition. Omitting nothing of importance that has hitherto been pointed to as reflecting these interests (I did not actually spot a reference to anti-docetic polemic, but this may be an oversight on my part), Colwell has added a wealth of new observations and, by copious comparison with the issues confronted by the second century apologists, has given clarity and point to the evangelist's undertaking. This Scott had previously done only in a general way.

By no means the least valuable feature of Colwell's presentation is that it inevitably raises certain questions in the mind of the careful reader. These questions concern not so much the fact of the evangelist's changes in the Gospel record, as the matter of when the motives underlying them may be said to be dominantly apologetic, and when theological, or a mixture of both. Here there

is undoubtedly room for a valid difference of opinion. John has the fortunate or unfortunate habit of never quite adopting a completely one-sided position on the issues he confronts, issues such as the world, the Jews, Christology, salvation, the sacraments, the last things. You think you have him pinned down to an "advanced" view, and he surprises you at the next turn by his conservatism. Dr. Colwell's reaction to this feature of John's Gospel is entirely plausible: such conservative elements of the record are "inherited" and "have not, and could not have, any important role to play in his Christian thinking." It is precisely here that I cannot be so sure. I am inclined to believe that for all its advance, John's point of view was more of the "both-and" than of the "either-or" type. It seems to me that for John the supremely important thing is that the transcendent Logos really became Jesus Christ, that while the Jews were Jesus' enemies, a "true Israelite" was the finest stuff for a good disciple; that while the Spirit is the thing, the sacraments are none the less invaluable as the media of its working; that the death of Jesus is both glorification and sacrifice; and that while eternal life is present now, there is also a real resurrection. If there be a higher unity into which these conflicting elements resolve themselves, it may be that certain of the changes which John makes in the record are at least equally determined by theology and apology, and certain ones may be dominantly theological in origin. The problem, then, is to what extent the ancients were correct in calling John *theologos*.

To try, as Colwell does, to establish the identity and character of the group for which the Fourth Evangelist wrote is extremely worth while. Clarity on such subjects is much needed. Two things are necessary before the characterization can really become complete. We need to know whether the really apologetic elements of the Gospel represent an attack upon a number of fronts, fronts visible to a leader but not necessarily all within the purview of the group in which he stands. We need to know the historical roots of those mystical and theological concepts to which he gives a dominant place in his religious thinking. Philo and the Hermetica still fall short of a complete explanation at this point. It would be most helpful if Dr. Colwell, with another such excellent work to his credit, would now give us a study of the theology of John.

CARL H. KRAELING.

THE BIBLE IN A NEW DRESS

THE BIBLE, DESIGNED TO BE READ AS LIVING LITERATURE, *edited by* ERNEST SUTHERLAND BATES. *Simon and Schuster*, \$3.75.

THE house of Simon and Schuster announced some months ago that it was planning to publish an edition of the Bible in a form adapted for reading as literature rather than in the traditional form better suited to the purposes of the student. The publication was awaited with great interest and has now been generally hailed as a conspicuous and significant achievement. One of

the more important book clubs has adopted it for wide distribution and literary critics are giving it enthusiastic notice.

It hardly needs to be said that every lover of the Bible will take pleasure in a publication project which gives such promise of making the Bible more widely known, although one should not be under any illusion as to how many even of those who are purchasing the book will actually read it. Ignorance of the Bible on the part of our contemporaries, as compared with certain other generations, has far deeper causes than the rather uninviting format of traditional Bible publication. Still, that format has been undoubtedly a contributing cause, and any effort to modify it in the direction of greater beauty is to be welcomed, particularly an effort so strikingly successful as this book represents. Typography, make-up, paper and binding combine to produce a magnificent volume, and if the primary intention of the publishers was to present the established Bible text in an attractive, appropriate and distinguished form, they have carried their purpose through in a manner which can only be described as superb. This is so true that one hesitates to make the strictures which a careful examination of the contents of the volume suggests.

The version used for the most part is the King James of 1611. The title page states that it is employed throughout, but a note tells us that the Revised Version is followed in the case of Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs. Since the superiority of the King James Version as literature is asserted again and again in the short introduction and a note, it is strange that the editor finds a later version superior only in books making the heaviest literary demands upon the translator. The title page is misleading in yet another respect. The volume is not "the Bible." Few books of the Bible have been presented in their entirety and Chronicles, Ephesians, II and III John, the Pastorals, Jude and I and II Peter are omitted entirely. The books commonly known as the Apocrypha have been properly regarded as an integral part of the King James Bible and sections of Susanna, Tobit, Judith, I Esdras, I Maccabees, Ben Sira and Wisdom have been included. The selection of materials is on the whole good and follows the general lines of other abridgements of the Bible. The books or excerpts of books are arranged in presumed chronological order, so far as this can be done without disturbing the adopted categories of "Historical Books," "Prophetic Books" and the like.

A student of the New Testament will wonder at the omission of Ephesians and I Peter. And when, looking for reasons for the omission, he finds these epistles referred to as "unimportant" and "minor," his perplexity is deepened. Doubts of the thoroughness with which the editor has done his job are further raised when one reads the short introductory paragraphs, in which he attempts to give the settings of the several books. For the most part he has followed Professor Edgar J. Goodspeed and, one suspects, has depended particularly upon the brief historical introductions which appear in Professor Goodspeed's

Short Bible. One is at a loss to know, however, where he discovered that the Philippians were Asiatics. That I Corinthians was written in Philippi and Galatians in Rome, he doubtless gathered from the colophons in the King James Bible—but what a source for a critical editor to depend on! The placing of Galatians at Rome is particularly strange in view of the fact that in his introduction to the later letter to the Romans, the editor points out that Paul had not at that time visited the imperial city. On page 1172 we are told that Philemon was a “Christian landowner of Laodicea” but on page 1261, that he was a “wealthy citizen of Colossae.” Ephesians is evidently included among the “unimportant pseudonymous epistles” but in a note on “Ephesus” (page 1249), “seat of one of the seven churches of Asia Minor,” Paul is said to have “addressed an epistle to its inhabitants.” And what can we say of the propriety of publishing ancient letters with the name of the writer neatly placed at the end of the letter on the right hand side of the page as though it followed a “Sincerely yours”? This procedure is followed except in the cases of the Epistle of James, where the ancient style is adopted, and of Galatians, where the name of the sender appears both at the beginning and at the end. No explanation is given in either instance of the apparent inconsistency. These are some of the more easily citable indications of a lack of scholarly care, which shows itself occasionally in more pervasive and more important ways.

This is hardly the place to raise the question of the relative value of the various English versions and translations of the Bible, but is there not a great deal of purely conventional reverence for the Authorized Version? Critics who have never read it pay tribute to its high literary excellence, to the depreciation of later texts, which likewise they have not read. That parts of the King James Bible, both because of unquestionable intrinsic worth and because liturgical and devotional usage has invested them with peculiar value, are and will probably always be unreplaceable, no one who knows either English literature or English religious tradition would deny; but that the whole of it has any such quality or status is open to serious doubt. It is a revealing fact that although the present editor throws the halo of the Authorized Version over all his work, he actually presents some of the most literary parts of the Bible in a later version. Does one dare suggest that translations by Moffatt, Goodspeed and others are at many points superior to the Authorized Version not only in accuracy but also in literary excellence? Certainly, if clarity is one of the requisites of good writing, this is true. May it not be, for example, that the epistles of the New Testament are on the whole better literature in Goodspeed or Moffatt than in King James? In other words, it is perhaps true that a Bible ideally adapted to be read as living literature would involve more than the mere adoption of the two English versions Dr. Bates has employed—the best of modern as well as of older scholarship and literary skill going into its creation.

But every book should be judged primarily in the light of what its makers

have aimed to achieve. The purpose of the makers of this one was to publish selected parts of an English classic in a form as appropriate and as beautiful as possible. In that undertaking they have succeeded admirably.

JOHN KNOX.

OTHER REVIEWS

THE HIGHER LEARNING, by ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS. *Yale University Press*, \$2.

ALTHOUGH many are disagreeing fundamentally or in detail with the ideas about education to which President Hutchins of the University of Chicago has been giving wide and vigorous expression during recent months, few will deny that he has "started something" of great importance. Most observers of higher education in America—not to mention workers in the field—have been keenly dissatisfied with the way college and university education has been conceived, organized and conducted, and the times are ripe for reform. Dr. Hutchins' own proposals for change first appeared in his book, *No Friendly Voice*, which was reviewed at some length in the last issue of CHRISTENDOM. The present book, the Storrs Lectures at Yale University for 1936, is a very suggestive elaboration of what is at least implicit in the earlier volume.

President Hutchins explains the difficulties of the modern American university largely by its failure to maintain the true character and function of the university, which is to promote "intellectual training and development." This function can be maintained in his judgment only if clear distinctions are made and preserved between the university on the one hand and the several fields of general education, professional training and mere fact-finding research on the other. He proposes that general education shall be carried on by what is generally known as the junior college; that merely vocational training ("the tricks of the trade") shall be given by professional schools near but not integral to the university; and that the kind of research which exhausts itself in the accumulating of information shall be conducted likewise in extramural institutes.

The content of general education should not be "child-centered" but centered about the "permanent studies" which "constitute our intellectual inheritance." These are the classics, grammar, rhetoric, logic and mathematics. The atomistic and chaotic nature of the contemporary university curriculum must be transformed by the introduction of some adequate unifying principle. Deploring the inability of theology to provide this principle, as it did for the medieval university, Dr. Hutchins proposes the metaphysics to which Greek intellectual life was oriented. "I am not here arguing," he says, "for any specific theological or metaphysical system. I am insisting that consciously or unconsciously we are always trying to get one. I suggest that we shall get a better one if we recognize

explicitly the need for one and try to get the most rational one we can. We are, as a matter of fact, living today by the haphazard, accidental, shifting shreds of a theology and metaphysics to which we cling because we must cling to something. If we can revitalize metaphysics and restore it to its place in the higher learning, we may be able to establish rational order in the modern world as well as in the universities."

To make any adequate comment upon a thesis so revolutionary must lie outside the province of a brief review, but we cannot forbear saying that however defective may be President Hutchins' solution, as a whole or in spots, he has not failed to put his finger on the problem. A confused, divided university can hardly hope to produce an integrated, effective person.

THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY, *by* FRANCIS PICKENS MILLER. *University of North Carolina Press, \$1.*

An excellent discussion of what is required, in the large and in particular, if the democratic way is to be maintained in America. It rests upon the thesis that the function of government is to establish liberty and that liberty is the "condition in which there is the most perfect balance between freedom and security." Those who find congenial the position stated by Professor Hoffman in his article, "The Property Basis of Liberty," in this issue of *CHRISTENDOM*, will like this book. But, as a thoroughgoing and constructive diagnosis of the American political situation made from a consistent point of view, it deserves the attention of distributist and collectivist alike.

THE DESERT FATHERS, TRANSLATION FROM THE LATIN, *by* HELEN WADDELL. *Henry Holt & Company, \$2.50.*

Here the reader will find the early Christian ascetics speaking for themselves in translations accurate yet clear and freshly idiomatic, and here he will also find the author of *Peter Abelard* speaking for them in introductions instinct with religious insight and poetic expression. As editor and translator she comes between us and the Desert Fathers only to disarm us of our prejudices and to adjust evenly the weights on the balances of our judgment. In introduction, deft characterization and wise selection, she sets before us the Desert Fathers living again in that world of asceticism which is so alien to the modern scene. Some of the literary Fathers become the more memorable in her crisp characterizations. Does Augustine criticize Jerome? "The old lion does but shift an indolent paw." What we admire in Jerome's approaching Rufinus to demolish him is "the smiling ease of the approach, the sinister lightness on his toes." Even more effective is the description in the general introduction of the values the Egyptian Fathers found in solitude. Written with sympathy but impartially, this volume should introduce many a layman as well as the student and cleric to the religious experience of these Christian ascetics from the long

ago who left the bright day of paganism for a Christianity that was "a starlit darkness, into which a man steps and comes suddenly aware of a whole universe, except that part of it which is beneath his feet. . . ."

SPRING UP, O WELL, *by* DOROTHY RUTH KAHN. *Henry Holt & Company*, \$2.75.

High enthusiasm for Zionism and remarkable detachment in the evaluation of its accomplishments so far combine to make this intimate account of present Jewish activities in Palestine both interesting and valuable. Even the frequent use of staccato phrases in lieu of sentences and the profusion of images come to seem appropriate to the author's zest for her subject, although such exclamations as "I wanted to wrap threads of pathos around the chorus of 'Hatikvah' and spill it unrestrainedly over the deck" and "I wanted to wave a bunch of too-red roses until the petals covered the oily water beneath" strike one as overdoing a good thing. The style is rich and vital. The very hammer beats of the rapid building of Tel Aviv, the all-Jewish city, strike our ears and Jerusalem sits "combing her hair" in all her ancient dignity.

COMMONSENSE GRAMMAR, *by* JANET RANKIN AIKEN. *Thomas Y. Crowell Company*, \$2.

Here is a book which will be enjoyed by lovers of literature as well as of language. It is a delightfully written account of the why and what of English grammar, with verbs and adverbs, nouns and pronouns made as fascinating as the characters in a good story. Even the paradigms in Dr. Aiken's grammar are alive and interesting. One to whom grammar means memorizing an endless number of arbitrary rules and equally arbitrary exceptions will be amazed to discover how much of reason and romance lies in it and will wonder why "grammars" have not more frequently revealed it.

CAESAR'S MANTLE, THE END OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC, *by* FERDINAND MAINZER. *Viking Press*, \$3.

A fascinatingly told story of the fifteen years between the assassination of Julius Caesar and the accession of Octavius, years brilliant with great personalities and fateful with great events. Although an authentic work of history, the volume reads like a novel. It has been translated from the German by Eden and Cedar Paul.

